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INTRODUCTION

Few subjects have produced as much legal commentary in
such a brief period of time as the issue of compulsory drug testing has generated over the past two years.' Despite this wealth of
analysis, both courts and commentators are far from reaching a
consensus on the matter. This comment attempts to give an
overview of the major issues which have been, and most still are,
the object of heated controversy. The state of modem technology is discussed at length, followed by a review of constitutional
issues, with an emphasis on Third Circuit opinions as a jurisdiction highly representative of the divergent schools of thought.
Although drug urinalysis litigation has been around for over
a decade,2 the recent surge in legal commentary is due to a great
I See, e.g., Cecere & Rosen, Legal Implications of Substance Abuse Testing in the Workplace, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859 (1987); Flannery, UnilaterallyInstituted Drug Screen
Tests in the Unionized PrivateIndustry, 38 LAB. L.J. 756 (1987); Lock, Drug Testing in the
NFL and the Obligation to Bargain under the NLRA, 3 LAB. LAw. 239 (1987); Lock, The
Legality under the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts by NationalFootballLeague Owners to Unilaterally Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1987); Miller,
Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees, 48 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 201 (1986); Rivest, Implications of the FourthAmendment to the U.S. Constitution in
Regard to Mandatory Drug Testing, 60 Wis. B. BuLL. 19 (1987); Rothstein, Drug Testing
in the Workplace: The Challenge to Employment Relations and Employment Law, 63 CHI.KENT L. REV. 683 (1987); Comment, Random Drug Testing of Government Employees, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1335 (1987); Comment, Yellow Rows of Test Tubes Due: Process Constraints on Discharges of Public Employees Based on Drug Urinalysis Testing, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1623 (1987); Comment, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis
Constitutional in California, 19 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 1451 (1986); Note, A Proposalfor
Mandatory Drug Testing of Federal Civilian Employees, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV. 322 (1987);
Note, Behind the Hysteria of Compulsory Drug Screening in Employment, 25 DuQ. L. REV.
597 (1987); Note, Dragnet Drug Testing in Public Schools and the FourthAmendment, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 852 (1986); Note, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Need for Quality
Assurance Legislation, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 887 (1987); Note, Drug Testing ofFlorida'sPublic
Employees, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101 (1987); Note, Drug Testing of Government Employees and the Fourth Amendment, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1063 (1987); Note, Employee
Drug Testing and the Fourth Amendment, 38 LAB. LJ. 611 (1987); Note, Employee Drug
Testing-Balancingthe Employer's Right to Know with the Employee's Right to Privacy, 1987
DET. C.L. REV. 27 (1987); Note, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Private Sector
Employers, 85 N.C. L. REV. 832 (1987); Note, Employee Drug Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453 (1987); Note, Lovvom v.
City of Chattanooga: Watering Down Public Employees' Fourth Amendment Rights, 20
MAR. L. REV. 769 (1987); Note, Public Sector Employer Drug Testing Programs:Has Big
Brother Finally Arrived?, 20 MAR. L. REV. 769 (1987); Note, Shoemaker v. Handel and
Urinalysis Drug Testing: Looking for an American Standard, 21 GA. L. REV. 467 (1986);
Note, Urinalysis Testing in Correctional Facilities, 67 B.U.L. REV. 475 (1987); Note,
Urinalysis Testing of Private Employees: A Callfor Legislation in Pennsylvania, 91 DICK. L.
REV. 1015 (1987).

2 See Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 533 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (upholding drug testing of bus drivers who
are involved in serious accidents or who are suspected of being under the influence
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extent to the Chief Executive's determination to test federal employees. On September 15, 1986, President Ronald Reagan directed the heads of all federal agencies to establish drug' testing
programs using whatever criteria may be necessary to insure a
drug-free working environment.4 Under the presidential directive, all government employees may be tested where there is a
reasonable suspicion of drug use or where there is a concern for
safety.- Random testing, however, is authorized only for employof drugs or alcohol).
s The United States Code defines drug as:
(A) [A]rticles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopaedia,
official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States or, official
National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than
food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man
or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a component of
any article specified in clauses (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph; but
does not include devices or their components, parts, or accessories.
21 U.S.C. § 3 2 1(2 )(g)(1) (1982).
The term drug, as used throughout this comment, has the same legal meaning
as "controlled substance." See infra note 15. Although alcohol is the "drug of
choice" in America (see infra note 21), because possession and consumption is not
illegal in this country and levels of intoxication can be accurately determined by
means other than testing body fluids, it is usually excluded from the meaning of the
term "drug" when used as a synonym for "controlled substance." See infra note 15.
4 See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1986). The order provides in part:
Sec. 2. Agency Responsibilities.
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall develop a plan for achieving the objective of a drug-free workplace with due consideration of the
rights of the government, the employee, and the general public.
Sec. 3. Drug Testing Programs.
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program to test
for the use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions. The
extent to which such employees are tested and the criteria for such testing shall be determined by the head of each agency, based upon the
nature of the agency's mission and its employee's duties, the efficient
use of agency resources, and the danger to the public health and safety
or national security that could result from the failure of an employee
adequately to discharge his or her position.
Id. at 225-26.
5 Section 3(c) of the order provides:
(c) In addition to the testing authorized in subsections (a) and (b) of
this section, the head of each executive agency is authorized to test an
employee for illegal drug use under the following circumstances:
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion that any employee uses illegal drugs;
(2) In an examination authorized by the agency regarding an accident
or unsafe practice; or
(3) As part of or as a follow-up to counseling or rehabilitation for illegal drug use through an Employee Assistance Program.
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ees in "sensitive positions." 6 These executive provisions are the
last in a series of government drug detection programs which
started six years ago in the Department of Defense.7 In the last
few years, testing to detect drug use has become widespread both
in government and in private enterprises." Municipalities across
Id. at 226.
6 Id. § 3(a). Section 7(d) of the order defines "employees in a sensitive position" as:
(1) An employee in a position that an agency head designates Special
Sensitive, Critical-Sensitive, or Non critical-Sensitive under Chapter 731
of the Federal Personnel Manual or an employee in a position that an
agency head designates as sensitive in accordance with Executive Order
No. 10450, as amended;
(2) An employee who has been granted access to classified information
or may be granted access to classified information pursuant to a determination of trustworthiness by an agency head under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 12356;
(3) Individuals serving under Presidential appointments;
(4) Law enforcement officers As defined in 5 U.S.C. § 8331(20); and
(5) Other positions that the agency head determines involve law enforcement, national security, the protection of life and property, public
health or safety, or other functions requiring a high degree of trust and
confidence.
Id. § 7(d).
At least 1.1 million out of approximately 2 million federal civilian employees
may be considered "sensitive employees." N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1986 at A-I, col.
3.
7 The prevalence of drug use, particularly marijuana, among the returning
Vietnam veterans, prompted the Department of Defense to implement drug detection procedures. See Hanson, Drug Abuse Testing Programs Gaining Acceptance in the
Workplace, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS, June 2, 1986, at 7-8. The Navy, which was identified as the branch with the highest incidence of marijuana use, implemented in
1981 what many consider the best drug detection program in the country. Id. at 8.
The Navy claims an almost 80% drug use reduction for the under-25 age group
from the inception of the program in 1981 to 1984 (47% to 10%). Id. See also
ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS, CONTROLS, AND CONTROVERSIES
(BNA) 27-28 (1986) [hereinafter ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE]. Overall

drug use reduction in the armed forces is estimated at two thirds, from 27% to 9%
in five years. Battle Strategies, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986 at 71. The Department of Defense uses random urinalysis testing. Id.
8 See Englade, Who's Hired and Who's Fired, 14 STUDENT LAw. 20, 22, Apr. 1986;
Rust, Drug Testing. The Legal Dilemma, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 60; The Enemy Within,
TIME, Sept. 15, 1986 at 58, 62; ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7,
at 27-28; Hanson, supra note 7, at 7; Stille, Drug Testing, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 1,
col. 1; Kaufman, The Battle Over Drug Testing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1986 § 6 (Magazine), at 52, 54. L. Abraham, Foreword to FACE OFF WITH AMERICAN DISEASE, A SYMPOSIUM ABOUT SUBSTANCE ABUSE SCREENING, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR CLINICAL
CHEMISTRY RESEARCH SERVICE 3 (Roche Diagnostic Systems, Nov. 1986) [hereinafter FACEOFF WITH THE AMERICAN DISEASE]. The trend has not yet reached the stu-

dent population at large. At least one attempt to test school children has been
summarily disallowed. See Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School
Dist., 211 N.J. Super. 54, 510 A.2d 709 (Ch. Div. 1985); accord Anable v. Ford, 663
F. Supp. 149, 152 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (marijuana urinalysis testing of students vio-
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the country are testing policemen and firefighters. 9 Most common carrier employees, particularly pilots or drivers, must submit to drug testing.' 0 More than 25% of the Fortune 500
companies" as well as all major league baseball,' 2 basketball 3
and football14 teams now test for use of controlled substances.' 5
lates fourth and fourteenth amendments to federal constitution). But see Schaill ex
rel. Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 857 (N.D. Ind.
1988) (random testing of high school student athletes did not violate either fourth
or fourteenth amendments to federal constitution). Parents, however, may very
well do so at home without too much trouble albeit with probably much lower standards of reliability. A Texas manufacturer has offered "home urinalysis kits" which
would allow parents to take urine samples of their children and mail them in a
safety package back to the manufacturer's laboratory for testing. Bringing Home the
Drug Test Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, July 21, 1986 at 56; Sims, Boom in Drug Tests Expected,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1986 at D21, col. 1.
9 See Stille, supra note 8, at 23, col. 1. See also Banzhaf, How to Make Drug Tests
Pass Muster, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 12, 1987, at 13-14.
10 See Parade Mag., Nov. 23, 1986, at 19, col. 4; Rust, supra note 8, at 50-54. One
example of current testing procedures for common carriers can be found in the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) rules as amended December 15, 1985. See
Department of Transportation (FRA) Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad
Operations, 49 C.F.R. § 219 (1987). The FRA requires testing upon "reasonable
suspicion" or after an "accident/incident" if the supervisor believes the employee's
conduct "contributed to the occurrence or severity of the accident or incident," or
if the employee has committed any one of a series of operating infractions. 49
C.F.R. § 219.301 (1987). Recently, the Ninth Circuit declared this testing program
unconstitutional. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575,
587 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988) ("Accidents, incidents or rule
violations, by themselves, do not create reasonable grounds for suspecting that
tests will demonstrate alcohol or drug impairment in one railroad employee, much
less an entire train crew.").
I I See Stille, supra note 8, at 23; Lahey, Whose Rights Are Violated?, NAT'L SAFETY &
HEALTH NEWS, June 1986 at 28; Englade, supra note 8, at 22. See also McClenahen,

The Privacy Invasion, INDUSTRY WEEK, Nov. 11, 1985 at 50.
12 See The Commissioner Gets Tough, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, at 32, May 20, 1985.
1 Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 1986 at BI, B13 col. 3.
14 Rust, supra note 8, at 51; N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, at 12, col. 3; Newark StarLedger, March 20, 1986, at 78, col. 2.
15 "Controlled substance" is defined as "[a]ny narcotic drug so designated by
law." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 298 (5th ed. 1979). Such drugs are listed in the
federal Controlled Substances Act (Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, n.321, 331, 333-34, 360, 372,
281, 801, n.801, 802, n.803, 811-12, 821-22, n.822, 823-29, n.830, 841-52, 871-86,
901-04 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987)) and in various state acts modeled after the Uniform Controlled Substances Act which were enacted "to control the distribution,
classification, sale and use of drugs." See id. Most statutes specifically exclude "distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco" from the scope of the act. E.g., 21
U.S.C. § 802(6) (Supp. IV 1987).
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The generic term "narcotic" is defined as "any drug which dulls the senses or
induces sleep and which commonly becomes addictive after prolonged use."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 922 (5th ed. 1979). It is also defined as:
1 a: a drug (as opium) that in moderate doses dulls the senses, relieves
pain, and induces profound sleep but in excessive doses causes stupor,
coma or convulsions b: a drug (as marijuana or LSD) subject to restriction similar to that of addictive narcotics whether in fact physiologically
addictive and narcotic or not c: something that soothes, relieves or lulls.
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 787 (1987).
Similarly, "narcotic drug" is statutorily defined as:
(A) Opium, opiates, derivatives of opium and opiates, including isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomer, esters, and ethers, whenever the existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible
within the specific chemical designation. Such term does not include
the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium.
(B) Poppy straw and concentrate of poppy straw.
(C) Coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from
which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have
been removed.
(D) Cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of
isomers.
(E) Ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers and salts of isomers.
(F) Any compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of the substances referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (E).
21 U.S.C. § 802(17) (Supp. IV 1987).
"Opiate" is specifically defined as "any drug or other substance having an addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into
a drug having such addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability." Id.
§ 802(18). Consequently, the statutory designation of "controlled substance" includes drugs other than the traditional narcotic-opiates. Hallucinogens marijuana
(usually listed as "cannabis sativa L") and LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide); stimulants cocaine and amphetamine; and depressant barbiturates and glutethimide are
also commonly included in the definition of "controlled substance." See, e.g., 21
U.S.C. § 812 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-5(e), -6(4), -7(c)(1),
-7(d)(1), (3) (West Supp. 1986). The standard for inclusion of a drug in a specific
schedule is based on the following factors: (1) the degree to which the drug is subject to abuse, (2) the degree to which it induces dependency, and (3) the degree of
acceptability for medical use in the United States. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(a), (c),
812(b) (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-3, -5(a), -6(a), -7(a), -8(a), -8.1(a) (West
Supp. 1986). See Annotation, Validity of Delegationto Drug Enforcement Administration of
Authority to Schedule or Reschedule Drugs Subject to Controlled Substances Act, 47 A.L.R.
FED. 869 (1980) for a discussion of the Drug Enforcement Administration's discretion to schedule or reschedule drugs. See also United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930,
939-41 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing drug schedules).
These classifications have received extensive judicial challenge. See United
States v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 287, 288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 876 (1982);
United States v. Stieren, 608 F.2d 1135, 1136-37 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
DiLaura, 394 F. Supp. 770, 772-73 (D. Mass. 1974) (each station classification of
cocaine as narcotic is constitutional despite cocaine's proper pharmacological classification). See also States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1221-22 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, Rodriguez-Camacho v. United States, 410 U.S. 985 (1973);
United States v. LaFroscia, 354 F. Supp. 1338, 1340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (each stating marijuana properly classified as a controlled substance); cf. State v. Nugent, 125
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Illicit 6 drug use has become pandemic in the United
States.' 7 A legacy of the cultural revolution of the 1960's and
125 N.J. Super. 528, 533, 312 A.2d 158, 161 (App. Div. 1973) (classification of
marijuana as a narcotic under previous law was not irrational). But cf. State v.
Carus, 118 N.J. Super. 159, 159-62, 286 A.2d 740, 741-42 (Law Div. 1972) (marijuana improperly classified as narcotic for moving traffic violation). See generally Annotation, Marijuana,Psilocybin, Peyote, or SimilarDrugs of Vegetable Origin as Narcoticsfor
Purposes of Drug Prosecutions, 50 A.L.R.3d 1164 (1973); Annotation, LSD, STP, MDA
or Other Chemically Synthesized Hallucinogenicor Psychedelic Substances as Narcoticsfor Purposes of Drug Prosecutions 50 A.L.R.3d 1284 (1973) (discussing drug classification
under different controlled substance acts).
16 Not all drugs of abuse are necessarily illicit drugs, although almost all are
controlled substances. See supra note 15. Some drugs only become illicit when produced, marketed or used in an unlawful manner. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
See also Exec. Order, supra note 4, at § 7(c). For example, prescription drugs such as
the sedative diazepam (Valium®), the soporific sodium pentobarbitone
(Nembutal®), or the anti-depressant dexamphetamine sulfate (Dexedrine®) are not
illicit when purchased with a legitimate medical prescription. Id. See also W. GARDNER, HANDBOOK OF CHEMICAL SYNONYMS & TRADE NAMES 232, 238, 490 (E.I. Cooke
& R.W.I. Cooke, eds., 8th ed., 1978). Nevertheless, whether legally or illegally obtained, these drugs are subject to abuse when intake exceeds the prescribed dosage
or are used for recreational rather than therapeutic purposes. See Department of
Transportation (FRA) Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations, 52
Fed. Reg. 2,112-20 (1987) [hereinafter DOT Comments (1987)]; but see supra note
10 (discussing recent Ninth Circuit decision holding this drug testing program unconstitutional). The U.S. Attorney General has the power, within certain limits, to
authorize the manufacture, distribution, or dispensation of controlled substances
for specific periods of time. 21 U.S.C. § 822 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). This authorization is carried out through a registration system which allows petitioning registrants who have never been convicted of controlled substance violations to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances when, in the opinion of
the registering authority, the substance is to be used in accordance with all applicable laws "for legitimate, medical, scientific, research, and industrial purposes"
which are "consistent with the public health and safety." See 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)(1),
(6) (1982).
17 The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) collects data from 733 hospital
emergency rooms and 73 medical examiners located primarily in 27 metropolitan
areas including Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas,
Denver, Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New
Orleans, New York, Newark, Norfolk, Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, Phoenix, St.
Louis, San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and Washington, D.C. with a
total population of 72,314,400 (1980 census). NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE
(NIDA), DIvISION OF EPIDEMIOLOGY AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK
(DAWN) 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 5 [hereinafter NIDA]. In 1985, DAWN reported a

total 105,699 drug abuse episodes involving 172,885 different drugs. For the same
period there were 3,562 total drug abuse related deaths involving 7,988 drugs.
(Death statistics do not include New York City because data from the City's medical
examiner was not available.) Id. These statistics are not from random samples of
eligible facilities, but from DAWN reporting facilities in an area comprising approximately one-third of the U.S. population. Id. at 3. The data represent only drug
use incidents resulting in medical crises, not total use. Id. Understandably, it is
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1970's, as the baby boom generation matured and entered the
work force, it brought along its drug habits and its skepticism of
warnings about such "recreational" substances as marijuana and
cocaine.18 Once associated with the marginal elements of society
and the super-rich, drug abuse has invaded the middle class and
it is now found in all sectors of American government, business
and professional life.' 9 It is perhaps this entry into the conservative realms of the bourgeoisie that has triggered a public outcry
against drug use not seen in this country since the turn of the
century.20 The drive against drugs has been fueled by an explosion of media coverage 2 1 which began in the early 1980's with the
discovery of widespread use of controlled substances among major sports figures 22 and culminated with the current "war on
impossible to obtain actual statistics on drug use as it involves a criminal activity.
Englade, supra note 8, at 22. Nevertheless, the NIDA statistics give a general indication of the extent of the problem. See NIDA, supra, at 4-240.
18 See Hoffer, Business War on Drugs, NATION'S BUSINESS, Oct. 1986 at 18, 22;
Korda, What's Wrong with Success?, SELF, Feb. 1987 at 94, 97; The Enemy Within, supra
note 8, at 63-65.
19 See Department of Transportation (FRA) Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in
Railroad Operations, 50 Fed. Reg. 31,508, 31,515 (1985) [hereinafter DOT Comments (1985)]; Dal Cortivo, Substance-Abuse Testing in a Government Laboratory,in FACE
OFF WITH THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 8, at 16; Hoffer, supra note 18, at 18,
19; Lang, America on Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 28, 1986 at 48-49; Speedway to Euphoria, ECONOMIST, June 21, 1986 at 63; Drug Use and Testing, 30 SEC.
MGMT. 18, May 1986; Kaufman, supra note 8, at 54.
20 See The Enemy Within, supra note 8, at 61-65.
21 See Diamond, Acosta & Thornton, Is TV News Hyping America's Cocaine Problem?,
TV GUIDE, Feb. 7, 1987 at 4; Henry, Reportingthe Drug Problem, TIME, Oct. 6, 1986 at
73. Some sources claim that the issue has been overreported, giving Americans a
distorted view of the nature and extent of drug use in the country. Id. While drug
use in the United States may have reached a plateau in the 1980's, the magnitude of
the problem cannot be dismissed as "media hype." The number of people using
cocaine, for example, may not have increased significantly since 1983, but the
deaths attributed to cocaine use have. See The Enemy Within, supra note 8, at 63-65;
Lang, supra note 19, at 50. The increase in the death rate is attributed to higher
concentrations of narcotic intake due to improved refining methods which produce
an almost pure grade drug and to smoking instead of sniffing. The higher concentration can have an instant traumatic effect on some users causing death through
cardiac arrest, respiratory failure, or brain hemorrhage. Id. In addition, experiments with combinations of drugs such as "speedballs" (injections of heroin mixed
with cocaine), or smoking of cocaine combined with PCP (phencyclidine, also
known as "angel dust" or "loveboat"), and the new crystalline cocaine, "crack,"
have not only heightened cocaine dependency, but also accelerated the death rate.
Id. Nevertheless, it should be noted that NIDA report places cocaine deaths a distant third at 643, below heroin/morphine deaths (1,315), and deaths due to alcohol, America's "drug of choice," when ingested in combination with other drugs
(1,288) (New York City metropolitan area not included). NIDA, supra note 17, at
53-55.
22 See Brubaker, A Pipeline Full of Drugs, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 21, 1985 at 18
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drugs."" Recently, the American public has been bombarded
with alarming statistics 24 linking drug use to economic and moral
decay across the nation.25 The connection to organized and
(steroids); Kaplan, Taking Steps to Solve the Drug Dilemma, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May
28, 1984 at 36; Sullivan, In Pittsburgh, the Party May Soon Be Over, SPORTS ILLusTRATED, May 20, 1985 at 34. Between 1980 and 1986, the following major league
baseball figures have been publicly linked to drug use: Darrell Porter, Kansas City
catcher (treated at rehabilitation clinic for drugs and alcohol abuse); FergusonJenkins, Texas pitcher (arrested in Canada for possession of marijuana, cocaine, and
hashish); Alan Wiggins, San Diego outfielder (arrested for cocaine possession,
treated at rehabilitation clinic); Juan Bonilla, San Diego second baseman (treated at
rehabilitation clinic); Tim Raines, Montreal outfielder (treated at rehabilitation
clinic); Ken Landreaux, Los Angeles outfielder (treated at rehabilitation clinic);
Steve Howe, Los Angeles relief pitcher (treated several times at rehabilitation clinics); Lonnie Smith, St. Louis Cardinal outfielder (treated at rehabilitation clinic for
drugs and alcohol abuse); Steve Bedrosian, Atlanta reliever (treated for cocaine
abuse); Claudell Washington, Atlanta outfielder (admitted cocaine dependency);
Willie Wilson, Kansas City outfielder (convicted of attempting to buy cocaine); Willie Aikens, Kansas City first baseman (convicted of attempting to buy cocaine); Vida
Blue, former Kansas City pitcher (convicted of possession of cocaine); Pascual Perez, Atlanta pitcher (convicted in the Dominican Republic of possession of cocaine);
Rod Scurry, Pittsburgh relief pitcher (treated at rehabilitation clinic); Jeff Leonard,
San Francisco pinch-hitter (treated at rehabilitation clinic). See Kaplan, supra, at 45;
Sullivan, supra, at 34. Drug abuse is not restricted to professional baseball: this was
dramatically illustrated in the summer of 1986 by the tragic deaths, a week apart, of
Len Bias, a basketball forward for the University of Maryland who had just been
signed by the Boston Celtics, and football player Don Rogers, a defensive back for
the Cleveland Browns. Both players died of cocaine intoxication. Cocaine Is a
Loaded Gun, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1986 at 26; Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 1986, at BI, B13
col. 3; Wash. Post, June 30, 1986 at D1 col. 1; Wash. Post, June 20, 1986 at Al col.
5 & CI col. 1.
23 The Reagan administration "declared war" on drugs in 1981. See Lang, supra
note 19, at 54. As part of this effort, Mrs. Reagan was later made spokeswoman for
the "just say no" campaign aimed primarily at school children and young teenagers. See Diamond, supra note 21, at 7; Battle Strategies, supra note 7, at 73; Henry,
supra note 21, at 73; Sidey, "It's Morally Wrong", TIME, Oct. 6, 1986 at 22. There
seems to be an inexhaustible supply of drugs coming into this country. It is, therefore, the administration's view that since the supply remains substantially unchecked (only 10% of drug traffic is normally captured), they must direct their
efforts at stemming the demand. See Hoffer, supra note 18, at 22; Battle Strategies,
supra note 7, at 69; The Enemy Within, supra note 8, at 60-62; Lang, supra note 19, at
54.
24 See Kaufman, supra note 8, at 54 (20 million use marijuana and 6 million use
cocaine at least once a month); The Enemy Within, supra note 8, at 62-63 (22 million
tried cocaine; 4.3 million are regular users; 5% of high school seniors smoke marijuana every day); Speedway to Euphoria,supra note 19, at 63 (America consumes half
the world's cocaine; 30 million people have tried cocaine; 6 million are regular
users); Drug Use and Testing, supra note 19, at 18 (cocaine related deaths increased
77% and requests for cocaine abuse treatment 600% between 1983 and 1986);
Englade, supra note 8, at 22 (64% of Americans aged 18-25 tried marijuana at least
once; 28% tried cocaine at least once) (quoting 1982 survey from the National
Center on Drug Abuse of Rockville, Maryland).
25 See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1986); Proclamation No. 5591, 3
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common crime is now unquestionable; 26 the quoted human and
economic costs, staggering. 27 Reports of high incidence of drug
C.F.R. 174 (1986); The Enemy Within, supra note 8, at 60-61.
26 It is estimated that cocaine alone brings $11 billion annual revenues to organized crime. Drug Use and Testing, supra note 19, at 18. See also Washington Report, THE
OFFICE, May 1986 at 31. It is difficult to substantiate any figures. Estimates of total
drug traffic income vary from a low of $27 billion to an incredible $110 billion per
year. The Enemy Within, supra note 8, at 63. A very high proportion of street crime is
linked directly to drug abuse. Id. at 65; see Reagan, Declaring War on OrganizedCrime,
N.Y. Times,Jan. 12, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 26; Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R.
224 (1986). There is a second, "tax free" economy in the United States which
thrives in the shadows of the underworld. Illegal drug traffic accounts for the largest growth sector. A kilo of cocaine which sells for $5,000 to $10,000 in Colombia
retails for $500,000 in the United States. Courtney, Dark Side of Growth: Drugs, N.Y.
Times, April 27, 1986, § 11 (N.J.) at 5, col. 1.
A very high proportion of common crime is also linked directly to drug abuse.
At least one study found that criminals increase their criminal activities between six
and eight times when on drugs. Id.; Bronstein, Study Shows Sharp Rise in Cocaine Use
by Suspects in Crimes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987 at BI, col. 1. Between April and
October of 1984, the United States Department of Justice compiled data on drug
use by people arrested for serious crimes in New York City and Washington, D.C.
The study showed that approximately between 50 and 60% of those arrested used
drugs. Id.; N.Y. Times, June 4, 1986 at A14, col. 6. The same study conducted in
1986 found that, while there was no significant change in the use of most drugs,
cocaine use among criminals in New York City had jumped from 42% in 1984 to
78% in 1986. Bronstein, supra, at BI, col. 4. The crime rate for the same period
had also risen, particularly robberies which had not shown an increase in four
years. They study found that over 70 percent of robbery suspects used cocaine. Id.
See also Purdum, Rise in Major Crimes in City Continues, the Police Report, N.Y. Times,
August 1, 1986 at B4, col. 1 (35 percent of all murders in New York City from
January to June, 1986 were drug related, 20 percent specifically tied to "crack");
Califano, A NationalAttack on Addiction is Long Overdue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1986, at
A35, col. 2 (Justice Department's figures for 1984 showed that "heroin addicts
committed at least 100,000 burglaries, robberies and automobile thefts each day").
For a thorough analysis of the relationship between delinquent activities and drug
abuse (association between common crime and illicit drug use repeatedly established), see Kandel, Simcha-Fagan, & Davies, Risk Factorsfor Delinquency and Illicit
Drug usefrom Adolescence to Young Adulthood, 46J. oF DRUG ISSUES 67 (Winter 1986).
But cf. Inciardi & Pottieger, Drug Use and Crime Among Two Cohorts of Women Narcotics
Users: An EmpiricalAssessment, 46J. oF DRUG ISSUES 91, 101-102 (1986) (Drug abuse
and delinquent activity "are less like cause and effect than they are like parts of the
same adolescent phenomenon."). Noting that the relationship is more prominent
with certain drugs, the authors pointed out that in the study sample "the regular
use of heroin and other narcotics began several years after the onset of criminal
activities." Id.
27 National costs due to lost productivity, lost wages, higher accident rates, and
higher health care expenses caused by drug abuse are estimated to exceed $25
billion annually. Englade, supra note 8, at 22; The Enemy Within, supra note 8, at 63;
Lahey, supra note 11, at 27. Some sources put the cost as high as $100 billion per
year. Hanson, supra note 7, at 8. Nevertheless, alcohol is still by far the "costliest"
drug. The Enemy Within, supra, at 64 (1983 health care costs totaled $59.7 billion for
drug abuse; $116.7 billion for alcohol abuse according to a study by the National
Center for Health Statistics).
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use in both the public and private workplace have prompted massive efforts to eradicate the .problem through identification by
testing, and rehabilitation or dismissal.2 8 Such testing did not go
unchallenged; virtually all programs have been challenged in
court on various constitutional grounds. 9 Private employers,
however, are not subject to the same constitutional restraints as
The impact on industry is particularly critical at a time when the United States
is losing its competitive edge abroad. A profile of a "typical recreational user in the
work force" discloses that such a worker is 22-39 years old and
" Is late three times as often as fellow employees.
" Asks for early dismissal or other time off 2.2 times as often.
" Has 2.5 times as many absences of either or more days.
" Is five times more likely to file a workers' compensation claim.
" Is involved in accidents 3.6 times more frequently than other
workers.
Hoffer, supra note 18, at 19. See also Wiedrich, Help Workers Beat Substance Abuse,
BUSINESS INSURANCE,June 6, 1986, at 24; Lahey, supra note 11, at 27. Drug abusers
are also three times more likely to case injuries to themselves and others, plus they
are more likely to steal cash, products or equipment from the workplace. Id. See
also DOT Comments (1985), supra note 19, 50 Fed. Reg. at 31,514-17 (prevalence
of alcohol and drug abuse among railroad employees posing a significant safety
problem). See generally ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 1-12
(statistical analysis of chemical abuse in the workforce).
28 See The Enemy Within, supra note 8, at 60-62; Weidrich, supra note 27, at 24.
Detection of drug abuse does not always mean dismissal. The investment an employer has in an otherwise valuable employee and social considerations have
prompted many employers to set up Employee Assistance Programs (EAP's) to
counsel and rehabilitate alcohol and drug addicts. Id. Failure to rehabilitate, however, usually means dismissal. See ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note
7, at 79-124.
29 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988) (customs officials); McDonell v. Hunter,
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (corrections employees); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 802 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986)
(railway employees); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 577 (1986) (horse-racing jockeys); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union
v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (transit employees); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(armed forces); Mack v. United States, 653 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 814
F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1987) (FBI agent); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986) (fire fighters); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga.
1985) (public utility employees); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (prisoners); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985)
(police officers); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford School Dist., 211 N.J.
Super. 54, 510 A.2d 709 (Ch. Div. 1986) (students); Patchogue-Medford Congress
of Teachers v. Board of Educ. of the Patchogue-Medford Union Free School Dist.,
119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456
(1987) (school board employees).
3o See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-03 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Krohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837
(1982); ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 60; Hanson, supra
note 7, at 13. See also Marie, "Letters to the Editor," STUDENr LAWYER, April 1987 at 3.
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the government.3 ° Consequently, most current litigation involves only public employers, or employers in highly regulated
private areas. 3 '
Drug use in the public sector and in most government regulated activities is of particular concern as it may affect both public
safety and national security. Heightened perception of such dangers has gone a long way towards deglamorizing dope. Whether
or not the extent of the problem is as serious as depicted, the
original resistance to drug testing is changing into conditional
acceptance. There is a conservative wind blowing across this
country and the question is no longer whether or not to test, but
how to test.

II.

THE MECHANICS OF TESTING

Employers who make the decision to test for drug abuse
among their employees are faced with procedural problems: the
system used to select employees for testing and the testing
method itself must withstand judicial challenges.
Although
public employers are subject to more constitutional constraints
than private employers, 3 both must insure that the test used is
reliable;3 4 that all positive results are confirmed 3 5 by a different,
more accurate method of analysis; 3 6 and that the integrity of the
Hanson, supra note 7, at 13.
See McClenahen, supra note 11, at 50-53; Marini, The Corporate Experience-A
Case History, in FACE OFF WITH THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 8, at 10.
33 See supra note 30.
34 See Marini, supra note 32, at 10; ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra
note 7, at 30, 68. "The success or failure of an analysis is often critically dependent
upon the proper selection of method." D. SKOOG & D. WEST, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 5 (3d ed. 1976). Research scientists can choose from an
increasing array of analytical methods. They usually choose on the basis of "speed,
convenience, accuracy, availability of equipment, number of analyses, amount of
sample that can be sacrificed, and concentration range of the analytes." Id. In the
commercial environment, however, cost often tops the list and modifies all other
considerations. See Rosenthal, Cutting Costs in Clinical Chemistry, MED. LAB OBS. 31,
July, 1984. See also Stille, supra note 8, at 23; Englade, supra note 8, at 23.
35 See Hanson, supra note 7, at 9-11. See also infra note 49.
36 Accuracy, in this context, indicates "nearness of a measurement to its accepted value and it is expressed in terms of error." SKOOG, supra note 34, at 45
(emphasis in original). It should not be confused with precision which denotes reproducibility of results, i.e., obtaining the same numerical value when measurements are made in an identical way. Id. at 44. Assuming there is an amount X of
drug in the sample and test a shows a measurement of X-1 while test b shows a
measurement of X, test b is more accurate than test a. However, if repeated measurements of the same sample using test a always show a measurement of X-1 while
test b shows a variation, sometimes X, sometimes X-1, then test a is more precise
than text b. See id.
3r
32
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sample3 7 to be analyzed is maintained throughout by proper
chain-of-custody procedures.38
A.

The Tests

The expansion in drug testing correlates to the modem
evolution of physical chemistry 9 and the biological sciences.4 °
Highly sophisticated laboratory equipment and analytical methods can now identify minute concentrations 4 ' of organic compounds4 2 in biological fluids.43 Dramatic discoveries in
enzymatic analysis 44 during the past twenty years have led to the
37 Unless otherwise indicated, the term "sample" throughout this comment,
when used in the context of testing for drug use, is intended to mean urine sample.
38 See Jatlow, Overview and Assessment of the Challenges, in FACE OFF WITH THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 8, at 9; ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note
7, at 30-31.
39 The application of the laws of physics to the study of chemical substances has
given rise to a variant-some might consider it a separate discipline-of both chemistry and physics known as physical chemistry. 10 McGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 263 (1982) [hereinafter McGRAw-HILL]. This field of
study has experienced extraordinary growth since World War II, developing new
methodology particularly in the area of energy transformation and chemical interaction of substances. Adlar, Stock & Whitham, Gas Chromatography, in 2B COMPREHENSIVE ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY, 55-57 (C.L. Wilson, D.W. Wilson & C.R.N.
Strouts, eds., 1968).
40 See Bergmeyer & Gawehn, Brief History and Definition, in 1 METHODS OF ENZYMATIC ANALYSIS 2-7 (H.U. Bergmeyer, ed., 1983).
41 See Jatlow, supra note 38, at 4; Graff, Automating a Research Lab, HIGH TECH,
Nov. 1985 at 45; Alpert, How Technology Transfer is Changing Lab Medicine, MEDICAL
LABORATORY OBSERVER, Jan. 1986 at 27; Dal Cortivo, supra note 19, at 17; 23 R.
KIRK & D. OTHMER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, TRACE AND RESIDUE
ANALYSIS, 310 (3d ed. 1978).
42 A compound is a definite substance formed by combining specific elements or
radicals in fixed proportions by weight. WEBSTER NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
270 (1987). An organic compound is a compound containing carbon. Id. at 831.
Almost all drugs of abuse are organic compounds. See U.S. PAT. No. 3,975,237 at 7
(K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Aug. 17, 1976).
43 Biological fluids are fluids produced by living organisms, such as blood,
urine, saliva, tears, etc. The biological fluids normally used in drug testing are
urine and blood, although saliva could also be used to detect some drugs such as
cannabinoids (marijuana). See ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7,
at 31-32.
44 Enzymatic analysis is a type of analytical chemistry concerned with enzymes
and their catalytic properties. See Bergmeyer & Gawehn, supra note 40, at 5. Enzymes are protein molecules, usually of high molecular weight, produced by living
cells. They are principally catalysts, that is, they accelerate or alter biochemical
reactions while themselves remaining unchanged; but they can also initiate such
reactions. See 5 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 137-44. See generally Bergmeyer &
Gawehn, supra note 40, at 2-5; Moss, Nomenclature and Units in Enzymology, in 1 METHODS OF ENZYMATIC ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 7-14; Bergmeyer, Fields ofApplication,
in 1 METHODS OF ENZYMATIC ANALYSIS supra note 40, at 15-21. Enzymes are essential to life processes, most notably metabolism (the sum of all chemical and physical
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commercial development of several immunogenic processes for
drug detection." 5 These processes, or "immunoassays," '46 have
reactions that make possible assimilation of nutrients and disposal of wastes in a
living organism) and immunization (the production of antibodies as protection
against invasion by foreign organisms or substances). 5 McGRAw-HILL, supra note
39, at 137-44. Through the metabolic process, enzymes digest (attack and break
down) organic compounds, such as drugs of abuse, into smaller molecules which
are either assimilated or excreted from the body through biological fluids. Id. The
substance subject to attack by an enzyme is called a substrate; the substance produced or converted through the metabolic activity of an enzyme is called a metabolite. Id.

See also W. DEGRUYTER, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOCHEMISTRY 272

(1983).
Enzymes are highly specific; that is, a given enzyme will only react with a certain substrate or closely related compounds and not others. This affinity or close fit
between an enzyme and a given substrate has been described as a "lock and key."
See Bergmeyer & Gawehn, supra note 40, at 3-4; 5 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at
141. The specificity of enzymes is also a factor in the immunization process. When
a foreign body invades the bloodstream of a vertebrate, a substance in the foreign
body stimulates the production of antibodies which neutralize the invader. The
substance that induces the formation of antibodies is called an antigen. Antigens
are usually proteins or carbohydrates, such as enzymes and toxins, of high molecular weight. Antibodies are proteins which react specifically with a given type of
antigen, by combining or "binding" to the antigen and ideally, eliminating it. See
id. at 5; Bergmeyer, supra, at 16; Oellerich, Principles of Enzyme Immunoassays, in 1
METHODS OF ENZYMATIC ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 237; 1 McGRAw-HILL, supra, at
608-10; 7 id. at 40-42.
45 See Bergmeyer & Gawehn, supra note 40, at 5. Screening for drug abuse
originated in the 1960s as a service to methadone treatment clinics and has
emerged as a distinct discipline during the past two decades. Jatlow, supra note 38,
at 4. The street availability of new natural and synthetic drugs of abuse has greatly
stimulated the growth of research in drug testing techniques. Id. at 6. Traditionally, clinical facilities were equipped to deal with heroin, amphetamines, barbiturates and methadone. During the last twenty years, the increasing popularity of
marijuana, cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), the benzodiazepines and other hallucinogens, stimulants, and sedatives has taxed researchers to find new detection methods. Id. Of particular interest are the so-called "designer drugs," or synthetic drug
variations or "analogs" of controlled substances which induce a similar "high" as
illicit drugs. Lang, supra note 19, at 50, 53. Most of these "designer drugs" are
variations of fentanyl (Sublimaze®), meperidine and PCP, such as MDMA ("Ecstasy"), which was outlawed by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
on July 1, 1985. Id. Because designer drugs are slightly different from banned
substances, until recently, they did not fall automatically under the Controlled Substances Act. Thus, they could be sold legally until specifically included in the controlled substances schedules. Id. However, no sooner a "designer drug" was
outlawed than another took its place: two new synthetic drugs, "Eve" (an MDMA
analog) and "Rhapsody," appeared in the "legal" street market immediately after
MDMA was outlawed. Id. At last, Congress included analogs in general, "to the
extent intended for human consumption," within the statutory schedule. 21 U.S.C.
§ 813 (Supp. IV 1987). One reason these analogs are so readily available is that
apparently they can be created and manufactured by anyone with some college
chemistry background. Lang, supra note 19, at 53. Drug screening researchers
must constantly develop new tests to keep up with the expanding choice in drugs.
The new immunogenic processes have made it possible to create screening tests
specifically for each new drug with relative ease. See infra note 46.
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revolutionized drug testing for their simplicity of use and fast results at a reasonable cost.47 Often sold as "kits" for either
clinical or on-site use,4 8 they have made systematic screening for
46 An "assay" is a process of analysis "to determine the presence, absence or
quantity of one or more components" in a given sample. WEBSTER'S NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 108 (1987). It is also "the tabulated result of assaying." Id.
Immunoassays are assays which use the antigenic ability of enzymes to produce
antibodies specific to an organic substance or family of substances to detect and
measure such substances in a given sample. 7 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 4142. Oellerich, supra note 44, at 233-37. The introduction of monoclonal antibodies, which have specific affinity for a given antigen within a family of antigens,
made possible the commercial development of the enzyme immunoassays. Id.; Alpert, Emerging Developments in Laboratory Technology, MED. LAB. OBS., Sept. 1983 at
36. See also U.S. PAT. No. 3,817,837 at 2-3, 8 (K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Aug. 18,
1974), U.S. PAT. No. 3,867,366 at 1 (K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Feb. 18, 1975),
U.S. PAT. No. 3,875,011 at 1-2 (K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Apr. 1, 1975); U.S.
PAT. No. 3,878,187 at 1 (R. Schneider & 0. Wagner) (Apr. 15, 1975); U.S. PAT No.
3,884,898 at 1 (R. Schneider) (May 20, 1975); U.S. PAT. No. 3,887,698 at 1-4 (H.
McConnell & G. Humphries) (June 3, 1975); U.S. PAT. No. 3,888,866 at 1-2 (R.
Leute & G. Bolz) (June 10, 1975); U.S. PAT. No. 3,905,871 at 2-7 (K. Rubenstein &
E. Ullman) (Sept. 16, 1975); U.S. PAT No. 3,935,074 at 2-5 (K. Rubenstein & R.
Leute) (Jan. 27, 1976); U.S. PAT. No. 3,975,237 at 2-5 (K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman)
(Aug. 17, 1976); U.S. PAT. No. 3,996,344 at 1-2 (J. Gross) (Dec. 7, 1976); U.S. PAT.
No. 4,022,878 at 1-5 (J. Gross) (May 10, 1977), U.S. PAT. No. 4,064,228 at 1-4 (J.
Gross) (Dec. 20, 1977); U.S. PAT. No. 4,282,325 at 2-7 (K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman)
(Aug. 4, 1981), U.S. PAT. No. 4,376,825 at 2-7 (K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Mar.
15, 1983) (enzyme-labelled immunoassay patents); and U.S. PAT. No. 3,690,834 at
1-5 (A. Goldstein, R. Leute & E. Ullman) (Sept. 12, 1972); U.S. PAT. No. 3,704,282
at 1-2 (S. Spector) (Nov. 28, 1972); U.S. PAT. No. 3,709,868 at 1-2 (S. Spector) (Jan.
9, 1973); U.S. PAT. No. 4,016,146 at 1-3 (J. Soares) (Apr. 5, 1977); U.S. PAT. No.
4,041,076 at 1-4 (R. AveniaJ. Christenson & B. Pecherer) (Aug. 9, 1977); U.S. PAT.
No. 4,053,459 at 1-3 (J. Christenson) (Oct. 11, 1977), U.S. PAT. No. 4,102,979 at 13 (J. Christenson) (July 25, 1978), U.S. PAT. No. 4,107,285 at 1-2 U. Christenson)
(Aug. 15, 1978), U.S. PAT. No. 4,182,879 at 1-3 U. Christenson) (Jan. 8, 1980)
(radioimmunoassay patents). See also infra note 50 for an explanation of labelling
technique.
47 Depending on the volume and the type of drug to be detected, immunoassays
range in cost from $5 to $20 per sample tested. This compares very favorably with
the cost of traditional chemical tests, such as gas chromatography where the cost
ranges from $80 to $100 per sample tested. See Englade, supra note 8, at 23; Stille,
supra note 8, at 24; Rust, supra note 8, at 51. See also Why Drug Testing Can Be a Very
Bad Trip, DISCOVER, March 1986 at 12. But cf. Rosenthal, supra note 34, at 36-38.
48 See Bluestone, On-The-Job Drug Tests: Bonanza or Bane?, CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec.
10, 1986 at 12; Low-Cost Kit For Drug Screening Now Available, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS,
Dec. 8, 1986 at 5. See generally HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE INC., ROCHE DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS, ABUSCREEN® RADIOIMMUNOASSAY FOR AMPHETAMINES (Package Insert) Uan.
1986) [hereinafter ROCHE, ABUSCREEN® AMPHETAMINE RIA]; HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE
INC., ROCHE DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS, ABUSCREEN® RADIOIMMUNOASSAY

FOR CANNABI-

NOIDS (Package Insert) (Aug. 1985) [hereinafter ROCHE, ABUSCREEN® CANNABINOID

RIA]; HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE INC., ROCHE DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS, ABUSCREEN® SYSTEM
(Price listing) (Jan 1, 1987) [hereinafter ROCHE, PRICE LISTING]; SYVA Co., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SYVA AND DRUG ABUSE TESTING 2 (1985) [hereinafter SYVA Co., QUESTIONS]; SYVA Co., EMIT® TESTING AND DRUGS OF ABUSE
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drug abuse economically feasible for most employers in the
United States. 49
There are several types of immunoassays of which two, the
"enzyme-labelled" 50 immunoassay (EIA) 51 and the radioimmunoassay (RIA),52 are the best known and most commonly used
for drug screening.53 Another test, thin-layer chromatography
(1983) [hereinafter SYVA Co. EMIT® TESTING].
49 Screens are initial tests, sometimes made on-site through "kits." See supra
note 48. Whether screens are made on-site or at an independent laboratory, they
are only meant as a first step subject to confirmation by a different method. See
Hanson, supra note 7, at 9;Jatlow, supra note 38, at 6-7; SYVA Co., QUESTIONS, supra
note 48, at 3-6.
50 In chemistry, to "label" usually means to join an atom with another capable of
giving a signal to be used as a tracer in chemical or biological processes. Labels can
be radioactive, fluorescent, or enzymatic. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 668 (1987); 7 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 41-42; 12 id. at 899.
The term "enzyme-labelled" refers to the coupling of a drug molecule (or other
organic compound) to an enzyme thereby "labelling" the drug with the catalytic
and antigenic properties of the enzyme. See 7 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 4142; Bergmeyer & Gawehn, supra note 40, at 5.
51 There are several enzyme immunoassays on the market. See Sims, supra note
8, at D1, col. 1; Bluestone, supra note 48, at 12. The first enzyme-multiplier immunoassay, the EMIT@, was developed by K.E. Rubenstein, R.S. Schneider and E.F.
Ullman in 1972. See SYvA Co., EMIT@ TESTING, supra note 48; Oellerich, supra note
44, at 245. Manufactured by the Syva Company of Palo Alto, California, a Syntex
company, the EMIT® was the first enzyme-labelled immunoassay to be mass marketed in the United States, realizing $40 million in sales in 1985. See Sims, supra
note 8, at Dl, col. 1;Jatlow, supra note 38, at 5. There are different EMIT® tests for
different drugs, but they all come in two basic types: the EMIT@ stT System, which
is a portable unit mainly intended for on-the-spot testing; and the EMIT@ d.a.u.M
System, mostly used in laboratories and intended for large drug testing programs.
See QUESTIONS, supra note 48, at 5. The EMIT@ tests are by far the most popular
enzyme-labelled immunoassays currently in use. Stille, supra note 8, at 24-25; Englade, supra note 8, at 22-25.
52 The radioimmunoassay uses molecules labelled with radioisotopes. 19 A.
KIRK & D. OTHMER, supra note 41, at 631; Hanson, supra note 7, at 9. Developed in
1959 by R.S. Yalow and S.A. Benson, it is an older technology than the EIA and,
some claim, more accurate albeit more dangerous to use than EIA since it involves
handling of radioactive material. See Oellerich, supra note 44, at 233. 19 R. KIRK &
D. OTHMER supra note 41, at 631. The most popular RIA is the Abuscreen@ manufactured by Roche Diagnostic Systems of Nutley, New Jersey, a division of Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. The Abuscreen@ RIA is the test of choice of the Department of
Defense. Hanson, supra at 10; In re Syva Co.-Reconsideration, B-218359.3, Comp.
Gen. (Jan. 22, 1986).
53 See Hanson, supra note 7, at 9. Two other competent processes are the "freeradical," also known as "spin-label" immunoassay and the fluorescent immunoassay. See U.S. PAT. No. 3,887,698 at 1 (H. McConnell & G. Humphries) (June 3,
1975); U.S. PAT. No. 3,966,764 at 2-3 (A. Goldstein, R. Leute & E. Ullman) (June
29, 1976); U.S. PAT. No. 4,025,501 at 1 (R. Leute) (May 24, 1977) (free-radical/spin-label immunoassay); U.S, PAT. No. 3,998,943 at 2 (E. Ullman) (Dec. 21,
1976) (fluorescent immunoassay). The free-radical immunoassay (FRIA) was one
of the first non-isotopic immunoassays on the market. It is "based on the principle
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(TLC), is a classic physical separation process. 54 TLC is one of
the oldest technologies still in use.55 None of these methods is
100% reliable by itself.56 Any positive finding 57 must be confirmed by other, more accurate means such as gas chromatography (GC), 58 high pressure liquid chromatography (HPLC), 59
mass-spectrometry (MS) 60 or a combination thereof. The combination GC/MS is almost universally accepted as the best confirmation process for any of the screens.61
1. The Screening Tests
a. The Immunoassays
All immunoassays use antibodies to a specific drug. 62 Most
drugs, however, are haptens 6 1 and therefore they must be atthat the signal obtained from spin-labelled drugs is altered upon their binding to an
antibody." Jatlow, supra note 38, at 5. This system works well but the equipment is
too costly and complex for mass screening. Id.
54 See infra, notes 87-95, 148-50 and accompanying text. Physical separation
methods use the physical characteristics of the analyte to divide it into fractions
representative of its different component substances. See Bergmeyer, Fresenius &
Haegele, Present Status and Future Aspects of Enzymatic Analysis, in 1 METHODS OF ENZYMATIC ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 57. Chromatography is one of the most commonly used physical separation methods in chemical analysis. See id.
55 Jatlow, supra note 38, at 4-5.
56 See DOT Comments (1985), supra note 19, 50 Fed, Reg. at 31,555-56; ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 30; Jatlow, supra note 38, at 7-8;
Hanson, supra note 7, at 10-11; Rust, supra note 8, at 51-52.
57 A "positive" finding only means detection above a certain level. Depending
on the cut-off point of a particular testing process, a person could be found both
positive and negative with the same drug concentration in the specimen. See infra
note 136.
58 Nomenclature can be somewhat confusing. The literature often refers to gassolid chromatography as GC, as distinct from gas-liquid chromatography, GLC,
while generally referring to both also as GC-sometimes in the same paragraph. See
infra note 97. Except where otherwise indicated, the term gas chromatograph (GC)
throughout this comment will indicate any chromatographic method using gas as a
carrier. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of gas
chromatography.
59 See infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of HPLC.
60 Spectrometric analysis determines the presence or concentration of a compound by measuring the electromagnetic radiation forced to emanate or interact
with a given sample. See 12 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 854. See also infra
notes 114-35 for an explanation of mass-spectrometry.
61 See DOT COMMENTS (1985), supra note 19, 50 Fed. Reg. at 31, 555-56; ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 30; Hanson, supra note 7, at 1011; Rust, supra note 8, at 51-52;Jatlow, supra note 38, at 7-8; 6 McGRAw-HILL, supra
note 39, at 63; 22B CHROMATOGRAPHY, B289 (E. Heftman, ed., 1983).
62 See 7 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 41-43. See also supra note 44 and infra
note 63, 66, 69-70 for a discussion of use of antibodies with immunoassays.
63 See U.S. PAT. No. 3,887,69 at 7-8 (H. McConnell & G. Humphries) (June 3,
1975). A hapten is a partial antigen incapable, by itself, of simulating the produc-
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tached to an immunogenic carrier 64 in order to induce the production of antibodies in a host animal.65 The usual carriers are
enzymes, 66 which are conjugated 6 7 to the drug hapten. 68 The

conjugated enzyme or antigen is then introduced into the bloodstream 69 of a suitable host animal. 70 The animal is "loaded"
through successive booster shots until its blood produces the desired quantity and quality of antibodies. The antibodies are
formed in a geometrical shape that fits the antigen much like a
"lock and key." 7 ' The animal is then bled and the antibodies retion of antibodies; but, when a hapten is coupled or "conjugated" to an immunogenic substance, the result is an artificial antigen which will induce the formation of
monoclonal antibodies which are specific for, i.e. react to or recognize, the hapten
half of the artificial (conjugated) antigen. Id. at 3; U.S. PAT. No. 3,975,237 at 8 (K.
Rubenstien & R. Ullman) (Aug. 17, 1976). See Oellerich, supra note 44, at 234; 1
McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 609. See also supra note 44; infra notes 67, 69.
64 See U.S. PAT. No. 3,996,344 at 3-5 (J. Gross) (Dec. 7, 1976). The term "immunogenic carrier" refers to a type of antigen, which is capable, by itself, of inducing
the production of antibodies in the bloodstream of a host animal, and which can be
conjugated to a hapten. Oellerich, supra note 44, at 234; U.S. PAT. No. 4,041,076 at
1-2 (R. Avenia, J. Christensen & B. Pecherer) (Apr. 9, 1977), U.S. PAT. No.
4,053,459 at 1-2 U.Christensen) (Oct. 11, 1977); U.S. PAT. No. 4,182,879 at 1-2 (J.
Christensen) (Jan. 8, 1980).
65 See infra note 69.
66 See 11 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 351. Although simple proteins are the
preferred immunogenic carriers, natural or synthetic polymeric compounds, such
as polypeptides or polysaccharides are also suitable. See id. U.S. PAT. No. 3,996,344
at 4 (J. Gross) (Dec. 7, 1976); U.S. PAT. No. 4,022,878 at 10 (J. Gross) (May 10,
1977); U.S. PAT. No. 4,282,325 at 9 (R. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Aug. 4, 1981).
Currently, most immunoassays use the glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase enzyme (G-6PDH). See Hanson, supra note 7, at 9; U.S. PAT. No. 3,875,011 at 20-21
(K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Apr. 1, 1975).
67 A conjugated enzyme is a compound formed by bonding a protein to a nonprotein or hapten. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 277 (1987).
68 See supra note 64.
69 Antibodies are proteins which are formed principally in blood serum in reaction to a specific natural or artificial (conjugated) antigen. The antigen must always
be foreign to the host, i.e. extracted from a different host. Oellerich, supra note 44,
at 233-37.
70 The process of producing antibodies through host animals is well established
in the scientific community. See 11 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 351-352; Oellerich, supra note 44, at 234-236. Originally developed for the creation of vaccines,
this method of producing antibodies is now employed for a variety of other uses.
See McGRAw-HILL, YEARBOOK OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, 1986 at 478, 479 (1985).
Any vertebrate is a competent animal for this purpose, but mammals are preferable. Suitable hosts are rabbits, goats, sheep, horses and cows. See U.S. PAT. No.
3,996,344 at 1 (J. Gross) (Dec. 7, 1976); U.S. PAT. No. 4,016,146 at 1 (J. Soares)
(Apr. 5, 1977), U.S. PAT. No. 4,025,501 at 1 (R. Leute) (May 24, 1977).
71 See Bergmeyer & Gawehn, supra note 40, at 4; Oellerich, supra note 44, at 23436; 5 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 141. See also U.S. PAT. No. 4,376,825 at 3-4
(K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (March 15, 1983).
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covered and separated from the antigen.72 These antibodies are
now the "key" to the antigen "lock," i.e. they are "specific" ' 73 for

the same drug as the hapten in the conjugated antigen. 4 Thus,
when they come into contact
with such drug, they will recognize
75
the drug and bond with it.

In both types of immunoassays, EIA and RIA, a given
amount of conjugated ("enzyme labelled") antigen and a given
amount of specific antibody are mixed with the sample, either serially or at once. 76 The RIA tests additionally "label" the conjugated antigens with a radioactive isotope for ease of detection.77
The conjugated antigens act as a reagent 78 inducing the haptens
72 Oellerich, supra note 44, at 234-36. See also U.S. PAT. No. 4,022,878 at 3 (J.
Gross) (May 10, 1977); U.S. PAT. No. 4,064,228 at 13-14 (J. Gross) (Dec. 20, 1977).
73 Specificity, in chemical analysis, generally refers to "[t]he ability of an analytical method to determine solely the component(s) it purports to measure."
Bergmeyer, Horder & Markowetz, Reliability of Laboratory Results and Practicabilityof
Procedures, in 1 METHODS OF ENZYMATIC ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 22. In enzymatic
analysis it means that an enzyme "converts only a certain substrate and not similar
compounds (such as homologues)." Id. at 24. This specificity is the basis of immunoassays. Id. However, some enzymes are only capable of "group specificity," i.e.
cannot discriminate among chemically related substances. Id.; 5 McGRAw-HILL,
supra note 39, at 141. See also U.S. PAT. No. 4,016,146 at 2-3 (J. Soares) (Apr. 5,
1977).
74 See supra note 63.
75 Bonding is achieved by having the geometrical shapes of the antibody "fit
into" and cover the antigen, thus neutralizing it. See U.S. PAT. No. 3,887,698 at 4
(H. McConnell & G. Humphries) (June 3, 1975); U.S. PAT. No. 3,905,871 at 7 (K.
Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Sept. 16, 1975); U.S. PAT. No. 3,935,074 at 3 (K. Rubenstein & R. Leute) (Jan. 27, 1976).
76 7 McGRAW-HILL, supra note 39, at 41-42; Oellerich, supra note 44, at 237-40.
77 7 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 41-42. See also supra note 50. Chemical
elements can be composed of two or more species of atoms known as isotopes of
the same element. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 402, 642
(1987). Isotopes of an element are almost identical: they have the same atomic
number but different mass number, i.e. the same number of protons but different
number of neutrons in their nuclei. Id. Atomic nuclei can be stable or unstable.
An unstable nuclei emits alpha, beta or gamma-rays, thus an unstable isotope is a
radioactive isotope or "radioisotope." 11 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 352.
There are approximately a dozen naturally occurring radioisotopes. Hundreds of
artificial radioisotopes, however, have been created by atomic bombardment of stable nuclei. Id. Iodine 125 (1-125) is the radioisotope most commonly used in RIA's.
Id. Radioisotopes make ideal tracers because: "(1) At the molecular level, the physical and chemical behavior of a radioisotope is practically identical with that of the
stable isotopes of the same element. (2) Radioisotopes are detectable in extremely
minute concentrations. (3) Analysis for radioisotopic content often can be achieved
without alteration of the sample or system." Id.
78 Generally, reagents are chemical substances used to determine the nature and
composition of other substances by reacting with the substances to be analyzed. 11
McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 420. In enzymatic analysis, a reagent is a conjugated molecule with two different epitopes, one in the hapten and the other in the
immunogenic carrier, but spatially juxtaposed so that antibodies cannot bind simul-
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in the sample, i.e. the substance of abuse, to compete with these
conjugated antigens for the available antibodies.79 Once the
bonding of all the antigens to the antibodies is completed, the
catalytic activity 0 in the EIA, or the amount of radioactive molecules not precipitated 8 ' in the RIA, is measured to determine the
presence or absence of the suspected drug. 2
Because each controlled substance normally binds only with
the specific antibody, the laboratory must run several screens on
taneously to both. See U.S. PAT. No. 3,935,074 at 3 (K. Rubenstein & R. Leute)
(Jan. 27, 1976); U.S. PAT. No. 3,887,698 at 2-3 (H. McConnell & G. Humphries)
(June 3, 1975). Epitopes or "determinant sites" are those sites in a molecule which
specifically attract and bind with an antibody. Id.; see also Oellerich, supra note 44, at
234-36, 238, 244-45.
79 See 1 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 350-51.
80 See Moss, supra note 44, at 12-14. See also supra note 44 (discussing enzymatic
analysis).
81 Precipitation is "[t]he process of producing a separable solid phase within a
liquid medium." 10 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 737. It is a common method
of separating the antigen-antibody complexes in the radioimmunoassay to discover
whether there is any controlled substance in the sample. 11 id. at 350-51. Precipitation is a necessary step prior to measurement in heterogeneous immunoassays.
See infra note 82.
82 In competitive binding assays, such as the EIA and the RIA, where the labelled and unlabelled antigens are "competing" for the available binding places
(epitopes) on a constant number of antibodies, there are two ways to measure the
results: either determine what amount of labelled antigen has been bound or what
amount remains free. Oellerich, supra note 44, at 237. Note that only the labelled
antigen is measured since it is precisely the "label" which produces the necessary
detectable signal. Since the amount of labelled antigen and antibody epitopes is
known, the presence of unlabelled antigens, i.e., the drug of interest, can then be
determined by the amount of labelled antigen that either did or did not bind. Id.
The measuring process sometimes requires previous separation of the bound and
unbound labelled antigen without disturbing the equilibrium. Assays that require
this additional step are called heterogeneous assays. The RIA is a heterogeneous
assay. Id. Homogeneous assays do not require separation before measurement:
the enzymatic activity is compared to a pre-existing calibration curve constructed
by the manufacturer. Id. The EIA is a homogeneous assay. Id. at 244-247.
There are several measuring methods applicable to immunoassays. Spectrophotometry is the one most commonly used for measuring EIA's. See Price, Hammond, Campbell & Atkinson, Drugs of Abuse and of Toxicological Relevance, in 12
METHODS OF ENZYMATIC ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 269-354. Spectrophotometry
measures the amount of light irradiated by a sample which has been subjected to a
monochromatic light. The intensity of the light irradiated by the sample is compared to a calibration curve to obtain a reading. 12 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39,
at 856-58. In the RIA, detection depends on measuring the level of radiation emitted by the isotope labelled antigen. See 11 id. at 350-52. Although a Geiger counter
could be used to detect the level of radioactivity in either the antibody-bound or
the free fraction, liquid scintillation counting provides a more sensitive method of
detection. This method involves converting the radiation into light by passing it
through the allium-activated sodium iodide scintillation crystals. The light is detected, amplified, and measured by photomultiplier tubes which are connected to a
light meter. 19 R. KIRK & D. OTHMER, supra note 41, at 635.
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the sample; usually one for each suspected drug. 83 The bonding
of antigen and antibody does not occur spontaneously outside of
a vertebrate's bloodstream, but must be induced under strictly
controlled conditions,84 such as a given temperature and pH.85
Any change in these conditions will affect the result of the assay
significantly.8 6
b.

Thin-Layer Chromatography

Thin-layer chromatography8 7 (TLC) is a physical method of
separation.88 It uses the adsorption properties of the different
substances in a sample to separate and identify such substances.90 A thin layer of very find powder is coated onto a rigid
plate.9 The suspected sample is assayed by depositing ("spotting") it at the bottom of the chromatoplate and adding a solvent
to elute 9 2 the components of the sample. As the various substances in the sample are washed
along the chromatoplate, they
93
separate into identifiable spots.
83

See

ROCHE, PRICE LISTING,

supra note 48;

SYVA Co., TESTS FOR DRUGS OF

EMIT@ D.A.U.
(1985); 12 METHODS OF ENZYMATIC ANALYSIS,
supra note 40, at 269-354.
84 See Clement, Should Community Hospitals Perform Substance of Abuse Screening?, in
FACE OFF WITH THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 8,at 9; R. KIRK & D. OTHMER,
supra note 41, at 206. See also infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
85 The symbol pH indicates the level of acidity or alkalinity on a liquid on a scale
of 0 to 14 where 7 is the neutral point, 0 is extreme acidity and 14 is extreme
alkalinity. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 880 (1987).
ABUSE IN URINE,

86 See infra note 202.

87 Chromatography is a qualitative analytical method which generally uses the
dynamic attraction between a mobile and a stationary medium to separate and identify the various substances in a sample according to the different rates of affinity of
such substances for the stationary medium. See 3 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at
142-43. The stationary medium can be either a liquid or a solid adsorbent. See id.
See also infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text for an explanation of other types
of chromatography.
88 See supra note 54.
89 Adsorption is the basic thermodynamic property of a body to attract and hold
on its surface the molecules of a gas or soluble substance in an extremely thin layer.
See 1 R. KIRK & D. OTHMER, supra note 41, at 531.
90 Peereboom, Paper Chromatography and Thin-Layer Chromatography, in COMPRE-

HENSiVE ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY

1-2 (C.L. Wilson, D. Wilson & C.R.N. Strouts,

eds., 1968).
91 Id. Chromatoplates are normally made of glass, but any non-fibrous, nonflexible flat support material may also be used. Id.
92 To elute is to remove or "wash" adsorbed materials with a solvent. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 405 (1987).
93 Peereboom, supra note 90, at 1-2. The different components of a sample have
different degrees of affinity for the coating on the chromatoplate, i.e., the adsorbent; thus, each substance is adsorbed at a different rate. Id. The coating on the
plate is the "stationary phase." When a solvent is added, it acts as the "mobile
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TLC does not require costly equipment and the assay can
often be completed in relatively short time.9 4 It is not amenable
to automation, however. It also lacks specificity and sensitivity,
labor dependent with its attendant risk of
and is almost totally
95
mistake.
subjective
2.

The Back-Up Tests

a.

The Chromatographies

There are two chromatographic methods9 6 suitable as confirmation tests: gas chromatography (GC) 9 7 and high pressure liquid chromatography (HPLC).98 All chromatographic devices are
based on the same physiochemical principles: they use the relative movement of two immiscible phases to separate the sample
into its component parts.9 9 As in TLC, there is a mobile phase
and a stationary phase,' 0 0 but in GC and HPLC the stationary
phase is packed in a "column"' 0 ' and it may be either a solid
phase," eluting the various components of the sample along the plate. Id. As the
sample migrates, its molecules are either dissolved in the solvent or are adsorbed
by the thin layer of coating. Id. at 2. The sample-solvent mixture migrates "only
during the time that it is dissolved in the mobile phase." Id. The sum of all the
times t equals the distance travelled by the mixture along the chromatogram, i.e. the
"length of the run." Id. Each substance in the mixture has a different t value and
therefore a different run length. Once development ends, i.e. the mixture stops
running, the chromatogram is sprayed with a detection agent which makes the different spots visible. Id. "Each component is typified by the distance the spot has
moved on the chromatogram divided by the distance travelled by the solvent
front." Id. This is the "ratio front" Rf:
Distance travelled by sample
Distance of solvent run
Id. See also Ganshirt, Documentation of Thin-Layer Chromatography, in THIN-LAYER
CHROMATOGRAPHY 127 (E. Stahl, ed. 1969). Photometry or fluorometry is often
used to evaluate the spots. Bergmeyer, Fresenius & Haegele, supra note 54, at 62.
94 See Bergmeyer, Fresenius & Haegele, supra note 54, at 62.
95 Id.; CHROMATOGRAPHY, supra note 61, at B289.
96 See supra note 87.
97 Gas chromatography is technically two processes: gas-solid (GSC) and gasliquid (GLC). See Adlar, Stock & Whitman, supra note 39, at 55-56. The common
nomenclature, however, indicates the sorbent only in gas-liquid chromatography.
See CHROMATOGRAPHY, supra note 61, at B287-89. For separation of drugs of abuse
GLC is, by far, the more common gas chromatographic method. See id. at B288-89.
98 Also commonly referred to as high "performance" liquid chromatography.
Bergmeyer, Fresenius & Haegele, supra note 54, at 63. See also CHROMATOGRAPHY,
supra note 61, at B287-88.
99 See supra notes 54 and 87.
100 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101 3 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 146; 6 id. at 61. A conventional gas chromatographic column is typically a long thin tube, 20 to 100 meters long by 0.2 to
0.8 millimeters inside diameter. Id.
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adsorbent 10 2 or a liquid.' 0 In GC, the mobile phase is an inert
gas' 04 which carries the vaporized sample at a constant high temperature

0

5

through the packing in a heated column. 10

6

The

HPLC method uses a liquid as a mobile phase, and either a solid
or a liquid as the stationary phase. 0 7 The mobile phase liquid is
propelled through the column by high pressure pumps; 0 8 it does
not require vaporization of the sample or a heated column.' 0 9 In
both methods, the affinity of the various substances in the sample
for the stationary phase I o determines the rate of progress of the
102 3 id. at 61. See also supra note 89 (for definition of adsorption). Most common
solid adsorbents are carbon, alumina, or silica gel. A. B. LITrLEWOOD, GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY 3 (1962).
103 See McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 142. The liquid is usually coated on a
porous solid which only acts as support, "and, ideally, does not participate in the
separation process." Id. See also Adlar, Stock & Whitman, supra note 39, at 55.
104 Typical inert gases used in gas chromatography are helium, nitrogen, hydrogen or argon. A.B. LITTLEWOOD, supra note 102, at 4; 3 McGRAw-HILL, supra note
39, at 146.
105 See A.B. LrTILEWOOD, supra note 102, at 5-6. In GC the sample must be
vaporized or at leat derivatized into a vaporizable compound in order to be carried
through the chromatographic column by the carrier gas. See id.; McGRAw-HILL
YEARBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 1982-1983 227 (1983) [hereinafter McGRAw-HILL YEARBOOK 1982-83]. This requires that the column itself also be kept
at a constant high temperature. See A.B. LITTLEWOOD, supra note 102, at 5-6.
Although columns generally can withstand temperatures of up to 400°C, most compounds analyzed by this method have boiling points below 250°C. See Adlar, Stock
& Whitman, supra note 39, at 67; 6 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 61.
106 See 3 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 146-47; A.B. LrLEWOOD, supra note
102, at 2, 8. Professor Littlewood explains the process succinctly:
When two or more components are present in the sample, each
usually behaves independently of the others, so that for a given carrier
gas flow rate, the speed of the zone of each component will depend on
the extent to which it is adsorbed. Since different substances differ in
their adsorption, they may therefore be separated by making use of their
different speeds of progress through the column. If they are eluted to
the far end of the column, they will appear one after the other in the gas
stream, the fastest first and the slowest last.
Id. at 2.
107 See 3 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 147. Where the stationary phase and
the mobile phase are both liquid, these liquids must be immiscible. See id. "Since
immiscibility means automatically that the two phases must have significantly different chemical properties, only combinations of either a nonpolar mobile phase and a
polar stationary phase or [vice versa] are feasible. A system that uses a nonpolar
stationary phase and an aqueous mobile phase is frequently called reverse-phase
chromatography." Id.
108 In HPLC, inlet pressures of several hundred atmospheres are often used to
impel the mobile phase through particle cases no bigger than 30 microns. Pressures of 1000-6000 psi are common (1 psi = 6890 N/m 2 ). 7 McGRAw-HILL, supra
note 39, at 739.
109 Id. at 738-39.
110 See 3 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 142-143. This affinity is translated into
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mixture" l ' and the ultimate partition of the sample into its component substances.'1 2 A detection device identifies
each sepa3
rated substance as it emerges from the column.' 1
b. Mass Spectrometry
Mass"

4

spectrometry is a physical method of separation and

different degrees of adsorption (GSC) or solubility (GLC, HPLC) for each substance in the mixture. See id. See also supra notes 89, 102-03 and accompanying text.
I I I See supra note 93.
112 3 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 145-46. The column type and packing determines the degree of selectivity and resolution of the chromatograph. Id. Selectivity indicates the capability of a certain chromatographic system to "select" and
separate a given substance or group of substances from a complex mixture. Id. at
145. Resolution is a "crucial parameter for the effectiveness of separations." Id. A
high resolution is indicated by the narrowness of the chromatographic separation,
since "the narrower the zones, the greater the number of peaks that can be spaced
between the components, and the higher the resolving power of the column." Id.
at 145-46. The position of a given substance within the chromatogram, which is
directly related to its retention rate, identifies the substance, while the degree of
resolution indicates quantity. Id. at 146. A recorder attached to a detection device
translates this information into peaks, similar to a wavelength, printed on continuous feeding paper. See infra note 113. The geometrical shape and chemical composition of the column, the type and density of the packing, and the quantity of
stationary phase, as well as the flow rate, temperature, and calibration of the column can significantly affect the accuracy of the results. See 3 McGRAw-HILL, supra
note 39, at 146. Accurate separations are ultimately dependent on the quality of
the equipment and the knowledge of the technician operating the equipment. See
generally id. at 142-49.
113 See 3 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 147-48. The type and reliability of detection devices vary with each chromatographic system. The best detection methods for organic compounds in GC are based on gas-phase ionization principles.
The flame ionization detector is the most common of these methods. See id. at 147.
It works by thermal ionization of the effluent in a hydrogen flame as it emerges
from the column: "An electrode situated above the flame monitors changes in the
flame conductivity. The hydrogen flame is ordinarily nonconductive, but current
can occur, owing to the ionization of solutes emerging from the column. The signal is then amplified and recorded." Id. There are no comparable general detection methods for liquid chromatography. The fractions emerging from the column
can be collected at predetermined time intervals or in given volumes and subjected
to further study by other physical or chemical methods. See id. at 148. The only
continuous detection method enjoying some success is the moving-wire flame ionization detector which uses an "on line" process to retain, and thermally evaporate,
part of the total column effluent on a moving platinum wire. The dry residue left
on the moving wire is then exposed to a flame ionization detector similar to the GC
flame ionization detector. Id. This detector, however, is not as effective or sensitive as the GC version. Id. Ultimately, a device such as a mass spectrometer or an
adsorption spectrometer coupled "on line" to the column provides the best detection methods for any chromatographic system by subjecting the sample to further
analysis and measurement. See id. at 147-48. See also infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text for discussion of spectrometric methods.
114 Mass is the measure of a body's inertia, i.e. a body's resistance to change or
motion which is directly related to the amount of matter in that body. WEBSTER'S
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measurement of chemical compounds through ionization"
identification by atomic

weight.'" 6

The vaporized

5

sample" 1 7

and

is in-

troduced into a mass-spectrometer" 8 where it is ionized by electron impact I9 or by chemical ionization 12 in a particle
accelerator chamber.' 2 1 This method releases both positive and
1 22
negative charged ions, but only the positive ions, or "cations"'
are significant to the analytical process. 123 The accelerated cations are swept through a magnetic field which deflects their
NINH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 731 (1987). Mass should not be confused with
weight. Although mass causes a body to have weight in a gravitational environment, and it may have the same value, it is a different concept. See id. at 1337.
Weight is "the force with which a body is attracted toward the earth or a celestial
body by gravitation and which is equal to the product of the mass and the local
gravitational acceleration." Id. Atomic mass, however, is usually called atomic
weight. See infra note 116.
115 When an atom gains or loses one or more electrons, it becomes an ion. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 638 (1987). An atom that has lost electrons carries a positive charge and it is called a "cation." See S. STERNHELL & J.R.
KALMAN, ORGANIC STRucTURES FROM SPECTRA 19 (1986). An atom that gains one
or more electrons, an uncommon occurrence, carries a negative charge and it is
called an "anion." See id. Mass spectrometry generally deals only with cations. Id.
at 20.
116 8 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 234-35. Atomic weight is really "the average atomic mass of an element compared to /12 the mass of carbon 12" in atomic
mass units. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 113 (1987). An atomic
mass unit (amu) measures the "masses of atoms, molecules, or nuclear particles
equal to I/1 of the atomic mass of the most abundant carbon isotope 6C1 ." Id.
117 The sample must be in a gaseous phase prior to ionization, which normally
requires a high vacuum heated chamber. See S. STERNHELL & J.R. KALMAN, supra
note 115, at 19-20; 8 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 234. However, where the
source of the analyte is a chromatographic column, the vaporizing stage is unnecessary as the chromatographed effluent is already volatized. See supra note 105.
118 A mass spectrometer is a spectroscopic measuring instrument which sorts and
identifies minute traces of substances by determining their atomic weight. See S.
STERNHELL &J.R. KALMAN, supra note 115, at 20. See generally 8 McGRAw-HILL, supra
note 37, at 234-40.
119 Ionization by electron impact is a method whereby the vaporized substance is
bombarded with a high voltage beam of electrons (70 microvolts). S. STERNHELL &
J.R. KALMAN, supra note 115, at 20. The high energy applied to the analyte not only
rips open the molecules but also breaks the loose electrons into atomic particles,
and often these particles into yet smaller fragments. Id. at 20.
120 Besides electron impact, the most common ionization method in spectroscopy is chemical ionization where a reactant gas, usually methane, is "introduced at
a higher concentration than that of the substance being investigated. The carrier
gas is ionized by electron impact and the substance is then ionized by collisions
with these ions." Id. at 19-20; 8 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 234-35.
121 A particle accelerator is a device that imparts a high velocity to ions and
atomic particles, often using magnets or electron bombardment. See S. STERNHELL
&J.R. KALMAN, supra note 115, at 22; 8 McGRAW-HILL, supra note 39, at 234-37.
122 See supra note 115.
123 S. STERNHELL &J.R. KALMAN, supra note 115, at 20.
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flight paths into a circular motion and eventually through a slit
into an ion collector and detecting system. 124 The degree of
flight path deflection depends on the atomic weight of the cations
with the lighter ions experiencing the sharper deflection.' 25 This
process sorts the cations by weight before passing sequentially
into the ion collector to be measured. 126 Since the mass of a cation is directly related to the mass of the atom from which it proceeds,' 27 it is possible to identify the atomic substance by
referring to the periodic table.1 28 Furthermore, as the mass-spectrometer can be calibrated to release ions from a chosen specific
site in the molecule, 29 a competent operator can produce the
molecular formula of a compound. 130 A computer attached to
the spectrometer translates all this information into a wavelength
graph known as the "spectrum"'13 1 of the analyte.132 By compar124 Id. "In practice, the magnetic field is scanned so that streams of ions of different mass pass sequentially through the slit before striking the detecting system (ion
collector)." Id. "The magnetic scan is synchronized with .. .a recorder and calibrated to appear as mass number .... Id.at 21.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Actually, we can only measure the mass to charge ratio m/e and we assume
that e = 1. This is because although there are some multicharge ions, the great
majority of the ions carry a single charge. See id. at 19.
128 10 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 21. The periodic table lists all known
elements in a grid table grouping together elements with similar properties. Each
element has a given atomic number that corresponds to its atomic weight. See id.
129 These specific sites are called chromophores. S. STERNHELL & J.A. KALMAN,
supra note 115, at 2-3. They are commonly defined as "a chemical group that gives

rise to color in a molecule."

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

239

(1987). The most important function of chromophores in spectrometrical analysis
is their identification with a single atom or group of atoms to pinpoint a specific
functional group within a molecule. S. STERNHELL &J.R. KALMAN, supra note 115,
at 3. This is a crucial advantage, as Professors Sternhell and Kalman point out:
The detection of a chromophore permits us to deduce the presence of a
structuralfragment or a structuralelement in the molecule.
The fact that it is the chromophores and not the molecules as a
whole that give rise to spectral features is very fortunate. Otherwise,
spectroscopy would only permit us to identify known compounds by direct comparison of their spectra with authentic samples. This "fingerprint" technique is often useful, but direct determination of molecular
structure is far more powerful, if more difficult.
Id. at 3.
130 See id.at 3, 21.
131 Spectrum is defined as "an array of the components of an emission or wave
separated and arranged in the order of some varying characteristic (as wavelength,

mass, or energy)."

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

1133 (1987). It

is also the actual graph representing the above information. See id.
132 See S. STERNHELL &J.R. KALMAN supra note 115, at 23; 8 McGRAw-HILL, supra
note 39, at 239-40; 12 id. at 854.
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ing this spectrum with prerecorded spectral3 3 of known substances or compounds, it is possible to "fingerprint" the
accurate when used
analyte.' 3 4 Mass spectrometry is extremely
35
technician.
trained
well
a
by
properly
3.

Evaluation

a. Accuracy
Both the screens and the back-up tests have a place in the
testing procedure. The screens provide a convenient method for
eliminating most non-users,' 36 while the back-up tests provide the
necessary scientific certainty to insure a positive result will stand
up in court.' 37 All the tests are designed to detect infinitesimal
133 There are currently several spectra libraries in the United States, some exceeding 25,000 spectra on file. 8 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 240. It is a relatively simple process to compare the graph of the analyte with the archival graphs
to see if there is a match which would "fingerprint" the substance. See id. See also
supra note 129. An alternative method would involve recognizing the patterns in
the graph through "learning-machine and factor-analyses approaches." 8 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 240. Although mass spectrometry is not a new technique, it could not be used for systematic identification of substances until recently.
It took a long time to program the profiles of controlled substances into the testing
system as many as 38,000 by 1984. Voy, The Science of Fair Play, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Aug. 1984 at 34.
134 See Voy, supra note 133, at 34. See also supra note 129.
135 See S. STERNHELL &J.R. KALMAN, supra note 115, at 4.
136 The screens, particularly the immunoassays, are calibrated to indicate detection at a certain concentrationprercentage level. See Hanson, supra note 7, at 9-10.
For example, the EMIT® st ' Cannabinoid (marijuana) Assay and the EMIT®
d.a.u.T Cannabinoid 100 Assay have a cut-off detection point of 100 ng/ml (nanograms per milliliter); while the EMIT® d.a.u. TM Cannabinoid 20 Assay is set at 20
ng/ml. SYVA Co., QUESTIONS, supra note 48, at 7. Thus, a person showing a cannabinoid content between 20 and 100 ng/ml could be found both positive and negative for marijuana depending on the test used. A high cut-off level gives a margin
of insurance against false positives, but increases the percentage of false negatives.
Jatlow, supra note 38, at 7. It is the industry's opinion that the majority of the incorrect results are false negatives. See Hanson, supra; Bluestone, supra note 48, at 12.
Nevertheless, even a single incorrect positive cannot be tolerated considering that a
person's reputation and livelihood may be at stake. There is a presumption, supported by a high probability, that a negative result indicates a non-user, while a
positive result only indicates a probable user. All positive results must be confirmed. See The Challenge of Substance Abuse Screening, in FACE OFF wrrH THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 8, at 34, 35; Dal Cortivo, supra note 19, at 18; Hanson, supra
at 9.
137 See Dal Cortivo, supra note 19, at 16-18; Hanson, supra note 7, at 10. See also
Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 756-57 (8th Cir. 1986) (confirmation by same test);
Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (confirmation by another method). But see Smith v.
State, 250 Ga. 438, 298 S.E.2d 482 (1983) (unconfirmed EMIT test sufficient to
revoke parole).
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amounts of either the parent substance or its metabolite.'
The immunoassays are rapid, inexpensive and relatively easy
to use. On the other hand, they require a different assay for each
suspected drug of abuse and kits may not be readily available for
new drug variants. 13 9 There are some claims that the RIA is
more accurate than the EIA; it has certainly been found superior
at least in the eyes of the Department of Defense. 4 ° The RIA,
however, presents some handling problems: it uses radioactive
materials which can contaminate premises and personnel, and
may even interfere with the immunochemical reaction itself. The
RIA's also require strictly monitored storage, use, and disposal
procedures, and only laboratories licensed by the Atomic Energy
Commission can perform RIA tests.14 1 The advantage of using

EIA's is that they are faster and easier to perform. 4 2 EIA's are
homogeneous, 143 present no safety problems, and have a long
shelf life. 144 Many can be administered on site. 145 Unfortunately,
sometimes they are affected by the enzyme poisons often found
138 Hanson, supra note 7, at 9. See supra note 44 (for definition of metabolite).
Some drugs break down and are eliminated very rapidly from the system. Others
remain as metabolites for long periods of time. See SYVA Co., QUESTIONS, supra note
48, at 4.
139 See supra notes 44-46. Although combining antisera from various animals for
use in a single immunoassay will elicit a positive response if the sample contains
some drug, such a practice has a "dilution effect" on the screen and does not identify the drug triggering the positive response. A screen which combines several
tests for various drugs in a single urinalysis must be followed by individual screens
for each drug to be identified. U.S. PAT. No. 4,235,864 at 2-3 (B. Kaul, B. Davidow
& S. Millian) (Nov. 25, 1980). Even where the drug is of known composition and
on the controlled substance list, it may have been altered through the smuggling
process, e.g. cocaine is sometimes smuggled in an alcohol solution which affects the
chemical composition of the drug. See U.S. PAT. No. 4,110,078 at 1 (T. Zelonis)
(Aug. 29, 1978).
140 See In re Syva Co.-Reconsideration, No. B-218359.3 (Comp. Gen.) (Jan. 22,
1986); In re Syva Co., No. B-218359.2 (Comp. Gen.) (Aug. 22, 1985); Hanson, supra
note 7, at 10.
141 See RocHE, ABUSCREEN® AMPHETAMINE RIA, supra note 48, at 2; ROCHE ABUSCREEN® CANNABINOID RIA, supra note 48, at 2, U.S. PAT. No. 4,400,353 at 2 (P.
Meserol & J. Acker) (Aug. 23, 1983). Radioisotopes decay very rapidly, therefore
they have a very short shelf life. See generally Alpert, supra note 41, at 27-28; Peter &
Berry, Guidelinesfor Evaluating and IntroducingNew Tests, MED. LAB. OBS., July 1983 at
76. Iodine 125, the isotope most commonly used in RIA's, has a half-life of 60 days.
11 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 352.
142 See Kropp, Our Mini-Screenfor Drug Abuse Testing, MED. LAB. OBS., May 1986 at
40.
143 See supra note 82. See also U.S. PAT. No. 3,935,074 at 2 (K. Rubenstein & R.
Leute) (Jan. 27, 1976).
144 See Peter & Berry, supra note 141, at 76.
145 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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in biological specimens.' 4
The greatest problem with both RIA's and EIA's is that they
are both subject to a certain amount of cross-reactivity. 4 7 Several over-the-counter medicines contain antigens so closely resembling the antigens of some controlled substances that the
antibody "key" will fit the "locks" of enough of these medicines
as to precipitate a false positive. 4 8 These clinically meaningful
but marginal reactions might account for as much as four percent
of all positive results. 4 9
TLC is inexpensive, reasonably specific, and the results are
quantifiable. 150 It allows simultaneous screening of various
drugs and, occasionally, it is the only method capable of separating some closely related compounds.' 5 ' Easy to maintain and
operate, it is, nevertheless, labor dependent as it is not amenable
to automation, the sample must be extracted and concentrated
prior to analysis, and it requires a high degree of proficiency in
its application and interpretation. It is frequently slow, vulneraand subject to severe fluctuation in
ble to interference,
52
reliability.
146 U.S. PAT. No. 4,235,864 at 2 (B. Kaul, B. Davidow & K. Millian) (Nov. 25,
1980).
147 Cross-reactivity is the affinity of some antibodies for antigens other than the
antigen of interest. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 310 (1987).
Antigenic substances of similar configuration sometimes attract antibodies of low
specificity originally developed to bond with only one of the similar substances.
Hanson, supra note 7, at 10-11. When this happens, a test will give a false positive
reading for the compound of interest. Id. Some controlled substances are more
prone than others to cross-react with over-the-counter medicines. Id. See also infra
note 148.
(1985);
148 See SYVA Co., TESTS FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE IN URINE, EMIT® D.A.U.'
SYVA CO., URINE ASSAYS FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE ON THE EMIT® STTM DRUG DETEChomogeneous enzyme immunoassays and st' singleTION SYSTEM, (1985) (d.a.u.'
vial homogeneous enzyme immunoassays for amphetamine also detect structurally
similar phenethylamines found in over-the-counter products; barbiturate assays
also detect high levels of glutethimide such as Doriden®; the opiate assays show
equal reactions to codeine); HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE INC., ROCHE DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS,
THE ABUSCREEN® SYSTEM BASIC PRODUCT INFORMATION (Dec. 1985) and ROCHE,
ABUSCREEN® AMPHETAMINE RIA, AND ROCHE, ABUSCREEN® CANNABINOID RIA, supra
note 48, at 5-6 (opiate assays show equal reaction to codeine; amphetamine assay
cross reacts with phenylpropanolamine); Hanson, supra note 7, at I (ibuprofen,
sold over-the-counter as Advil®, cross reacts with the EMIT® cannabinoid assays).
See also supra note 44 and accompanying text for discussion of "lock and key."
149 See SYvA Co., QUESTIONS, supra note 48, at 5; Hanson, supra note 7, at 9. But
see In re Syva Co., supra note 140, at 6 (RIA 100% accurate); ROCHE, ABUSCREEN®
AMPHETAMINE RIA, supra note 48, at 6 (claiming 99% accuracy).
150 CHROMATOGRAPHY, supra note 61, at B289, B315.
151 Id.; Hanson, supra note 7, at 9.
152 CHROMATOGRAPHY, supra note 61, at B289, B316; Bergmeyer, Fresenius &
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Assuming that the employer uses proper procedures for obtaining the testing sample; the laboratory facilities, equipment,
and protocols are of certification standard; and the sample is analyzed by proficient laboratory personnel, 153 all three screens can
perform satisfactorily as preliminary tests. 15 4 They all, however,
must be confirmed by one or more of the back up tests.' 55 Of all
the confirmation tests commonly used, GLC enjoys the greatest
15 6
popularity, although HPLC is becoming more competitive.
Generally, GC is faster and provides higher resolution than
LC,15 7 while HPLC works better with substances of poor volatility

or thermally unstable.15 8 Both methods have high detectability, 159 and are particularly suited for separation of complex
substances and differentiation among chemically related compounds over a wide range of concentrations. 60 Column chromatographies are highly accurate, provided a proper measuring
device is attached to the chromatographic apparatus. This is relatively easy with GC, but as yet, no detection device of high reliability similar to those used in GC has been found for HPLC. 161'
These methods depend on expensive sophisticated equipment
and require
a considerable amount of technical knowledge by the
62
operator.1

Haegele, supra note 54, at 62; Hanson, supra note 7, at 9. See also U.S.
3,905,871 at 1 (K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Sept. 16, 1975); U.S.
3,975,237 at 1 (K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Aug. 17, 1976), U.S.
4,282,325 at 1 (K. Rubenstein & E. Ullman) (Aug. 4, 1981).
153 See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 49.
155
156

PAT.
PAT.
PAT.

No.
No.
No.

Id.

Since the 1970's, advances in column design and the development of extremely powerful high pressure pumps have made HPLC a highly desirable tool in
forensic analysis. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES IN CHEMISTRY,
272-74 (1985). Where some separations originally took days to complete, now they
can be accomplished in minutes with high selectivity and resolution. Id. at 272. See
also supra notes 108, 112-13 and accompanying text.
157 Organic molecules diffuse much more rapidly in gasses than in liquids. This
results in sharper bands (resolution) and higher flow rates (turn-around speed). See

Adlar, Stock & Whitman, supra note 39, at 64-65, 152-53;

CHROMATOGRAPHY,

supra

note 61, at B288-89.
158 Id.
159 Bergmeyer, Fresenius & Haegele, supra note 54, at 63. Detectability or "detector limit" is the smallest possible measurement, expressed as "the smallest single result which, with a stated probability, can be distinguished from a suitable
blank. The limit may be a concentration or an amount and defines the point at
which the analysis becomes just feasible." Bergmeyer, Horder & Markowetz, supra
note 73, at 24-25.
160

Id. at 25;

161
162

See supra note 113.
Bergmeyer, Fresenius & Haegele, supra note 54, at 63; Challenge, supra note

NATIONAL RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

supra note 156, at 252-53.
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Mass spectrometry is the most accurate measuring device
currently available for detecting microscopic substances in biological fluids; it can even differentiate between isomeric substances.16 3 It does require extraction and pre-volatization of the
sample' 64 and the instrumentation is extremely costly and very
difficult to operate.165 Only technical personnel especially
trained in this
equipment can normally operate mass
66
spectrometers.

By far, the most accurate and efficient drug testing method is
the combination GC/MS where a mass spectrometer becomes a
detector for a GC column, often by direct coupling of the two
systems.167 The volatization and separation of the sample in the
GC column increases the efficiency of the mass spectrometer,
which then acts only as a measuring device for each separated
substance as it comes into the particle accelerator chamber. 6 '
This system produces a 100 percent reliable "fingerprint" of the
component substances in the sample.' 69 The simple objection to
combining these methods is the double expense of two very
costly, extremely sophisticated instruments which
require highly
170
trained and experienced personnel to operate.
136, at 35. But cf. Rosenthal, supra note 34, at 38 (chromatography costs comparable to automated EIA's and RIA's and within competence of many laboratory
technicians).
163 See S. STERNHELL & J.R. KALMAN, supra note 115, at 23; NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 156, at 183-84, 254-55.
164 See supra note 115.
165 S. STERNHELL &J.R. KALMAN, supra note 115, at 4. In 1980, a top of the line
instrument cost $400,000. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 156, at
185. Although there is a wide range in prices, a commercial laboratory should expect to pay at least $200,000 for an average mass spectrometer. See S. STERNHELL &
J.R. KALMAN, supra note 115, at 4; Voy, supra note 133, at 34.
166 S. STERNHELL & J.R. KALMAN supra note 115, at 4; Bergmeyer, Fresenius &
Haegele, supra note 40, at 64.
167 See supra note 61.
168 See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. An alternative method to direct coupling of the two systems is to trap the effluent as it emerges from the chromatographic column and submit the fractions to mass spectrometric analysis. See 8
MCGRAw-HILL, supra note 39, at 240. The advantage of this alternative method lies
in the elimination of the carrier gas before mass spectrometry which is not the case
with direct coupling. See id. Direct coupling, therefore, requires the additional step
of carrier gas extraction during the ionization process. See id.
169 See 8 McGRAw-HILL, supra note 39 at 240; CHROMATOGRAPHY, supra note 61, at
B289; Voy, supra note 133, at 34.
170 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 156, at 185; K. STERNHELL &J.R.
KALMAN, supra note 115, at 4-5. See also supra notes 162, 166 and accompanying
text.
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b. Impairment
The most accurate tests currently available can only measure
presence or absence of certain amounts of controlled substances
in biological fluids. 1 7 1 Some types of tests can approximate the
1 72
time of ingestion, but none can supply proof of impairment.
Unlike alcohol, there is no scientific or "official" impairment
benchmark for controlled substances. 73 Legislatures have determined that a given level of alcohol content in the blood renders a
person legally drunk, usually for the purpose of operating a motor vehicle. 174 It is an artificial figure which may or may not indicate actual impairment for every person affected, but it does give
a benchmark for the administration of the law. Alcohol intoxication levels can be determined quite accurately by a breathalyzer
175
reading, the least intrusive of all tests.
To establish a similar system of legal impairment levels for
drugs of abuse, it will be necessary to show the correlation between consumption per body weight and behavior for each drug
of abuse in the market. Current urinalysis does not provide this
data. 176 The presence of controlled substances or their metabolites in the urine only indicates that the body is breaking down
171 See ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 29; Jatlow,
supra note 38, at 7; ROCHE, ABUSCREEN® AMPHETAMINE RIA, supra note 48, at 5;
ROCHE, ABUSCREEN® CANNABINOID RIA, supra note 48, at 5.
172 Jatlow, supra note 38, at 7.

Dr.Jadow explains the limits of current state of the

art testing. He points out that a positive urinalysis test does not indicate:
" Clinical condition or degree of intoxication of the subject at the
time the specimen was obtained...
" Amount of drug that was used.
* When identified drug was used relative to the time of sampling,
except within the crudest time window.
Id.
173 DOT Comments (1985), supra note 19, 50 Fed. Reg. at 31,513.
174 For example, in New Jersey, a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more
is considered legal intoxication. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Supp. 1986).
However, before administering a breathalyzer test, police officers must have prima
facie indications that a defendant is under the influence of alcohol, such as defendant's demeanor, smell of alcohol, empty cans of beer, opened or empty liquor bottles, etc. See State v. Dickens, 130 N.J. Super. 73, 78 (App. Div. 1974); State v.
Tabisz, 129 N.J. Super. 80, 81-82 (App. Div. 1974). In New Jersey, while lay testimony is sufficient to establish a driver's alcohol intoxication, allegations of drug
intoxication must be corroborated by expert testimony. See State v. Tiernan, 123
N.J. Super. 322, 325-26, 302 A.2d 561, 563-64, (Law Div. 1973). It is generally felt
that the effects of drugs vary widely with the substance and such testimony is not
within the "common knowledge and observation" of a lay witness. Id.
175 See 13 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 51-3.1 to -3.6 (1982) (discussing approved instruments of breath testing).
176 See ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 16-17, 28-29,
32; Challenge,supra note 136, at 35; Tiernan, 123 N.J. Super. at 325, 302 A.2d at 564.
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and excreting a drug ingested at some prior time; usually within
the previous three days, but sometimes as far back as more than a
month.1 7 7 Habitual marijuana smokers may retain traces of 11nor-A9 -THC-carboxylic acid, the major cannabinoid metabo79
lite, 1 7 8 up to six weeks after they have stopped smoking it.'

Other popular drugs with long body retention times are methaqualone (two weeks), methadone (two to three weeks), and phenobarbital (two to six weeks). 8 0 In contrast, alcohol is
eliminated from the system in three to ten hours.'' These diverse elimination patterns do not necessarily correspond to
levels of impairment. There is yet no scientific proof that traces
left in the urine from a drug ingested several days before the test
affects the behavior of the user; conversely, just because a drug
such as propoxyphene (Darvon®) may be eliminated from the
system in a few hours it does not necessarily mean the behavior
of the drug user is not affected.'8 2 Only clinical research can proSee Hanson, supra note 7, at 4; Clement, supra note 84, at 24.
The marijuana parent drug, delta'-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), is seldom
excreted unmetabolized into the urine. The bulk of the drug passes from the blood
into the body fat deposits where it is slowly broken down into more than ten different metabolites and then eliminated into the urine. Hanson, supra note 7, at 9.
179 Clement, supra note 84, at 24.
180 SYVA Co., QUEsTIONS, supra note 48, at 4; Clement, supra note 84, at 24.
181 Clement, supra note 84, at 24. Dr. Clement provides the following table of
approximate body retention times for various drugs:
Detection Period
Drug
Alcohol
3-10 hours
Amphetamine
24-48 hours
Barbiturates
Secobarbital
24 hours
Phenobarbital
2-6 weeks
Benzodiazepines
3-5 days
Cocaine
5 hours
Benzoylecgonine (metabolite)
2-4 days
Codeine
1-2 days
Heroin
1-2 days
Hydromorphone (Dilaudid®)
1-2 days
Methaqualone (Quaalude)
2 weeks
Methadone (Dolophine®)
2-3 weeks
Morphine
1-2 days
PCP
2-8 days
Propoxyphene (Darvon®)
6 hours
Propoxyphene metabolite
6-48 hours
THC (Marijuana metabolite)
4 times weekly
2 weeks
daily
3-6 weeks
177
178

Id.

182 See ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 16, 17, 29,
32. Dr. Ronald Siegel observed that a person "can be in a virtual 'catatonic state'
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vide the answer and such research is not feasible without a strong
commitment of time and economic resources. It would have to
be an on-going research as there seems to be an inexhaustible
supply of new drugs or drug analogs constantly popping up in
the street market.' 8 3 It will also have to be a blood/body-weight
impairment standard, because urine, unlike blood, is not a reliable source of drug quantitative measurement. 184 Blood testing,
of course, would exacerbate the dispute over "intrusive" procedures which are believed to violate fourth amendment and privacy rights. 185 Whether or not such legal obstacles become a
major impediment, there can still be no legal proof of what constitutes drug abuse impairment until consumption per bodyweight curves are established. Once such data is compiled, the
standard may shift from consumption to impairment, thereby extending proscribed abuse6 to mind altering prescription and overthe-counter medicines.

18

from use of [PCP] and yet test negative for the drug in blood and urine." Id. at 29.
Dr. Siegel is a psychopharmacologist from the U.C.L.A. School of Medicine. Id.
But cf. id. at 16 (initial use of cocaine on the job may not be noticed and some hard
drug addicts can go undetected for years). See also Brotherhood of Maintenance of
Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington N.R.R., 802 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir.
1986). "It is the insidious nature of these substances that too often the user's faculties are impaired and the damage done through a serious error on this part before
he realizes that he is impaired and without any outward sign of his impairment that
could lead a supervisor or other person to intervene." Id.
183 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
184 Hanson, supra note 7, at 14; ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE,
supra note 7, at 32; McBay, Dubowski & Finkle, Letter to the Editor, 249J.A.M.A., Feb.
18, 1983, at 881. See also Childs & McCurdy, Evaluation of a Radioimmunoassay ("'5I)
Kit for CannabinoidMetabolites in Urine and Whole Blood, J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY,
Sept.-Oct. 1984 at 220. Urine is a waste material which varies in chemical composition throughout the day and it is subject to interference by other waste substances.
Id. Blood is a more reliable measuring source because it is chemically stable, which
facilitates comparative measurement. Id.
185 See ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 32-33;
McBay, Dubowski & Finkle, supra note 184, at 881; Voy, supra note 133, at 37. See
also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
186 Various commonly used medications can impair judgment and performance
even when taken in normal dosages. Antihistaminics, for example can affect alertness and ability to drive an automobile or operate dangerous machinery. ALCOHOL
& DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 15. Prescription medications
are, of course, controlled substances. That is the precise reason why they must be
prescribed. See supra note 16. However, they are often not perceived as drugs of
abuse even though a person high on diazepam, commercially sold as the prescription tranquilizer Valium®, can be just as disabled and dangerous as a person high
on marijuana. Id. See also DOT Comments (1987), supra note 16, 52 Fed. Reg. at
2,120.
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The Procedure
1.

Selecting the Subject

Employers generally use three basic methods of selecting
employees for drug testing: universal selection within a class, selection upon suspicion of use, and random selection. In universal selection, all employees within a certain class must be tested
without exception and regardless of suspicion, such as pre-em87
ployment testing of all job applicants for a certain occupation,1
all employees in major modes of transportation who are involved
in serious accidents,1 88 or all customs inspectors applying for a
promotion. 8 9 Although there are some complaints that pre-employment testing does not afford disqualified employees a means
of redress, universal selection has so far been tolerated because
usually there is adequate notice. 190 Furthermore, in pre-employment and pre-promotion testing, the applicant is free to decline
and withdraw. 19 1 Selection upon suspicion almost always requires a "reasonableness" test: absent undisputable signs of impairment or possession, a government employer must be
prepared to show that the proverbial reasonable person in the
same circumstances would have suspected drug use. 9 2 As the
name implies, under a random selection system employees are
picked at random, either in groups or individually, without regard for probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and often with187 See ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 35, 73. The
authors cite a pre-employment testing program instituted in 1984 by a steel manufacturer in Bridgeport, Conn. Id. at 35. In the first year, the program yielded 49
positive results out of 172 tests, showing " 'a veritable shopping list' of illegal drugs
as well as alcohol." Id. The positive results came from applicants at all levels of
employment, including "salaried-exempt and salaried non-exempt positions." Id.
188 See id. at 35-36; DOT Comments (1985), supra note 19, 50 Fed. Reg. at
31,508-09; DOT Comments (1987), supra note 16, 52 Fed. Reg. at 2,118. See also
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington N.R.R.,
802 F.2d 1016, 1023 (5th Cir. 1986) (railway workers); Division 241 Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Suscy, 508 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976)
(bus drivers).
189 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1072 (1988).
190 See ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 35.
191 See id.
192 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979). Under most circumstances
"reasonable suspicion" must be "individualized suspicion." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976);Amalgamated Transit, 508 F.2d at 1267; American Federation of Government Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733
(S.D. Ga. 1986); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C.
1985).
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out notice.19 3 This is the method that has engendered the bulk of
the litigation over drug testing, with both federal and state courts
9 4
currently debating the constitutional issues.
2.

The Sample

Once an employee has been selected for testing, he or she
must provide a biological fluid specimen to be analyzed. Most
commonly, the specimen is urine-although blood provides a
more reliable reading.195 The preference for urine is attributed
to several factors: it is a waste material, easy to obtain and available in large quantities. Moreover, urine testing is a well-tried
method and tests are comparatively inexpensive and reasonably
accurate. 19 6 Although urine testing seems less intrusive than
blood testing in terms of the means used to obtain the sample,
urinalysis is actually much more invasive because of what it may
97
reveal about a person's habits and physical condition.
The integrity of the urine sample is at a much greater risk
than a blood sample. While blood must be extracted under
clinical conditions by qualified personnel, urine is provided by
the individual being tested almost always in a bathroom and away
from monitoring eyes. The courts are adamant about the need
for privacy.' l9 Unfortunately, privacy afforded in order to safeguard human dignity also provides an opportunity for tampering
with the specimen. l° Experts suggest several precautions to
protect the integrity of the sample. These include not allowing
pocketbooks or coats in the bathroom; no hot water taps; mixing
dies into the toilet water, thereby rendering it useless as a
193 See McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987); Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516 (D.N.J. 1986);Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp.
1500, 1502-03 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
194 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 808 F.2d 1057, 1059
n.5 (5th Cir.), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 2479 (1987).
195 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
196 See ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 29; Kropp, supra
note 142, at 38.
197 See ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 32-33. Urine testing can disclose pregnancies, as well as "a heart condition, manic-depression, epilepsy, diabetes or schizophrenia." Stille, supra note 8, at 22 (quoting statement of
chemist Dr. Harold M. Bates, Metpath Laboratories, Teterboro, N.J.). See also McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987); Capua v. City of Plainfield,
643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
198 See McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1309; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
199 See Banzhaf, supra note 9, at 13; Lang, supra note 19, at 51.

1988]

COMMENTS

715

dilutant; 200 listening for sounds of urination;2 0° and making a
clinical examination of the specimen for temperature and color
immediately after it has been submitted by the employee. 2
These methods, although providing increased safeguards, are
not foolproof. Short of demanding a minimum amount of urine,
which is not always possible to produce, only a search of body
cavities can insure that the specimen submitted is indeed that of
the person being tested. 2° ' This, of course, would never be tolerated by the courts.2 °4
200 See The Challenge of Substance Abuse Screening, supra note 136, at 34-35; StarLedger, Feb. 20, 1987 at 16, col. 1 (Federal government plans to use blue toilet
water and restroom monitors).
201 National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 174.
202 See Clement, supra note 84, at 22. Dr. Clement sets out guidelines for specimen collection and provides a check-list to verify that the specimen has not been
adulterated:
1. Do a urinary creatinine-average for urine 2 mg/ml.
2. Do a refractive index (Rf)-a urinary Rf should be 1.005 to 1.030. A
low Rf may indicate dilution of the specimen; a high Rf may suggest the
addition of foreign substances.
3. Look for a precipitate or solids in the urine. This may suggest the
addition of a solid material that may interfere with selected
methodologies
4. Look at the urine color. A very light yellow color may suggest dilution, while other non-yellow colors may suggest the addition of other
liquids, eg apple juice.
5. Note the temperature of the urine collection container when received in your hand. A container holding freshly voided undiluted urine
will feel warm (about 37°C).
6. Note the odor. A nonurine smell may be consistent with adulteration from "fruity liquids," perfumes or a detergent.
7. Have a urinary dip stick available for testing. A "healthy" individual
produces a urine that is negative for glucose and ketone bodies and has
a pH between 6 and 8. A 6-pad dip stick should be negative when used
for testing fresh urine specimens from "healthy" individuals.
Id.
203 Employers often request that the employee "produce... urine under observation within 3 hours of the request." Id. This is not always feasible, and an employee who is forewarned of the possibility of a test can prepare to either adulterate
or substitute the sample. Salt and detergents are sometimes added to the specimen. See Lang, supra note 19, at 51. Other employees use diuretics or drink large
quantities of water to flush the system. Id. Substitution of "clean" urine is sometimes possible by women who conceal a vial in the vagina. Id. There is now a
market developing for those who have no friends willing and able to provide
"clean" urine. Byrd Laboratories of Austin, Texas, advertises "clean" urine for
sale at $49.95 per bag. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1986 at A-9, col. 4. As Dr. Clement points out, "adulteration of a urine specimen submitted for drug analysis is
method dependent. However, dilution of the specimen with water from the toilet
may be the single best method to produce a false-negative result." Clement, supra
note 84, at 22.
204 See Security & Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. Carey, 737
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Once the employee hands over the sample, the employer
must follow strict chain-of-custody procedures to insure fair results and to preserve confidentiality. 20 5 Most on-site testing programs use laboratory kits consisting of tamper resistant
collection bottles, seals, mailing containers, consent forms, and
chain-of-custody documentation. 20

6

Employees are usually re-

quired to place their signatures on the seal of the specimen bottle.20 7 This insures that the correct bottle gets to the laboratory;
its does not necessarily guarantee correct attribution once the
seal is broken for testing at the lab. Carelessness in handling the
documentation can have grave consequences. Drug testing puts
people's livelihoods and reputations at stake; given the seriousness of the matter, there is no room for error.208
3.

The Laboratories

Methodology and procedure greatly affect the accuracy and
reliability of any test. Some tests, such as the chromatographies
and mass spectrometry, depend almost entirely on the technician's expertise and interpretation; 209 but, even a highly automated immunological procedure is ultimately subject to human
error and contamination.2 1 ° Contaminants are naturally present
F.2d 187, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1984).
205 See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
206 Clement, supra note 84, at 22. Dr. Clement, describing proper procedures for
substance abuse testing in community hospitals, outlines the contents of a typical
laboratory urine collection kit:
1. Screw-capped, self-sealing, tamper resistant urine collection bottle
or a 50 ml screw-capped, plastic bottle-two containers, if a split collection is required
2. Security tapes for sealing and initialing each collection-if kit is to
be mailed, outside shipping package should have flaps that can be secured with tamper-proof shipping seals
3. Instructions for .specimen collection, subject consent form, and
chain of possession form
4. Secure storage location
Id. See also, 23 R. KIRK & D. OTHMER, supra note 41, at 311-21 for proper methods
of collecting and preserving samples. "The method of collecting a sample, and the
container used, should preserve essential sample parameters... not cause the loss
...of any substances of interest. Of practical importance, sampling should be easy
to do safely, by only semiskilled personnel." Id. at 311.
207 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1982); ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 36.
208 See Jatlow, supra note 38, at 9; Clement, supra note 84 at 21-23. See infra note
217 and accompanying text discussing liabilities that arise from mistakes and
breaches of confidentiality.
209 See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
210 See Stille, supra note 8, at 24. The author interviewed various chemists who
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in the laboratory atmosphere, equipment, instruments and supplies; thus, care must be exercised at all times to minimize contamination. 2 1 '

Laboratories

should establish and adhere to

clinical quality standards in equipment maintenance, procedures,
and competent personnel. Unfortunately, laboratories do not
need a government license to operate, and professional certification is voluntary. 2

Consequently, there is a wide range in the

quality of service and professional standards. Government studies have uncovered serious deficiencies in a substantial segment
of the drug testing industry.21 " This problem has intensified in
pointed out the dangers of incompetent handling of the sample:
The real room for error is not with the technology but with administrative error.... A human being has to pick up the sample and put it in the
machine. It may sound trivial but it is not. When the volume of work
goes up, the error rate goes up. ... I wouldn't want somebody taking
my urine .... I would always be afraid that somebody might... mix up
samples. It may only happen in one out of 100,000 cases. But I always
have that fear.
Id. (quoting statement of Dr. Harold M. Bates, Metpath Laboratories, Teterboro,
NJ.). Dr. Jatlow, suggesting guidelines for drug testing laboratories, stated that
"as with many endeavors the human element is critical. Instruments do not perform tests, nor do they interpret test results. Those who perform the test must
have skill, intellect, dedication, and must understand what they are doing. They
must be provided with adequate quality control mechanisms and supervision."
Jatlow, supra note 38, at 9.
211 23 A. KIRK & D. OTHMER, supra note 41, at 322-23.
212 Hanson, supra note 7, at 12. Apparently it is quite easy to set up a drug testing operation as there are no professional prerequisites for testing facilities. Professional associations, like the American College of Pathologists, or the American
Association of Bioanalysts, evaluate and issue certificates of competence to laboratories willing to submit to inspection. Id. In California, NewJersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania, the state offers quality assessment programs where the laboratories
receive pre-tested samples to evaluate the laboratory's accuracy. Id. All these programs are voluntary and even the best laboratories are not always willing to pay the
cost. Furthermore, "many labs don't want to know how good, or bad, their work
might be." Id. Certified labs are often more expensive, but worth the price in improved methods and diminished risk of litigation. Id.; see also Stille, supra note 8, at
24.
213 See Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing Results of CDC Blind Study,
253 J.A.M.A., Apr. 26, 1985, at 2382. The authors describe a famous laboratory
quality survey of 13 laboratories conducted by the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia under the direction of the National Institute on Drug
Abuse (NIDA), which found widespread inaccuracies in drug testing. CDC conducted the study from 1972 through 1981 using samples from 262 drug treatment
facilities affiliated with NIDA. Id. About 10% of all samples sent from, the clinics
were "blind" samples which had been purposely mixed with patient samples and
treated as patient samples through out the process. Id. at 2384. The survey found
that while the identified samples tested at 98% average accuracy, the blind samples
only yielded 69% average accuracy-far below the 80% minimum standard required by the CDC for a satisfactory grading. Id. at 2382. Most of the inaccurate
results were false negatives. Id. at 2384. This was attributed to "less sensitive test-
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recent years as the increase in drug testing keeps attracting marginally qualified newcomers to this lucrative field.2 14 Often, even
reputable laboratories may shortcut the standards under pressure to offer the fastest service at the lowest price in competitive
bidding.2 15 Employers who deal with uncertified laboratories
must be prepared to inspect such laboratories periodically to insure minimum of safe standards. Otherwise they may find that
what they save in drug testing costs will not compensate for the
losses incurred through litigation by wronged employees.216
ing" resulting from "methodological design, personnel problems, or the reimbursement process" which put pressure on the laboratories for a quick turn-around
time. Id. at 2386-87. The survey found that "(1) greater care is taken with known
evaluation samples than with routine samples, (2) laboratories are often unable to
detect drugs at concentrations called for by their contracts, and (3) the observed
underreporting of drugs may threaten the treatment process." Id. at 2382. But cf.
Hanson, supra note 7, at 10 (greatest concern is false positives, which affect one's
livelihood and reputation). There was only one lab in the study with a high incidence of error in positive results (67%). "That was only one lab and that was for
methadone. Since all the samples coming to them were from methadone treatment
programs, they naturally assumed the person would be on methadone. This particular lab didn't even test the samples." d. (quoting Dr. Joe Boone who had conducted the NIDA study for CDC). Dr. Jatlow points out that, unlike clinical testing
where there is direct observation of a patient, "independent laboratories conduct
testing in a vacuum." Jatlow, supra note 8, at 9. "Most other clinical laboratory
data is interpreted and used in conjunction with additional information such as
clinical history, physical examination, and other diagnostic tests." Id. at 8. The
independent laboratory is not privy to the additional information. Moreover, nonclinical personnel "do not always have a good understanding or real interest in the
technological and biological ramifications of drug-abuse testing." Id. at 9. Thus,
there is a need for quality control, confirmation tests and strict chain-of-custody
procedures. Id.
214 See Stille, supra note 8, at 24; Hanson, supra note 7, at 12 ("Anybody can buy a
portable testing unit and hang up a shingle claiming to be operating a drug-testing
lab."). Jatlow, supra note 38, at 9 ("Clearly, in our entrepreneurial society, the dramatic increase in the demand for drug-abuse screening is seen as business opportunity. The misconception appears to exist in the part of some that selection of the
appropriate state-of-the-art technology is all that is necessary to go into
'business.' ").
215 Stille, supra note 8, at 24. Employers usually contract out drug testing services to the lowest bidder on a reimbursement basis. Hansen, Caudill & Boone,
supra note 213, at 2386-87.
216 See ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 30-31; Hanson, supra note 7, at 12. Dr. Dal Cortivo, discussing drug testing guidelines developed by the Office of the Medical Examiner, Suffolk County, New York, states:
We emphatically recommend that cost not be the principal determinant
in awarding a contract to a laboratory. Rather, in rough order of their
importance, the following should govern the selection process:
" reliability of work-product
" caliber of laboratory management and staff
* resources of the laboratory, e.g., equipment, space
" communication between vendor laboratory and personnel desig-
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Reporting the Results

Proper chain-of-custody procedures also apply to laboratory
reports. Liability is not restricted to mistaken identification of
samples: breaches of security which result in wrongful disclosures of either medical conditions or test results may give rise to
suits for defamation.217 This is particularly applicable to collateral discoveries of physical conditions or infirmities which are
either voluntarily disclosed by the employee or discovered by the
laboratory in the process of testing.2 18 The confidentiality issue
is of prime importance with in-house laboratories where special
precautions must be taken "[t]o avoid even the remotest possibil219
ity of a conflict of interest . . . or laboratory personnel bias."
Employers must also be cautious in their handling of employees who are confirmed positive for drug use. Where a high
risk activity is involved, such as cargo or passenger carriers, there
are government regulations determining the options available to
employers and employees. Such regulations often involve suspension and rehabilitation. 220 Absent statutory guidelines, the issue of good faith and fair dealing may arise where an employer
tests employment-at-will employees without reasonable suspicion
nated by purchaser
* geographic proximity of vendor facilities to purchaser
* timeliness of reports
* cost
Dal Cortivo, supra note 19, at 19. He suggests that -[e]xcepting unusual circumstances, turn around time for results of tests will not exceed 96 hours (excluding
weekends and holidays) from the time of specimen collection." Id.
217 See O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986)
(employee awarded $358,000 for lost wages plus $50,000 for defamation based on
a statement by the employer disclosing the employee had been discharged for drug
use); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 962 (1977) (employee awarded $200,000 for damages
suffered when employer released a written report mistakenly stating the employee
was a drug user). See also Note, Liability Waiting to Strike: Violation of an Employee's
Privacy through Disclosure of Records, 14 Loy. LA. L. REV. 385 (1981) (discussion of
possible tort claims based on breach of confidentiality by leaking medical or other
personal information).
As a collateral problem, an employer who in the process of testing discovers
that the employee is suffering from some serious illness, may have undertaken an
affirmative duty to warn the employee and failure to do so may subject the employer to tort liability. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d
229 (6th Cir. 1956) (holding employer liable for failing to inform employee of tubercular condition discovered when employer undertook to have his employees
examined).
218 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
219 Dal Cortivo, supra note 19, at 18 (suggesting several urine-testing laboratory
protocols). See id. at 18-19.
220 See ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, 39-46.
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of drug use and discharges them on the basis of testing positive.22 ' On the other hand, an employer who establishes or contracts with an employee assistance program (EAP) 22 2 and gives

those employees testing positive the opportunity to undergo rehabilitation as a condition of keeping their jobs, will probably
have "good cause" to discharge recalcitrant employees. 2 3
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Opponents of workplace drug testing have been challenging
this practice in court for the past decade. They claim that drug
testing violates constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches, that it denies those tested their right to due process,
and that the process itself constitutes an invasion of privacy.2 2 4
Drug testing has also been challenged as discriminatory under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,225 on the grounds that it
may have disproportionate impact on certain groups, such as
blacks and Hispanics. 26 It has also been challenged for handicap
discrimination under the Vocational and Rehabilitation Act of
1973.227 None of these theories has enjoyed much success.
221 See id. at 39, 75-77.
222 See id. at 39-58, 72. EAP's have a long history which goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century. Originally established to deal with alcoholism, they
have been expanded in the middle 1960's and 1970's to include drug rehabilitation.
Id. at 39. In recent years, EAP's have multiplied and become fairly common. As
many as 57.7% of the Fortune 500 companies had EAP's by 1979. Id. at 40 (quoting a National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism survey). EAP's may be
independently owned, whereby services are contracted to employers and/or unions
on an exclusive basis or to several work places in the community; or they may be
internal programs established by the Employer or the union themselves. Id. Quality, manner, and type of service vary widely. See id. at 40-41.
223 Id. at 72, 76.
224 See infra Part III of this comment.
225 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1982) (prohibiting race discrimination by
employers).
226 Although, to date, there have been no judicial opinions specifically on point,
some authorities maintain that "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be
involved in the case of a drug or alcohol policy-or any other employment policywhich [is] disproportionately applied against a protected minority group." ALcoHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 63. Contra New York Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (holding New York Transit Authority's refusal
to hire individuals on methadone maintenance programs did not violate Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even though as many as 63% of the methadone
patients were black or hispanic, because such refusal promoted "general objectives
of safety and efficiency").
227 The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982) protects handicapped persons from employment discrimination by federal contractors
(section 503) and federal grant recipients (section 504). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-94
(1982), amended by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, P.L. No. 99-506,
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The original judicial challenges were directed at the concept
of drug testing regardless of method. 228 Later, attacks have been
usually directed only at mass testing or random selection. 229 The
constitutional analysis in this Comment will be restricted to mass
or random testing programs in the public sector, including heavily regulated private enterprises.23 °
A.

The Fourth Amendment
1. Probable Cause: The Reasonable Suspicion Standard

Most judicial challenges to drug testing have been made on
constitutional grounds. There has been, however, considerable
confusion about what may or may not be constitutionally acceptable. 2 3 The main objection against random testing is that it constitutes an "unreasonable search and seizure" because, under
this system, employees are singled out for testing without first
establishing a causal probability of drug use.232 The fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution 23 3 protects individ§ 103(d)(2)(B), 100 Stat. 1807, 1810 (1986) and Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, P.L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). The Act clearly exempts alcoholics and drug addicts:
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections relate
to employment, such term does not include any individual who is an
alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents
such individual from performing the duties of the job in question or
whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse,
would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B). This section has been held to apply to present alcoholics or
drug abusers only. Those who can prove they are no longer addicted, cannot be
discriminated against because of past abuses. See Whitaker v. Board of Higher
Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99, 106-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791,
795-96 (E.D. Pa. 1978). It must be noted that although section 504 allows private
causes of action against recipients of federal grants, section 503 is restricted to
federal contractors only. Private actions by employers or applicants must be
brought through the Department of Labor. See ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 62 (citations omitted).
228 See Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 533 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (testing bus drivers involved in serious accidents or who are suspected of being under the influence).
229 See infra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
230 See infra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
231 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 808 F.2d 1057, 1059 &
n.5 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2479 (1987); Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Education, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 64-65, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 459
(1987). See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
232 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
233 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
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uals from warrantless intrusions by the sovereign and it is enforceable against the states through the fourteenth
amendment.23 4 Although the fourth amendment clearly disallows warrantless searches and requires "probable cause" before
a warrant can be issued, courts have-ruled that it does not disal23 5
low all warrantless intrusions, only "unreasonable" ones.
Since warrants can be issued only "upon probable cause," it follows that warrantless searches, even when "reasonable," should
be permitted only when they meet at least the same standard as
that required to issue a warrant, if not a higher standard. The
Supreme Court, however, has ruled that searching an individual
with less than probable cause, and occasionally no probable
cause at all, may not violate the fourth amendment under certain
circumstances.236

The major problem with a "probable cause" standard is that
it implies a precedent knowledge about-the object of the search
often only available precisely through a search and seizure. To
deal with this difficulty, the federal courts have instituted the
"reasonable suspicion" standard which is lower than probable
cause, "but something more than mere suspicion.

' 23 7

Reason-

able suspicion applies an objective "reasonable person" standard
where, under the totality of the circumstances, most people of
common sense would arrive at the same conclusion. 2 38 Reasonand effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
234 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
235 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55, 663 (1979) (the exercise of discretion by government officials must be guided by a standard of "reasonableness");
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (fourth amendment protects
against "arbitrary invasions" by government officials).
236 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). Although normally the
fourth amendment mandates a warrant and probable cause, "in certain limited circumstances neither is required." Id. at 340. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 602-605 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970). See also Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986)
(discussed at length, see infra notes 273-301 and accompanying text, applying administrative search exception to urinalysis).
237 See State v. Hunt, 391 So.2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See also Hunter v.
Auger, 672 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1982); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322,
1325-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
238 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 769 U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985); Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 236-39 (1983); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322, 1325-26
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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able suspicion is sometimes described as "founded suspicion." It
may not be a generalized suspicion that something may be
wrong, but must be particularized suspicion predicated upon
"specific objective facts and rational inferences... draw[n] from
th[o]se facts."12 3 9 There must be a "clear indication'" that the evi-

dence sought will be found through the search.. 4 Whether the
search should be allowed, and if so, to what extent, is more difficult to determine. In Terry v. Ohio,2 41 the United States Supreme
Court indicated that a reasonable search must have been "justified at its inception" and that it must have been "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.

' 24 2

Nevertheless, in a much

quoted passage, the Court later observed: "The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a
balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. 243
In balancing needs against rights, courts have carved out
some notable exceptions to probable cause or even reasonable
suspicion. These exceptions are generally known as "administrative searches," a name derived from the statutory power occasionally given to some government administrators to search
people or property without a warrant under some very narrow
circumstances. 44 Administrative searches without warrants or
239 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). Courts have described particularized
suspicion as individual suspicion regardless of the surrounding circumstances. See
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-63 (1976). In the specific context of drug testing, this would mean that a general problem with drug use among
the work force is not sufficient to qualify as reasonable suspicion. Guiney v.
Roache, 654 F. Supp. 1287, 1300-02 (D. Mass.), rev'd on othergrounds, 833 F.2d 1079
(1st Cir. 1987). But cf. Gates, 462 U.S. at 213 (court must examine "totality of circumstances" in deciding whether or not to issue a search warrant). See also
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987) (plurality opinion) (declining to consider whether individualized suspicion is essential to reasonableness standard for
searching employee office).
240 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
241 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court upheld a police officer's impromptu stop and frisk of three men standing on a street corner under what the
officer thought were suspicious circumstances. Id. at 4-7.
242 Id. at 18-20. See also Note, Dragnet Drug Testing in Public Schools and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 852 (1986) (discussion of the implications of Terry on
drug-related searches of students).
243 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). The Court held that in applying
this balancing test, the "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the
place in which it is conducted." Id.
244 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, the Supreme
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founded suspicion have been upheld for government inspections
of coal mines,2 45 firearm and munitions dealers,2 46 retail liquor
outlets,2 47 travelers and their personal effects at border cross* 248
ings,
and, recently, drug testing of jockeys after a horse
race.2 49 Almost invariably the courts have concluded that, since
these are heavily regulated activities, participants in those activities have a diminished expectation of privacy which dispenses
with the notion that the search is unduly intrusive.250
2.

Expectation of Privacy

There is a correlation between the reasonableness of the intrusion and the expectation of privacy of the citizen. 25 ' A search

which is otherwise reasonable at its inception will be found unreasonable if the interference becomes intolerable in intensity
and scope. 52 Every action taken by the government is a potential interference into someone's privacy. Such interferences are
usually tolerated so long as they do not violate a specific right
Court for the first time allowed house inspectors to effect warrantless administrative searches of real property. The Court stated that these searches must be allowed on the grounds that it was impossible to tell the interior condition of the
property from an exterior inspection and custom and public policy sanctioned the
practice in the interest of public health. Id. at 537-38.
245 See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05 (1981).
246 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972).
247 See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970).
248 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1985).
249 See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
577 (1986).
250 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978). In Marshall, the
Supreme Court stated that if an industry has a history of heavy regulation, there is
"no reasonable expectation of privacy." Id.
251 Allen v. Passaic County, 219 N.J. Super. 352, 530 A.2d 371 (Law Div. 1986).
"In order to relax the probable cause requirement the test to be applied is whether
the search is reasonable and that requires a balancing of the need, supported by the
promotion of a legitimate government interest, against the intrusiveness of the
search relative to the individual's expectation of privacy." Id. at 373-74, 530 A.2d
at 382. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). See also
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986). But cf.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1513 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In
Ortega, Justice Blackmun stated:
Just as the elimination of the warrant requirement requires some nexus
between its absence, the employee's privacy interests, and the government interests to be served by the search, so also does the formulation
of a standard less than probable cause for a particular search demand a
similar connection between these factors. The plurality's discussion of
investigatory [and inventory] searches reveals no attempt to set forth
the appropriate nexus.
Id. at 1513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
252 Terry, 392 U.S. at 18.
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protected by the United States Constitution.255 In Brinegar v.
United States, 2 54 the Court stated that the purpose of the fourth

amendment is to "safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy" by the sovereign. 255 The fut
fourth
amendment, however, does not protect against a general right to
privacy.256 It only protects against very narrowly defined intrusions into areas where the individual retains a "legitimate," "justifiable" or "reasonable" expectation of privacy.257 The
emphasis must be placed on the individual. As the Court stated
in Katz v. United States, 2 58 "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 259
There is no clear standard of what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy in every situation. 260 The Court has indicated that the determination must be made on a case by case basis. 2 6 ' The basic test was first articulated in Katz by Justice
Harlan. Summarizing the Court's opinion, he stated: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that
there is a two fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "262 This "reasonable" expectation must be justified in
relation to concepts outside of the fourth amendment, such as
real or personal property law or widely held societal values. 2 63 It
must be, however, "more than a subjective expectation of not be26
ing discovered.

'

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967).
338 U.S. 160 (1949).
Id. at 176.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51 (footnote omitted). The Court observed that "the
protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the
law of the individual states." Id. (footnote omitted).
257 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citations omitted). See also
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1967).
258 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
259 Id. at 351.
260 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
261 Id. See also O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1497 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion).
262 Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan observed that although "a man's home" will normally be accorded a reasonable expectation of privacy, such is not the case with "objects, activities, or statements that
he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders" because there is no obvious intention to
keep them private. Id.
263 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978).
264 Id. at 143 n.12; accord United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984)
253
254
255
256
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The Katz test has been used consistently in fourth amendment analysis since it was first enunciated.265 Although it is generally adequate as originally stated it could have overbroad
interpretations if carried to extreme conclusions. Essentially, if
expectation is based on what external sources determine as reasonable, conceivably the reasonableness of the expectation can
be defeated by previous warning that such expectation is misplaced. Aware of this problem, the Supreme Court has indicated
that the Katz test may not be used to invalidate the reasonableness of the expectation through adequate notice that certain
traditionally protected areas would henceforth lack such protection.266 According to this reasoning, expectation of privacy as it
relates to workplace urinalysis could not be defeated by pre-employment warning or implied notice through pervasive regulation. Nevertheless, the cases that have upheld compulsory drug
testing have found a diminished expectation of privacy on the
basis of either pre-employment awareness, or pervasive regulation, or both.267
("The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the
authorities.").
265 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1498 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion); id. at 1505-06 (Scalia, J., concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979).
266 Smith, U.S. at 740 n.5 (1978). Analyzing the Katz two-pronged test, the Court
stated:
For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual
expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation's
traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the content of his calls might be lacking as well. In such
circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations has been
"conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no
meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of the- Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether a "legitimate expectation
of privacy" existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.
Id. at 740 n.5.
267 See Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 1987) (diminished expectation of privacy as FBI agent); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 180 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988) (U.S.
customs employees applying for promotion to sensitive positions in "drug interception know that inquiry may be made concerning their off-the-job use of drugs");
McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1306 (8th Cir. 1987) (department of corrections employees who signed pre-employment search consent forms have dimin-
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Urinalysis as a Search

There is no question that mandatory urine testing of government employees is a warrantless search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.2 68 Consequently, all courts
agree that the proper basis for allowing drug testing is reasonable suspicion. The disagreement involves whether there is a
compelling reason to overcome the constitutional restrictions in
the absence of founded suspicion.2 69 Some courts have upheld
random testing for reasons ranging from public policy to diminished expectation of privacy in certain heavily regulated activiished expectation of privacy); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986) (jockeys who choose to become involved in pervasively regulated horse racing industry have reduced privacy expectation); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (urinalysis of
soldiers does not infringe upon their privacy since "inspections have been traditionally accepted and are expected of soldiers"); Rushton v. Nebraska, 653 F. Supp.
1510, 1524 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (nuclear power plant
employees have diminished expectation of privacy given the pervasive regulatory
scheme of the industry).
268 McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1306 (8th Cir. 1987); Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986);Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp.
1500, 1508-09 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 833 F.2d 335 (App. D.C. 1987); Allen v. City of
Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F.
Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322,
1325-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Cf. Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511
(11 th Cir. 1987) (no search when employee refuses to be tested).
269 Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 216 N.J.
Super. 461, 471-72, 524 A.2d 430, 436 (App. Div. 1987). It has often been argued
that evidence of drug use in the workplace indicates a "compelling need" sufficient
to outweigh fourth and fourteenth amendment protections. See Guiney v. Roache,
654 F. Supp. 1287, 1300 (D. Mass.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 833 F.2d
1079 (1st Cir. 1987). Courts have not been inclined to find a "compelling need" in
urinalysis cases. In a case involving police officers, the United States District Court
for the District of Tennessee found that two positive tests, rumors of switching
specimens, a statement by the chief of police asserting the possibility of a 10%
incidence of abuse in the department, tips from FBI agents about drug use, and
statements by former police officers that "several officers used marijuana" were not
sufficient to overcome the need for reasonable suspicion. Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F.
Supp. 815, 816-17 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1988). In a
companion case, which involved fire fighters, the court found that showing drug
use through several positive tests and evidence of switched samples was not sufficient to demonstrate increased drug use to the point of threat to the efficiency of
the Department. Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 882 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988). In New York, twenty-two positive tests in a police force of 26,000 officers indicated that drug use was a very
infrequent problem at best. Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc.2d 544, 551, 506 N.Y.S.2d
789, 795 (1986), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1987). Other cases have
found compelling need, at least implicitly, to justify allowing random drug testing.
See infra note 270 and cases cited therein.
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ties. 2 70 As of this writing the majority of the courts dealing with
the issue have rejected random testing of government employees
almost invariably on the basis that it is an unreasonable intrusion
in violation of the fourth amendment. 2 7' The uncertainty, however, is far from over. The decisions do not always split along
jurisdictional lines; occasionally, the split occurs within the jurisdiction itself. Such is the case in the Third Circuit where currently there are major differences of opinion about the
constitutionality of government mandated random testing of
New Jersey employees.2 7 2
a.

The Federal Courts

The first New Jersey case to deal with random selection was
Shoemaker v. Handel,2 73 which involved testing jockeys after horse
races. The New Jersey Racing Commission (Commission) has
the statutory power to license and regulate all persons employed
in the horse racing industry. 2 74 Pari-mutuel betting is an integral
part of the sport and the state receives a percentage of the wagering revenue. 2 75 The Commission has issued very strict guidelines
which allow the State of New Jersey to exert tight regulatory controls over the sport through the Commission.2 7 6 In January
1985, the Commission adopted two regulations giving the State
Steward the power to test jockeys for drugs and alcohol.2 7 7
270 See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1987) (FBI
agents); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987) (prison security
officers); Shoemaker v. Handel; 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 577 (1986) (horse racing jockeys); Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518
F.2d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (soldiers).
271 See Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1522; Caruso, 133 Misc.2d at 557-58, 506 N.Y.S.2d
at 799; Penny, 648 F. Supp. at 816; Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d
1005, 1008-09 (D.C. 1985).
272 See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986) (jockeys at government owned horse track); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643
F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (fire fighters); Policemen's Benevolent Association of
NewJersey, Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 672 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1987)
(police officers); Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark,
216 N.J. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1987) (police detectives); Allen v.
Passaic County, 219 N.J. Super. 352, 530 A.2d 371 (Law Div. 1986) (sheriff's department officers).
273 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
274 Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1137-38. The NewJersey Constitution was amended in
1939 to permit horse racing and pari-mutuel betting in the state. Id. at 1141 & n.3.
Shortly thereafter, the Racing Commission was created and given broad regulatory
powers. Id. at 1141. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:5-33 (West Supp. 1985).
275 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:5-64, 64.1 (West Supp. 1987).
276 Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1138, 1141.
277

See N.J.

ADMIN. CODE tit.

13:70, § 14A.10- 11 (1985). The New Jersey Racing
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Under the detailed guidelines, the State Steward was given discretionary power to order post-race breathalyzer and urine testing of all officials, jockeys, trainers and grooms involved in a
particular race.278
Immediately after the regulations became effective, five jockeys licensed to race in New Jersey2 79 sued in Federal District

Court for a preliminary injunction against the Racing Commission under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.280 The jockeys claimed that

the regulations violated their rights under the fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments, as well as the due process and equal protecCommission (Commission) has the power to "prescribe rules, regulations and conditions under which all horse races shall be conducted." N.J. STAT. ANN. 5:5-30
(West 1973).
278 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13:70, § 14A.10-11 (1985) (use of controlled sub-

stances is forbidden both on and off the track). This directive is currently implemented by selecting three to five names at random after a given race. The selection
may be witnessed by a representative of the Jockey's Guild, and those selected
more than three times in a seven day period are excused from taking the test. Jockeys must also inform the Steward about all prescription and non-prescription drugs
they are currently using. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1094-95 (D.N.J.
1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986). To insure
anonymity, the urine sample is identified solely by a number which correlates with
the number in the certification form provided at the time of testing. Id. at 1095.
Only the Executive Director of the Commission has access to the certifications. Id.
The test results, however, are also available to a designee of the Executive Director,
and to all the Commissioners, but may not be disclosed to enforcement agencies.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13:70, § 14A. 1 (e) (1985). If no violations are discovered,
the test results are routinely destroyed after one year. Id. § 14A. 11(f). Although
the breathalyzer tests are administered in private, there is no comparable provision
for confidentiality in preserving the results. See Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1094.
The penalties for refusing to take the tests include fines, suspension and loss of
license. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13:70, § 14A.7 (1985).

279 The five jockeys were William Shoemaker, Angel Cordero, Jr., William H. McCauley, Phillip Grove, and Vincent Bracciole. See Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1091.
280 Id. This federal statute, originally included in the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
provides a private cause of action against abuses of power by state public officials:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Although this section may have been prompted by the
plight of former slaves, it was always intended for the protection of anyone victimized by persons acting under color of state law. Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 635-636 (1980); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 591-93 (1978);
Miller v. Apartments & Homes of New Jersey, Inc., 646 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.
1981); cf. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268-271 (1981).
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tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. 2 8

l

The court denied the preliminary injunction in

counts.28 2

all
Later, at the trial on the merits,28 3 the court upheld
the constitutionality of requiring such tests, but directed the
Commissioner to adopt confidentiality guidelines in the administration of breathalyzer tests similar to those already in place for
urinalyses.2 a4 On appeal, the jockeys invoked the fourth amendment guarantee against warrantless searches, the fourteenth
amendment requirement of equal protection of the laws, and a
general constitutional right of privacy. The Third Circuit rejected all their arguments and affirmed the district court's
decision. 8 5
The Third Circuit held that the urinalysis program in question fell under the administrative search exception to the fourth
amendment.28 6 A warrantless administrative search exception
applies to closely regulated industries provided the state has a
high interest in conducting surprise searches and provided the
regulatory controls have diminished the privacy expectations of
those to be searched.28 7 In the court's opinion, the Commission's drug testing program met both requirements. Judge Gibbons, writing for the court, stated that there is a strong state
interest in preserving public confidence in a wagering sport.2 8 8

He also noted that the jockeys have little expectation of privacy,
not only because of the pervasive regulations, but also because of
the character of the sport itself which focuses attention on the
physical condition of the participants. 8 9 Thus, he concluded,
the jockeys could be tested without a prerequisite of individualized suspicion.2 9 6
Aside from the administrative search exception, the court
also found that the State Steward's system of random selection
may not necessarily be unreasonable. Under this system, subShoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (D.C.N.J. 1985).
Shoemaker, 608 F. Supp. at 1155, 1161. The court, nevertheless, directed the
Commission to display the word "optional" in the medical treatment disclosure
form. Id. at 1160.
283 Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985), aft'd, 795 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
284 Id. at 1107.
285 Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141, 1144 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 577 (1986).
286 Id. at 1142.
287 Id. (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)).
288 Id. at 1141-42.
289 See id. at 1142, 1144.
290 Id.
281
282
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jects are selected by lot and all participants have an equal chance
of being chosen. 29 ' The court observed that there is a constitutional distinction between random testing pursuant to a predetermined plan, and surprise testing at the discretion of a field
officer. The presence or absence of limiting guidelines is a crucial element of the fourth amendment "reasonableness" requirement. 29 2 Since the State Steward does not determine who will be

tested on each occasion, this system of random selection was held
to meet the constitutional standard. 293 As for the other constitutional arguments, the court rejected the equal protection claim
on the ground that the state had an overriding interest in preserving the integrity of the sport, and concluded that the Commission's method of testing and preserving laboratory files did
not infringe upon the jockey's right of privacy.294 Five months
later, the Third Circuit decision became final when the United
States Supreme Court denied certification.295
Clearly, the State has a high interest in preserving the integrity of horse racing. It is precisely for this reason that horse racing is such a heavily regulated sport. There is also a well
established precedent for allowing warrantless searches of heavily regulated industries.296 This precedent, however, has usually
been confined to administrative searches of property.2 9 7 What
makes Shoemaker unique is the court's extension of the administrative search exception to a human being's body fluids without
probable cause or, at least, reasonable suspicion 2 98 and without
the extenuating circumstances attendant to searches at border
crossings.299 It is true that the Shoemaker court restricted its decision to "voluntary participants in a highly regulated industry"
Id. at 1143.
Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-84 (1975)).
293 Id. The court, however, did not foreclose the issue of constitutionality in reference to breathalyzer tests for alcohol abuse. Id. at 1143 n.6.
294 Id. at 1143-44.
295 Shoemaker v. Handel, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
296 See supra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
297 Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 584 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988). But see In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 313-14, 447 A.2d
1290, 1299 (1982) (administrative search may extend to persons associated with the
enterprise if they are present at the site while the search is taking place).
298 See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. In a later decision, the Nebraska district court
cited Shoemaker as controlling precedent for holding mandatory random drug testing of nuclear plant employees constitutional under the administrative search exception to the fourth amendment. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F.
Supp. 1510, 1524 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F. 2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
299 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
291
292
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who have minimal expectations of privacy.30° Nevertheless, this
holding represented a clear departure from the general trend in
drug testing cases.3 0 '
Capua v. City of Plainfield,- °2 decided shortly after Shoemaker's
appellate review, falls in line with the majority of the jurisdictions. In Capua, a system of ad hoc mass urinalysis of fire department employees, was declared unconstitutional. 0 3 Without
specific suspicion that any fire fighter was on drugs, 0 4 the city
had, on three different occasions, conducted early morning surprise inspections at the municipal fire station. After locking all
the building doors, the fire fighters had been forced to produce a
urine sample under direct surveillance.3 0 5

The city had not

warned the employees about the impending urine testing program; it had not established guidelines for conducting such tests;
and it had not ordered back-up tests on the samples found positive. 0 6 All the fire fighters who had tested positive were summarily discharged without pay. 0 7 They immediately brought action
in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983308 claiming that
Plainfield's drug testing program violated their constitutional
rights under the fourth amendment.3 0 9 The court ordered the

plaintiffs reinstated and enjoined the city from conducting any
further urine tests.31 0
Judge Sarokin, in a scathing opinion, denounced both the
mandatory testing and the procedures used in conducting the
tests. 3 1l
Noting that the "essential purpose" of the fourth
amendment is to protect the "privacy and security" of the citi300 Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. Accord Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist.,
653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (random
testing of public utility employees).
301 See generally National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); American Federation of Government Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Penny v.
Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aft'd, 346 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1988);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Caruso v. Ward, 133
Misc. 2d 544, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1986), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551
(1987) Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. App. 1985).
302 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.NJ. 1986).
303 Id. at 1522.
304 Id. at 1517.
305 Id. at 1511.
306 Id. at 1511-12, 1521.
307 Id. at 1512.
308 See supra note 280.
309 Capua, 643 F. Supp. at
310 Id. at 1512, 1522.
311

Id. at 1511-20.
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zens from "arbitrary invasions by government officials," 12 he
observed that the city of Plainfield's testing methods were particularly offensive. He stated that individuals have a high expectation of privacy in the act of urination. Forcing the fire fighters to
urinate under close visual supervision was a totally unreasonable
intrusion, akin to a strip search.3 13 More significantly, however,
he found a further expectation of privacy in the physiological
data contained in a person's urine. Observing that modern medical technology can elicit a wealth of information about a person's
physical condition, he held that this program's lack of safeguards
for confidentiality were completely unacceptable. 1 4 He was particularly concerned about the potential for misuse of such information. Carelessness in these matters, he stated, could result in
embarrassment to the employees and even affect their "job assignments, security and promotion. 31 5 Taking pains to distinguish Shoemaker, Judge Sarokin pointed out that the city had
conducted the tests "without notice, without standards, and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. "316
The Plainfield testing program is, undoubtedly, an extreme
example of intrusion without standards. The sweeping nature of
the selection procedure and the clumsy method of implementation make it easy to distinguish this program from other programs where selection was based on reasonable suspicion. 17
This task becomes more challenging, however, when the precedent a lower court is trying to distinguish is a case on point recently decided by the circuit court with appellate jurisdiction over
the lower court's district. In his efforts to distinguish Shoemaker,
Judge Sarokin emphasized that the state of New Jersey has a
strong interest in enhancing the image of the racing industry because of the state's "direct financial stake" in the sport.31 8 He
conceded that the general public may have an interest in preservId. at 1512 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).
Id. at 1514.
314 Id. at 1515.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 1511.
317 See id. at 1515-16. The court distinguished Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.
Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985), on the grounds that the City's Board of Lights and
Water employees had been tested only "upon some reasonable, individualized suspicion that the employees subjected to urinalysis were under the influence of drugs
while on thejob." Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1516. It also distinguished Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1976), on the same
"reasonable suspicion" grounds. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1516.
318 Id. at 1519.
312
313
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ing the integrity of the municipal fire brigades. Nevertheless, he
stated, public confidence is not as important to the effective performance of the fire fighting forces as it is to the operation of the
horse racing industry. 31 9 He contended that the process of selection through the civil service test and the "exhaustive training"
of fire fighters should be sufficient to reassure the public of their
competence. 2 ° In addition, he found that fire fighters have a
much higher expectation of privacy than jockeys, as fire fighters
are not subject to pervasive regulation.3 2

But, the "most critical

distinction" between the two cases, he stated, was the lack of procedural protections in the municipal program. 2 2
While the lack of notice and testing standards may distinguish Capua from Shoemaker, there is hardly a distinction on the
issue of probable cause. The jockeys of Shoemaker must submit to
urinalysis at random whether or not there is founded suspicion
that any or all may be using controlled substances on or off the
premises. The innocent is searched along with the guilty. In
Capua, the same disregard for the rights of the innocent drew
harsh criticism from Judge Sarokin.3 23 After condemning arbi-

trary drug testing as a type of Orwellian surveillance,3 24 he expounded at length on the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty:
If we choose to violate the rights of the innocent in order to
discover and act against the guilty, then we will have transformed our country into a police state and abandoned one of
319 Id. Judge Sarokin pointed out that horse racing is particularly vulnerable to
"untoward influences" associated with organized gambling. Id. (quoting Shoemaker,
795 F.2d at 1141). He stressed the Shoemaker court's reasoning that urinalysis "was
the only 'effective' means to dispel long standing public suspicion of criminal influences" in the horse racing industry. Id. How urinalysis will accomplish this has not
been explained in either opinion.
320 Id. at 1519-20. The judge observed that 'it is not the demonstration of propriety that is essential but rather the determination ofjob-related capability." Id. at
1519.
321 Id. at 1518-20.
322 Id. at 1520. Judge Sarokin called particular attention to the shoddy methods
employed by the city: "The harassment, coercion and tactics utilized here even if
motivated by the best of intentions, should cause us all to recognize the realities of
government excesses and the need for constant vigilance against intrusions into
constitutional rights by its agents." Id. at 1511.
323 See id. at 1511, 1517. "Such an unfounded presumption of guilt is contrary to
the protections against arbitrary and intrusive government interference set forth in
the Constitution." Id.at 1517.
324 Id. "Drug testing is a form of surveillance, albeit a technological one. Nonetheless, it reports on a person's off-duty activities just as surely as [if] someone had
been present and watching. It is George Orwell's 'Big Brother' Society come to
life." Id.
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the fundamental tenets of our free society. In order to win the
must not sacrifice the life of the Constiwar against drugs, we
3 25
tution in the battle.

These sentiments were echoed by Judge Rodriguez in Policemen s Benevolent Association of New Jersey, Local 318 v. Township of Washington,32 6 which further widened the gap between the opinions of the
district court and the Third Circuit's Shoemaker opinion. This case
involved a proposed pre-employment and post-employment drug
screening plan to test the township's police force as part of
mandatory medical examinations. All employees were required to
comply at least once a year, and at random on other "regularly
scheduled and announced" occasions.3 2 7 Testing was to be confined to specific drugs, and the random selection of employees was
to be made "by a computer programmed by an independent contractor." 328 Although those selected would not have been informed
until "just prior" to being tested, the testing plan could not have
been activated without first giving the employees a minimum sixty
days advance notice.3 2 9 The actual testing and chain-of-custody

procedures, as well as provisions for back up testing and preserving
confidentiality, were spelled out in minute detail.3 3 0 Before the plan
went into effect, however, the local police officers' association
brought an action in federal district court to enjoin the township
from implementing the program. 3 1 Judge Rodriguez granted the
injunction holding that universal and random urinalysis of police officers violated the fourth amendment of the United States ConstituIn order to reach that conclusion, it was not only necessary
tion.3
for Judge Rodriguez to distinguish Shoemaker,33 3 but also to interpret Capua as intended to apply beyond the stated facts of the case.
Id.
672 F. Supp. 779 (D.NJ. 1987).
Id. at 781, 794. As a condition of employment, the plan required all applicants for municipal jobs to sign forms consenting to urinalysis. Id. at 781. Detection of drugs or refusal to submit to testing would result in disqualification for
employment. Id.
328 Id. at 781-82.
329 Id. at 781-82, 789.
330 Id. at 782.
331 Id. at 780-81.
332 Id. at 796.
333 Id. at 786-87. In addition to Shoemaker, 795 F.2d 1136 (horse racing jockeys),
the court also distinguished National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816
F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988) (customs inspectors);
McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (prison guards); National
Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists v. Dole, No. A87-073 (D. Alaska 1987) (flight service
specialists); and Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb.
1987), aft'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (nuclear plant employees).
325
326
327
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After the prerequisite warrantless search/reasonable suspicion
fourth amendment analysis, Judge Rodriguez stated that random selection was the "heart and soul" of the township's proposed plan
and the crux of the constitutional problem in this matter.3 3 4 He
noted that mass-testing or random selection had only been upheld
for individuals with minimum privacy expectations employed in
highly regulated enterprises which were the object of a strong state
interest. 3 35 Comparing Shoemaker and other similar decisions to the
present case, he stated that the Washington Township police force
was not a highly regulated industry.3 3 6 He added that, although police officers may have a diminished expectation of privacy in their
employment, "they do not surrender all their constitutional rights
when they accept a public position. ' 3 3 7 As for the state interest,
Judge Rodriguez acknowledged the importance of maintaining a
drug-free police force. Nonetheless, he held that absent proof of
risk to the public or impaired performance due to widespread use,
the state interest did not outweigh individual rights.3 38 Thus, he
concluded, none of the compelling reasons applicable to Shoemaker
and related holdings were present in this case. 3 9
Citing "a plethora" of reported opinions,Judge Rodriguez held
that the "overwhelming consensus" of the decisions did not allow
drug testing "in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that the employee has been using illegal drugs." 34 0 The defendants, however,
maintained that the real reason many of these programs had been
struck down was because of lack of procedural standards. One of
the most notable examples, they asserted, could be found in Capua,
a decision which Judge Rodriguez had cited throughout his opinion
as controlling precedent. The defendants alleged that the township's plan had been carefully drafted to overcome the constitutional infirmities that had disqualified other programs. 3 4 ' Unlike
the program in Capua, the defendants pointed out, the township's
plan provided ample notice and detailed guidelines for selection,
implementation, and confidentiality. Nothing was left to the discretion of field supervisors.3 4 2 Judge Rodriguez conceded that previous decisions had emphasized the absence of well-defined
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342

Policeman's Benevolent Association, 672 F. Supp. at 785.
Id. at 784-86.
Id. at 786-87, 793-94.
Id. at 787 (citations omitted).
Id. at 791.
Id, at 787.
Id. at 788.

Id. at 789.

See id. at 789, 781-83.
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administrative procedures and standards. Nevertheless, he concluded, "the standard which was most significantly absent" was the
one calling for individual suspicion.3 43 He specifically stated:
[T]his court does not find that the result in Capua would differ
if the mass testing had been carried out in a less offensive
manner. The constitutional standard enunciated in Capua was
that mandatory department-wide urine testing was not
permissable (sic) because it was not based upon "individualized, reasonable suspicion." Mass or random testing, though
it might be carried out in a more civilized manner, will still fail
to meet that standard. 4 4
As of this writing, the last federal case heard in the district of
New Jersey seems to turn the trend back towards Shoemaker. Poole v.
Stephens,34' decided by Judge Bissell, upheld the state's right to conduct random testing of Corrections Officer Training Academy
(COTA) recruits. 4 6 This is not, however, a conclusive decision. In
an ambivalent opinion, Judge Bissell also agreed that drug testing of
veteran corrections officers could only be oeffected on the basis of individualized suspicion. 4 7 Moreover, he indicated that the ultimate
decision on whether or not these recruits could be subjected to random testing will rest with the New Jersey state courts.3 48
This suit was brought by COTA recruits, veteran corrections
officers, and their representative union as a challenge to a memorandum issued by the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department
of Corrections. 49 The memorandum outlined a drug testing plan
implemented under guidelines previously promulgated by the State
Attorney General.3 5 0 The program required testing of all "permanently appointed" internal affairs investigators or supervisors, and
corrections officers or supervisors on the basis of "individualized
reasonable suspicion" of use or impairment.Si It also required
testing COTA recruits upon application for admission to the Academy and subsequently "more than once while at the COTA, without
'
any individualized reasonable suspicion to suspect drug usage. " 52
The plaintiffs claimed that this testing plan violated both the federal
Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, 672 F. Supp. at 789.
Id. (citations omitted).
345 688 F. Supp. 149 (D.N.J. 1988).
343

344

346
347
348
349
350
351
352

Id. at 158.
Id. at
Id. at
Poole,
Id. at

157-58.
158. See also infra notes 362-66 and accompanying text.
688 F. Supp. at 150.
159 (exhibit A).

Id. at 151.
Id. at 152.
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and the state constitutions. They principally alleged violations of
the fourth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution, and to article one, paragraph seven of the New Jersey
constitution.3 5 3
With an economy of authority,35 4 Judge Bissell conceded that
drug testing may be a "seizure," albeit not an unreasonable one. 5
Examining recent case law on point, he unreservedly cited Shoemaker
as controlling precedent.3 56 He quickly distinguished Capua by noting that, unlike the Capua firefighters, the COTA recruits had not
been subjected to a "raid.1 3 7 He also disposed of Township of Washington by stating that the case was currently "on appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the author of Shoemaker."'358 Judge Bissell compared the situation of the COTA recruits to that of the jockeys in Shoemaker. He observed that the
recruits, being "aware of the peculiar circumstances and demands"
of their chosen profession, had reduced privacy expectations.3 59
Balancing the equities of the parties involved, he found that the
methods employed by the Commissioner were "hardly onerous.
Thus, he concluded, the Commissioner's plan did not violate the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 '
Judge Bissell specifically declined to consider the state constitutional claim on the ground that the issue, as it applied to the parties
before the bench, was not yet a settled matter under state law.3 6 2
He acknowledged that New Jersey state courts have repeatedly held
that the New Jersey constitution affords greater protection against
warrantless searches than the federal constitution. 63 Moreover, the
Poole opinion was released after one appellate state court had invalidated random testing of law enforcement officers under the New
Jersey constitution. 6 4 Judge Bissell, however, observed that there
are major differences between testing officers and testing trainees,
and as yet there had been no definitive decision on the matter of
Id. at 150.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id.
357 Id.
358 Id.
359 Id.
353
354
355
356

360 Id.
361 Id.
362 Id. at 158 (citations
363 Id.
364 See Fraternal Order

omitted).

of Police v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 461, 524 A.2d
430 (App. Div. 1987). See infra notes 387-412 for an extended discussion of this
case.
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trainees.3 6 5 Should the state establish that random testing of recruits violated the state constitution, Judge Bissell conceded that he
would probably have to revise the Poole decision. 6
b.

The State Courts

The Poole opinion implicitly underscores another split in the
decisions: that which exists between the federal and the state
courts. While the federal courts were developing precedent
under the United States Constitution, the New Jersey state courts
had been simultaneously considering the same issues under both
the federal and the state constitutions. The first employee drugtesting case heard in state court, Allen v. Passaic County, 36 7 was decided shortly after the federal district court had sanctioned random testing in Shoemaker. It concerned corrections employees
3 68
from the sheriff's department.
Disturbed by an investigation which had uncovered possession and drug use among corrections officers and Passaic County
Jail inmates, 6 9 the sheriff had issued a terse memorandum ordering drug urinalysis of all sheriff's department employees "no less
than twice and no more than four times annually. 31 7 0 The order
called for "disciplinary action and/or dismissal" upon refusal to
comply. 3 7 ' The memorandum did not contain instructions for
carrying out the actual testing, protecting the integrity of the
sample, or safeguarding confidentiality.3 72 After submitting to
urinalysis, several employees brought an action in state court to
enjoin the testing program, claiming that dragnet testing violated
both the United States and the New Jersey Constitutions.
De365 Poole, 688 F. Supp. at 158. Judge Bissell indicated that there were presently
two unreported decisions on the subject of random testing of police trainees "fasttracked" for appeal. Id. (citing Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, No. A2998-87T5, appealcert. (App. Div. March 21, 1988); Sweeney v. County of Bergen,
No. C-475-87 (N.J. Ch. Div. Jan. 7, 1988), appeal docketed, No. A-2632-87T5 (App.
Div. Jan. 15, 1988)).
366 Poole, 688 F. Supp. at 158.
367 219 N.J. Super. 352, 530 A.2d 371 (Law Div. 1986). The court noted that this
was a case of first impression in a New Jersey state court. Id. at 367, 530 A.2d at
379. A previous New Jersey state case, Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School Dist., 211 N.J. Super. 54, 510 A.2d 709 (Ch. Div. 1985), concerned
drug testing school children, not employees. Id. at 55-56, 510 A.2d at 709-10.
368 Allen, 219 N.J. Super. at 354, 530 A.2d at 372.
369 Id. at 355-56, 530 A.2d at 372.
370 Id. at 383, 530 A.2d at 387 (appendix A).
371 Id.
372 Id. at 379, 530 A.2d at 385.
373 Id. at 356, 530 A.2d at 373.
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ciding the case exclusively under federal constitutional law, Superior Court Assignment Judge Mandak held that the only
appropriate standard for drug testing was reasonable
suspicion.374
In this case, the plaintiffs had specifically argued that even if
dragnet testing was found to be permissible under the federal
fourth amendment, it should still be disallowed under the New
Jersey constitution because the state constitution afforded "even
greater protection for individual rights than provided by the Federal Constitution. 3 75 Judge Mandak, however, rejected this argument stating that although there was a modern trend towards
citing state constitutions as a vehicle for "expanding the protection of individual rights," prior New Jersey case law had only expanded the protection in criminal cases.376 As this was not a
criminal matter and being an issue of first impression in the state,
he felt compelled to apply federal precedent in a manner consistent with the thinking of New Jersey courts on analogous issues. 377 On that basis, Judge Mandak stated that since both the
United States and the New Jersey constitutions only forbid unreasonable searches, then if the search is reasonable, it may be
conducted without a warrant or probable cause.378 On the other
hand, he aoted, it could be argued that all searches carried out
without a warrant or probable cause may be per se unreasonable. 3 79

Nevertheless, Judge Mandak rejected this position,

indicating that "constitutional rights may give way when reasonableness prevails. 380
After analyzing a line of cases which allowed searches in the
absence of probable cause, he concluded that the best approach
was to balance "the need for the search ... against the invasion
of privacy or the intrusion that the search entails. 3 8 1 Applying

this test, he found that the request for urine samples was not
"unduly repugnant" nor did it "per se offend the sensibilities of
the average person. '"382

He stated, however, that the request

374 Id. at 380, 530 A.2d at 385.
375 Id. at 356, 530 A.2d at 373.
376 Id. at 367, 530 A.2d at 379 (quoting State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super.
229, 238, 491 A.2d 37, 42 (App. Div. 1985)).
377 Id. at 367-68, 530 A.2d at 379.
378 See id. at 358, 530 A.2d at 374.
379 Id. at 358-59, 530 A.2d at 374.
380 Id. at 363, 530 A.2d at 376.
381 Id. at 360, 530 A.2d at 374 (citation omitted).
382 Id. at 375, 530 A.2d at 383.
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could not be made without reasonable suspicion. 83 In reaching
this conclusion, he distinguished the New Jersey Racing Commission's urinalysis program as described in Shoemaker from the
county's crude efforts. 84 He stressed that the sheriff's department was not regulated by the state, that its employees had not
been forewarned of drug testing as a job requirement, and that
they were not subject to "the criminal influence [as] in the gambling and horse racing industry.

38 5

In addition, he found that

the sheriff's plan lacked appropriate standards, not only for testing, but also for follow-up measures. "The rules should not be
made up along the way," he asserted, "they should
be estab' 38 6
lished, complete and in place from the inception.

In the next reported state case to deal with drug testing, Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, sat the court avoided the issue
of conflict with Shoemaker by basing its holding exclusively on the
NewJersey constitution. This case was prompted by an order of
the City of Newark Police Director requiring immediate drug
testing of all members of the city's Narcotic Bureau. Declaring
that "the health of the employee and the trust of the public" were
of paramount importance to the police department, the Director
had issued a memorandum ordering urinalysis and blood tests of
detectives, both upon transfer into the bureau and subsequently
at least twice a year.388 The first such testing was ordered without notice on the same day the memorandum was delivered to
the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). 8 9 The FOP immediately
brought suit in state court seeking a permanent injunction
against the city under both the United States and the New Jersey
constitutions.3 9 0 The trial court, in an unreported opinion, upId. at 380, 530 A.2d at 385.
Id. at 376-79, 530 A.2d at 383-85.
Id. at 378, 530 A.2d at 385.
386 Id. at 379, 530 A.2d at 385.
387 216 NJ. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1987).
388 Id. at 462, 524 A.2d at 431 (quoting Memorandum 85-259, issued by Police
Director Knox).
389 Id. at 463, 524 A.2d at 432. The Memorandum provided in pertinent part:
Effective 0001 hours, December 12th, 1985, all members of the Narcotic
Bureau shall be required to take a urinalysis and blood test. Furthermore, any transfer into the Unit shall be predicated upon a successful
urinalysis and blood test. Any request of transfer to the Narcotic Bureau shall be forwarded with the understanding that a urinalysis exam
and blood test is required as part of the assignment, both upon transfer
and at least twice a year afterwards.
Id. at 463, 524 A.2d at 431.
390 Id. at 465-66, 524 A.2d at 433.
383
384
385
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held the city's right, to conduct mass urinalyses. The court ordered, however, that the tests must be performed pursuant to the
39
detailed chain-of-custody guidelines set forth in the judgment. '
The FOP appealed, and the appellate court reversed the law division. 92 Without making any reference to the conflicting language in Allen, the court held that drug urinalysis testing without
individual reasonable suspicion violated article one, paragraph
seven of the New Jersey constitution. 9 3
While recognizing that the federal fourth amendment may
also be applicable, the court declared that the New Jersey constitution afforded greater protection to the rights of individuals. s 9
391 Id. at 465, 524 A.2d at 432-33. These guidelines, which were attached as an
appendix to the appellate opinion, set out in painstaking detail the methods and
procedures to be followed. It provided for method of selection, sampling procedure, chain-of-custody, laboratory protocols, and confidentiality safeguards. It also
required thirty days notice before implementation, and before any changes could
be made in the procedure. See id. at 478-84, 524 A.2d at 439-41 (appendix).
392 Id. at 478, 524 A.2d at 439.
393 Id. at 477, 524 A.2d at 438. The New Jersey constitutional provision on
searches, which is almost identical to the fourth amendment of the Federal Constitution, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the papers and things to be seized.
N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 7.
394 FraternalOrder of Police, 216 N.J. Super. at 477-78, 524 A.2d at 438-39. In a
similar New York case, the court stated sua sponte that "resort to the State Constitution, in addition to the Federal, is particularly apt when the result under Federal
law is uncertain." Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70
N.Y.2d 57, 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 460 (1987) (drug testing of school teachers). The
court, however, rendered 'its decision on the basis of both constitutions. Id. at 70,
517 N.Y.S.2d at 462. The majority's decision to include the state constitution elicited strong criticism from Judge Simons. He felt that a determination on state
grounds should have waited until after the United States Supreme Court had ruled
on the issue. Invoking state grounds at this stage, he declared, was being used to
"preempt the Supreme Court and avoid its upsetting our interpretation of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 72, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 464 (Simons, J., concurring).
Viewed from the federal side, the only recent drug testing case in which a federal district court declined jurisdiction in deference to a state constitutional provision, was overruled on appeal. Guiney v. Roache, 833 F.2d 1079, 1080 (1st Cir.
1987). This case involved Boston police patrolmen who brought an action under
the federal constitution. The court, however, decided sua sponte that Article 14 of
the Commonwealth's constitution was "potentially dispositive" of the issue, and
refused to hear the case. See Guiney v. Roache, 654 F. Supp. 1287, 1298 (D. Mass.),
vacated, 833 F.2d 1079 (lst Cir. 1987). Citing Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 ( 1941), the district court observed that where there are
unsettled issues of state constitutional law, the federal courts should abstain from
the case, particularly if the constitutional provision in question "is substantively
different from the federal provision at issue." Guiney, 654 F. Supp. at 1298 (cita-
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Despite this assertion, the court considered and adopted a large
body of precedent decided under the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 95 Judge Gaulkin, writing for the appellate division, reiterated that urinalysis is a search, and as such
it should not be conducted without a warrant. Citing federal precedent, he nevertheless conceded that warrantless searches may
be allowed where the search falls within a specific exception to
the warrant requirement or where there is probable cause to believe the search will produce evidence of the suspected violation."39 Otherwise, he stated, the warrantless search must be
subjected to the "overall reasonableness" analysis. 9 7 Citing
Capua, among other cases, Judge Gaulkin indicated that the overwhelming majority of the reported cases equate reasonableness
with individualized suspicion. 9 8
Reviewing previous case law, he noted that the consensus of
tions omitted). The court pointed out, however, that where the state provision "is
modeled on or substantively identical to a federal constitutional provision, there
are no uniquely state interests at stake, and the policies underlying Pullman abstention would not be served by abstaining in order to allow a state court to interpret
the ... rule in light of the state constitution." Id. (citations omitted). Noting that
Article 14 of the Commonwealth's constitution had been "explicitly" interpreted by
the state's highest court "to be independent of the Fourth Amendment and to provide greater substantive protection than the Fourth Amendment, at least with respect to determining the existence of probable cause[,]" the court concluded that
abstention was required. Id. at 1299. On appeal, the First Circuit vacated the district court's decision, holding that Article 14 was almost exactly parallel to the
fourth amendment and thus abstention was not required. Guiney, 833 F.2d at 108384. But see State v. Kirk, 202 NJ. Super. 28, 35, 493 A.2d 1271, 1274 (App. Div.
1985) (article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey constitution, although almost identical to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, it nevertheless has
been interpreted to confer greater protection of individual rights than the parallel
provision in the federal constitution). In another case, involving NewJersey corrections officer trainees, the court decided the constitutional issues under federal law
and reserved decision on the state claim pending resolution of contested points of
law by state courts. See Poole v. Stephens, 688 F. Supp. 149 (D.N.J. 1988). See supra
notes 362-66 and accompanying text.
The United States Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of independent state
grounds rather than federal grounds to resolve constitutional issues in state courts.
This is only allowed, however, if the state court makes "a plain statement in its
judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of
guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached."
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). Moreover, the Court stressed that
there must be justifiable state grounds: "If the state court decision indicates clearly
and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision." Id.
395 See FraternalOrderof Police, 216 N.J. Super. at 466-68, 470-72, 524 A.2d at 43336.
396 Id. at 466-67, 524 A.2d at 433-34.
397 Id. at 470, 524 A.2d at 435.
398 Id. at 471, 524 A.2d at 435-36.
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the opinions had found "an important and legitimate" state interest in insuring a drug-free environment. 399 He also stated

public employees have lower expectations of privacy. 400 However, he added that these findings did not outweigh the need for
individualized suspicion "in absence of a factual showing that
drug use is widespread among the affected employees or that it
presents an identifiable risk to the public." 40 1 The "reasonable

suspicion standard," he concluded, fairly balances the interests
of both employer and employee. 40 2 At the time this opinion was
written, there were only four reported cases upholding government mandated random testing outside of the military. Three
concerned employees on the government payroll: guards at maximum security prisons,40 3 an FBI agent,40 4 and nuclear plant employees.40 5 Judge Gaulkin explained that in these cases "the
public need for such testing, although not specifically proved,
was sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion.

' 40 6

The

fourth case, Shoemaker v. Handel, he dismissed as involving "a different mix of public and private interests" inapplicable to the
present case.40 7 Observing that Shoemaker was applicable only to
highly regulated private industries, he stated unequivocally that
the policy force is neither a "highly-regulated industry" nor a
Id. at 472, 524 A.2d at 436 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted). However, in a case decided a few days after Fraternal
Order of Police, the United States Supreme Court held that an employee retained a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his desk and office furniture.
See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987) (plurality opinion).
401 FraternalOrder of Police, 216 N.J. Super. at 472-73, 524 A.2d at 436.
402 Id. at 473, 524 A.2d at 436. In support of the court's position, Judge Gaulkin
also mentioned the Law Enforcement Drug Screening Guidelines issued by the
state attorney general, W. Cary Edwards, on October 22, 1986. Id. at 475, 524
A.2d at 438. These guidelines call for surprise mandatory testing of police recruits,
but provide for drug testing of permanent officers only upon individualized reasonable suspicion. While acknowledging that these guidelines were not binding on the
court, Judge Gaulkin noted that they reinforced the court's "conclusions from this
record that the public interest does not require police officers to be subjected to
[mass] drug testing." Id. at 475-76, 524 A.2d at 438.
403 McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (random testing upheld
for corrections employees who came in contact with inmates).
404 Mack v. United States, 653 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing testing of
FBI agent without reasonable suspicion), aff'd, 814 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1987).
405 Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987),
aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that nuclear public utility employees
already subject to constant surveillance, physical checks, and electronics searches
for weapons and explosives have diminished privacy expectations and cannot object to random testing).
406 Fraternal Order of Police, 216 N.J. Super. at 473-74, 524 A.2d at 437.
407 Id. at 474 n.8, 524 A.2d at 437 n.8.
399
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While he acknowledged that police

officers are under strict statutory and administrative controls, he
emphasized that these controls could not be equated with the
"close supervision and inspection" imposed on sensitive industries. 4 9 Furthermore, he indicated that Shoemaker may well be an
oddity "out of step" with the trend in the law.410
In his concluding remarks, Judge Gaulkin emphasized the
advantages of deciding the case under the New Jersey constitution. Aside from the higher level of protection for individual
rights, he also mentioned such procedural advantages as avoiding "needless review in the United States Supreme Court" which
could lead to "subsequent redundant proceedings in our own
courts."' 4 11 Moreover, he observed that there is an urgent need

for a reliable constitutional standard: "There is clearly a necessity
for our giving firm guidance to our own public employers and
employees and to limit the
prospect of disarray in decisional
'
treatment of the question. 412
4.

Consent

Generally, uncoerced consent to a search serves as waiver of
the warrant or the probable cause requirement. 4 13 Certainly, employees who knowingly consent to a search give up their reasonable expectation of privacy.4 14 They do not, however, waive all
Id. at 469, 524 A.2d at 434-35.
Id. (citing In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 312-13, 447 A.2d 1290, 1298 (1982)).
Id. at 470 n.7, 524 A.2d at 435 n.7 (quoting Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc.2d 544,
556, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 798 (1986), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551
(1987)). The Caruso court had stated that "Shoemaker ... on close examination is
either not applicable to the facts in the instant proceeding, or is clearly distinguishable therefrom or simply out of step with the rest of the authorities." Caruso, 133
Misc.2d at 556, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 798. This sentiment has been echoed by various
other courts. See Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F.Supp. 815 (E.D.Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846
F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1988); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of
Educ. of the Patchogue-Medford Union Free School Dist., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505
N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987). See also American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 734 (S.D. Ga. 1986)
("As to the enigmatic case of Schoemaker v. Handel, it has been referred to but has
been rejected or distinguished by all of the courts that have dealt with the
mandatory drug testing of law enforcement personnel subsequent to the Shoemaker
decision.").
411 FraternalOrder of Police, 216 N.J. Super. at 478, 524 A.2d at 439.
412 Id. at 477-78, 524 A.2d at 439.
413 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
414 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233-34; Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593
(1946).
408
409
410
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their constitutional rights by consenting to a search.4 15 If the
search is unreasonable, consent, whether express or implied, will
not cure the constitutional infirmity. Requiring "advance consent to future unreasonable searches is not a reasonable condition
of employment. "416
In the context of drug testing, courts have tended to find
implied consent where they have found random or mass testing
constitutionally acceptable. Such consent has often been called
"voluntariness" and it has been explained in various ways. One
court clearly defined it as "voluntarily seeking employment in a
covered position knowing in advance of the urinalysis requirement. 41 7 Another described it as choosing to work in a highly
regulated occupation knowing that such regulations may entail
invasions of privacy.4 18 Others identify it as simply signing a consent form. 41 9 The United States Supreme Court has defined

"voluntariness" (in a criminal context) ultimately as "a question
of fact to be determined from all the circumstances" surrounding
a particular case.42 ° In Shoemaker, Judge Brotman for the district
court, and later Judge Gibbons for the Third Circuit, concluded
that the jockeys had given their tacit consent to urinalysis by
seeking a license to race in New Jersey. 42 1 The other NewJersey
opinions, however, did not endorse the idea that fourth amendment restrictions could be evaded through consent.4 22 Here as
in other jurisdictions, the interpretation of valid consent seems to
be directly related to the court's approval or rejection of random
drug testing.
415 See Comment: Random Drug Testing of Government Employees: A ConstitutionalProcedure, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1353 (1987).. In his extensive analysis of consent as
a means of eliminating fourth amendment limitations, the author describes the difference between waiver and consent: "If one consents to a government investigation, it is not a search. If one waives constitutional rights, then a search occurs; one
merely does not contest such activity." Id. at 1353 n.79.
416 McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting McDonell
v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. Iowa 1985)).
417 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 178 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
418 See Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1524-25 (D.
Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
419 McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1310.
420 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
421 See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1141-42.
422 Policeman'sBenevolent Ass'n, 672 F. Supp. at 789; FraternalOrder of Police, 216
NJ. Super. at 466 n.4, 524 A.2d at 433 n.4. See alvo Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1518-19;
Allen, 219 N.J. Super. 377-79, 530 A.2d 384-85.
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As it now appears, the New Jersey cases show a microcosm of
current fourth amendment analysis of drug testing. Although
there is considerable disarray in the opinions across the nation,
there remains some consensus on the basic ways to approach the
problem. These "common threads" were best summarized by

Judge Mandak in Allen v. Passaic County:
1. Whether the urinalysis is conducted as part of a criminal investigation or for some other reason such as employment is a very significant factor of consideration.
2. In order to relax the probable cause requirement the
test to be applied is whether the search is reasonable and that
requires a balancing of the need, supported by the promotion
of a legitimate government interest, against the intrusiveness
of the search relative to the individual's expectation of
privacy.4 23
The disagreement is centered on whether random or mass-testing rises to the level of unacceptable intrusion. The cases that have
upheld dragnet testing have also found an actual or implied valid
consent to the test. They usually involve activities or enterprises
that are either highly regulated or present a danger to the general
public.4 2 4 But so, it could be argued, are the activities of policemen
and fire fighters and yet they usually have been found deserving of a
higher constitutional protection.
This is not unique to the Third Circuit.4 2 5 What makes the split
in the New Jersey cases remarkable, is that although the first case
heard and affirmed by the Third Circuit should have established the
constitutionality of random testing as a binding precedent, it has
generally not been followed by the other courts in the jurisdiction.
The majority of the New Jersey federal courts, and all of the state
423 Allen, 219 N.J. Super. at 373-74, 530 A.2d at 382. Judge Mandak added two
other basic points of agreement pertaining exclusively to correctional institutions:
3. Employees in penal and correctional institutions do not, by virtue of their employment, lose all of their Fourth Amendment rights.
4. Correctional facility security considerations reduce the scope of
the reasonable expectation of privacy that one normally holds and
makes reasonable some intrusions that would not be reasonable outside
the facility.
Id. at 374, 530 A.2d at 382.
424 See supra notes 403-05.
425 Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507 (11 th Cir. 1987) (fire fighter); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1563 (5th Cir. 1988)
(police officers); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (fire fighters); Turner v. Fraternal Order
of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985) (police officers).
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courts that subsequently examined the issue, have either distinguished or side-stepped Shoemaker, or both. Nevertheless, the Shoemaker view may well be the one that ultimately prevails. After all, the
Supreme Court has already tacitly endorsed the Third Circuit's
opinion by refusing to grant certification.4 2 6
B.

Other Constitutional Challenges

Although the bulk of the drug testing litigation has revolved
around federal fourth amendment rights, plaintiffs have often added a few other constitutional arguments to bolster their claims.
These challenges usually include the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination;4 2 7 the fifth and fourteenth amendment
rights of due process and equal protection, 4 28 and the fundamental right to privacy, sometimes brought under the ninth amendment.4 2 9 Some of the New Jersey cases have addressed these
concerns with, again, varying results.
1.

Self-incrimination

Both state and federal courts have almost unanimously
agreed that while the search and seizure provisions of the fourth
amendment apply to urinalysis, the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination does not.4 " The fifth amendment protects individuals accused of a crime from being compelled to disclose inculpatory information about themselves. 43'
This
protection is now enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment.43 2 It has also been independently incorporated into the New Jersey common law.43 3
While the privilege against self-incrimination has been exShoemaker, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
See infra notes 430-44 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 445-74 (due process), 475-507 (equal protection) and accompanying text.
429 See infra notes 508-35 and accompanying text.
430 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); Burka v. New York City Transit
Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 611-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power
Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1527-28 (D. Neb. 1987), aft'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir.
1988); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F.
Supp. 1560, 1571 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
431 The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person ...
shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CoNsT.,
amend. V., cl. 3.
432 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
433 In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 331, 447 A.2d 1290, 1309 (1982).
426
427
428
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panded to include all jurisdictions, it has remained very narrow
in scope. It can only be invoked in criminal proceedings,434 and
it applies only to verbal communications, that is, to "evidence of
a testimonial or communicative nature," not to physical evidence.435 The United States Supreme Court has excluded such
concrete evidence as a blood specimen,436 a voice sample,437 a
line-up identification,43 8 and even a handwriting exemplar,4 39
holding that these were mere indications of "physical characteristics" and not disclosures of personal knowledge by the
accused.440

None of the New Jersey cases developed a full analysis of the
self-incrimination implications. The only plaintiffs who even
bothered to plead violation of the privilege were the jockeys in
Shoemaker, and the district court dismissed their claim in one
short paragraph. Pointing out that sanctions for drug use involved only civil administrative penalties, Judge Brotman
stressed that the State Division of Criminal Justice had no intention either to seek or to use the information obtained through
urinalysis for criminal prosecution. 44 1 The issue was not raised

on appeal.
All the other opinions indicated in various ways that employees testing positive could be subjected to some form of disciplinary proceeding, but generally gave no indication that criminal
charges would be forthcoming. 442 The only exception is found in
Capua v. City of Plainfield, in which the fire fighter plaintiffs had
been threatened with criminal prosecution. 443 Even in Capua the
plaintiffs did not allege violation of the privilege, preferring to
base their claims entirely on the fourth amendment. Notwithstanding the complaint, Judge Sarokin held, sua sponte, that plain434 See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956) (citation omitted) (selfincrimination clause does not apply absent threatened criminal actions). See also
Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1528; Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1107.
435 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 & n.5 (1966).
436 Id.

437 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973).
438 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967).
439 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967).
440 Wade, 388 U.S. at 222.

441 Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1107.

442 See Policeman'sBenevolent Ass'n, 672 F. Supp. at 782 (drug testing not intended
for purposes of criminal prosecution); FraternalOrder of Police, 216 N.J. Super. at
483, 524 A.2d at 441 (officers testing positive may be subject to disciplinary proceedings); Allen, 219 N.J. Super. at 369-70, 530 A.2d at 380 (urinalysis not intended
as a means to gather evidence for prosecution).
443 Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1512.
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tiffs' rights against self-incrimination had been impaired,
although he based his holding on the "threat of immediate discharge" and not on the danger of criminal prosecution. 444 It is
very doubtful, however, that urinalysis will ever be accorded fifth
amendment protection. Even if positive tests were to lead to
criminal charges, the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to extend the privilege beyond verbal testimonial communications
makes Judge Sarokin's conclusion highly unlikely. If the results
of a blood test are not considered self-incriminatory, the results
of a urine test could hardly be found to be so.
2.

Due Process

The constitutional right of due process of law is guaranteed
by both the fifth 445 and the fourteenth amendments 446 to the
United States Constitution. Both amendments impose equal due
process constraints upon individuals acting under color of government authority. The difference lies in the origin of the power
to act: the fifth amendment applies only to actions based on federal legislation, while the fourteenth amendment imposes restraints only on actions derived from state law.4 4 7 Due process is
also guaranteed by many state constitutions.448
There is no exact definition of the expression "due process
of law." ' 44 9 It is usually defined in a functional manner within the
context of the legal problem to be solved.45 ° Most commonly,
courts simply enunciate precepts to insure that proper procedures are used before depriving citizens of their life, their liberty,
or their property. Such procedures must include adequate notice
444 Id. at 1521. "By compelling plaintiffs to participate in the urine testing under
the threat of immediate discharge, defendants effectively coerced a waiver of any
rights, including the right against self-incrimination, plaintiffs may have had under the
collective bargaining agreement to challenge such unilateral action." Id. (emphasis
added).
445 The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be
...deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .....
U.S.
CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
446 The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
447 Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 319-20 (1892); Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
448 See 16 AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 804, & n.95 (1979).
449 See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898).
450 See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960); Brock v. North Carolina, 344
U.S. 424, 427-28 (1953).
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and an opportunity to be heard through a fair contest.4" 5 ' However, although the phrase "due process" conjures up procedural
connotations, the United States Supreme Court has also recognized the existence of "substantive" due process.

4 52

Generally,

substantive due process purports to guarantee that a person's
life, liberty or property will not be withheld for arbitrary reasons. 4 53 It applies to situations where the government uses procedural sound methods to achieve unacceptable goals.4 4 In
order to overcome the substantive due process claim the object
of any legislation must be rationally related to a compelling state
interest. 455 Random and mass testing programs have been often
challenged under both types of due process. 456 The majority of
these challenges have been aimed at summary discharges without
notice or hearing. This discussion, however, is restricted to due
process challenges relating to the process of testing. Claims of due
process violations in the disciplinary treatment of employees after
testing has taken place, are beyond the scope of this
457
Comment.
451 Mullane v. Central Hanover & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950). In
1976, the Supreme Court set forth the necessary standards for evaluating due process violations:
[Olur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (citation omitted).
452 See Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229-30 (1985)
(Powell, J., concurring).
453 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 537, 539 (1934). This doctrine, as
applied to economic legislation has been greatly discredited in recent years. See
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963).
454 See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986).
455 See Kelley v.Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
456 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988) (substantive due process); Mack v.
United States, 814 F.2d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1987) (procedural due process); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (procedural
due process); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency,
663 F. Supp. 1560, 1569 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (procedural due process); Rushton v.
Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562
(8th Cir. 1988) (substantive and procedural due process); Capua, 643 F. Supp. at
1511, 1520-21 (procedural due process).
457 See Comment, Yellow Rows of Test Tubes, supra note 1, for an extensive discus-
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Procedural due process challenges to the testing programs
are usually based on lack of procedural safeguards.4 58 At least
one case has found a procedural due process violation in the lack
of notice inherent in surprise mass urinalysis.45 9 Substantive due
process challenges are usually directed at the lack of reliability of
the chosen testing methods and at the lack of a compelling state
interest. 460 Unfortunately, the courts at times seem to confuse
the two types of due process. 4 6 1 The procedural due process

claim as it refers to lack of notice is hard to defeat. One possible
defense would be to insure that there is ample forewarning
before a testing program is activated. 462 The absence of procedural safeguards will almost certainly defeat any government
drug testing program, while their existence will not necessarily
guarantee approval.463 In truth, there is no hard and fast guideline of what constitutes minimum standards. Courts are not always willing to supply benchmarks. 4 4
Substantive due process claims against the reliability of tests
can usually be defeated by insuring that the immunoassays are
confirmed by a reliable back-up test.465 Courts have allowed disciplinary actions against prison inmates on the basis of double
sion of this aspect of drug testing.
458 See Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1526 (lack of safeguards).
459 See Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1521 (testing without notice).
460 See Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1512-13 (11th Cir. 1987) (compelling
state interest); National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 181-82 (reliability of
tests); Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1525 (reliability of tests).
461 See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F.
Supp. 1560, 1569-70 (C.D. Cal. 1987). The court analyzed the "procedural" due
process implications of using allegedly unreliable tests. Id.
462 See Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1527. See also Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1521. "Such
testing was unilaterally imposed by defendants as a condition of employment without prior notice to plaintiffs and without opportunity for plaintiffs to voice objections or seek the advice of counsel." Id. Note, however, that in Policeman's
Benevolent Association,Judge Rodriguez indicated that the Capua decision would not
have been different even if all the procedural objections had been cured by the
defendants. Policeman's Benevolent Ass 'n, 672 F. Supp. at 789. See supra note 344 and
accompanying text.
463 See Egloff v. NewJersey Air Nat'l Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275 (D.N.J. 1988). See
also Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1521; Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, 672 F. Supp. at 789;
Allen, 219 N.J. Super. at 379, 530 A.2d at 385.
464 See Egloff, 684 F. Supp. at 1281-82; Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1526. But cf.
McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987); Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F.
Supp. 1504, 1514 (N.D. Ind. 1985); FraternalOrder of Police, 216 N.J. Super. at 465,
524 A.2d at 432-33.
465 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181-82
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1309;
Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1525. See also supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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EMIT@ tests (original test and confirmation), 46 6 and even on the
basis of a single test. 4 6 7 There is no record of any court allowing

discharge of government employees on the basis of EMIT@ tests
alone. This is not surprising considering that even the most accurate immunoassays are less than 100% reliable.468 On the
other hand, at least one court had held that conclusive evidence
can be less than 100% accurate. In Peranzo v. Coughlin,469 Judge
Sand stated that 95% probability of accuracy was sufficient to
meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in prisoner's
drug testing accusatory proceedings. 470 As for the compelling

state interest, it is generally conceded that the state, as employer,
may have a legitimate interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace. 4 7 ' Few courts, however, have found this interest compel-

ling enough to overcome a substantive due process challenge.4 72
The Third Circuit cases mostly either ignore or barely mention due process issues. The only Third Circuit opinion to give
the subject moderate consideration is Capua v. City of Plainfield. In
Capua, Judge Sarokin found that both the unannounced mass
testing and the lack of procedural safeguards were a "flagrant
violation of the due process rights that inure to plaintiffs under
both the New Jersey statutory regulations and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

'4 7'

He criticized

particularly the lack of standards for protection of the fire fighters' personal physiological information which had so unexpectedly been placed in the custody of government authorities.
Noting that the reliability and accuracy of the EMIT@ tests were
open to question, he held that "defendant's refusal to afford
plaintiff a full opportunity to evaluate and review their personal
466 See Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504, 1512 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Peranzo v.
Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1514 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Contra In re Brown, 132
Misc.2d 686, 689, 505 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
467 Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226, 230 (W.D. Ky. 1985); Jensen v. Lick, 589
F. Supp. 35, 39 (D.N.D. 1984). These cases fly in the face of the current admonitions of both the legal and the scientific community which call for confirmation by a
different more reliable method. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
468 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
469 608 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
470 See id. at 1512 (quoting United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), aft'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980)).
471 See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 594 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
472 See, e.g., Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th Cir. 1987); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 v. 170, 173, 181 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
473 Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1521.
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test results or to have their own specimens re-tested by a technician of their choice offends traditional notions of fundamental
fairness and due process. 4 74
3.

Equal Protection

Drug testing programs have occasionally also been challenged on the ground of equal protection violations. 47' The
fourteenth amendment is the only provision in the United States
Constitution which guarantees the equal protection of the laws to
all inhabitants of the Union.4 76 It is not, however, "the exclusive
fount of doctrine in this area" of the law. 477 In the century-plus
since its ratification the meaning of the phrase "equal protection" has gradually evolved into a major constitutional tenet.
The Supreme Court has recognized that its interpretations of the
amendment have "never been confined to historic notions of
equality. '478 The equal protection clause is merely a standard:
"Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties. The function of the Equal Protection Clause,
rather, is simply to measure the validity of classificationscreated by
state laws." '479 It protects against dissimilar treatment of individuals who are similarly situated. 8 In this century, the equal protection clause has been made applicable to actions of the federal
government through the due process clause of the fifth
Id.
475 See Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 592 (9th Cir.),
474

cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th
Cir. 1987); Chappelle v. Rice, No. 87 C 4494 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1988) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590,
601 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 647 F. Supp. 274, 281-87
(N.D. Ohio 1986), rev'd, 838 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F.
Supp. 1089, 1105, (D.N.J. 1985) aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 57
U.S. 3392 (1986).
476 The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV 1, cl. 4.
477 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 992 (1978).
478 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, clearly asserted that "the Equal Protection Clause is
not shackled to the political theory of a particular era .... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change." Id.
(emphasis in original).
479 San Antonio Independent School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
480 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) (quoting Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 333-34 (1921).
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amendment.48 '
Originally intended as a guarantee of racial equality, this
clause is now a tool for implementing not only the right of every
person to be treated by the government "as an equal," but also,
"with respect to a limited set of interests[,]" for safeguarding
everyone's "right to equal treatment."' 48 2 Judicial review normally

looks beyond the letter of the legislation to its original intent and
its ultimate impact. Just like substantive due process does not
allow procedurally sound means to achieve or cover-up undesirable state actions, the equal protection clause also does not
condone seemingly innocent regulations which are unconstitutionally motivated and administered in a race-dependent
manner, or those that have a clearly discriminatory impact.483
Not all discriminatory behavior is unconstitutional. Under
the traditional standard for evaluating equal protection violations, the government is allowed to exercise disparate treatment
of individuals so long as the government action is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 484 The existence of
alternate, perhaps less discriminatory means will not automatically disqualify the government action. Nor is it necessary that
every stated goal be attained,48 5 or that the classification be allinclusive.486 It is only when the state action affects fundamental
rights or when it involves certain types of classifications that
higher, stricter, standards must be applied.48 7 Classifications inBoiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
L. TRIBE, supra note 477, at 992-93 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218,
231 (1964) (footnote omitted) ("Whatever non-racial grounds might support a
State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as
constitutional."); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960) ("[A] constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional
result.") (quoting Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114
(1918)); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (ordinances neutral on their
face but administered "with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a
practical denial by the State of [the] equal protection of the laws"). But see Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (illicit motivation alone is insufficient to
violate the equal protection clause).
484 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40
(1973).
485 Id. at 51.
486 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314, 316 (1976).
"Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary." Id. at 314 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
487 San Antonio Independent School Dist., 411 U.S. at 60, 61 (Stewart, J., concurring).
There are two higher levels of scrutiny. At the highest level are fundamental rights
and "suspect" or "invidious" classifications which call for strict scrutiny and a com481
482
483

756

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. .18:679

volving availability of employment have traditionally been analyzed under the rational basis standard.4 88
As it pertains to drug testing litigation, equal protection
claims have revolved around selective targeting of certain classes
of employees for random or mass testing. None of the challenges have so far been successful. Such challenges include
transit union employees claiming disparate treatment of drug
abusers in comparison to alcohol abusers; 48 9 probationary police
officers being subject to random urinalysis while non-probationary officers are tested only on the basis of reasonable suspicion; 490 and one firefighter who was singled out for urinalysis

from a group of suspected drug users.4 9 '
In one unusual case, a group of black police cadets who had
been subjected to urinalysis, challenged the use of immunoassays
charging that the tests had a disproportionate impact on minorities. In Shield Club v. City of Cleveland,492 the plaintiffs alleged
"that dark skin tone 'could' affect the outcome of an EMIT, RIA
or GC/MS marijuana screening test.

'49 3

According to some ex-

pert testimony, melanin, which is a basic component of dark pigmentation, "interfered" with the tests by tending to "hold and
congregate drugs. 494 This testimony was thoroughly discredited by opposing expert testimony.495 Holding that the evidence
as presented was insufficient to support the melanin theory, the
district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for additional discovery on the drug screening laboratory records.496 Nevertheless,
the court reserved decision on the discriminatory impact allegations until further proof of the melanin theory, while conceding
that, should the theory prove to be true, the tests would have to
pelling state interest. The first and foremost suspect classification is one based on
race, but in this level are also included classifications based on alienage and national origin. Id. A second, intermediate level calling for a less stringent judicial
review and a substantial state interest, consist of classifications based on gender or
illegitimacy. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976); Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
488 See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
489 See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 602 (S.D.N.Y.

1988).
490 See Chappelle v. Rice, No. 87C4494 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file).
491 See Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th Cir. 1987).
492 647 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ohio 1986), rev'd, 833 F.2d 138 (1987).
493 Id. at 284.
494 Id. at 277, 284, 286.
495 Id. at 284, & n.5.
496 Id. at 285.
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be found racially discriminatory. 497 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision denying plaintiffs' access to
additional information, and remanded the case for further discovery on the laboratory data.49 8
To date, two Third Circuit cases have considered claims of
violation of the equal protection clause. The jockeys in Shoemaker
contended that they were victims of unjust discrimination because they were the only individuals in the racing industry subject to urine testing by the racing commission. 4 99 Both the

district court and the court of appeals considered and rejected
this claim, but on different grounds. The district court based its
decision on safety considerations. After noting that this type of
government regulation need only show a "rational relationship"
to a legitimate state interest, Judge Brotman stated that the jockeys were the individuals bearing the highest risk, and, as such
were the natural objects of the legislation. "Safety concerns[,]"
he asserted, "are greatest during the running of the race, when
most serious accidents can occur.

' 50 0

On appeal, the jockeys

pointed out that since the drawing of the sample took place after
the race, the accident prevention reasoning did not apply. Judge
Gibbons, writing for the court, conceded the point, but held that
the regulation was sustainable on other grounds. 50 Falling back,
once more, on the regulated enterprise premise, he declared that
the State of New Jersey had an overriding interest in projecting a
clean image for the racing industry. "Substance abuse by jock497 Id. at 281, 285.
498 See Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 838 F.2d 138, 140 (6th Cir. 1987). Both
the lower court and the appellate court opinions were based on the interpretation
of a consent decree previously signed by both the Shield Club and the City pertaining to police hiring and retention procedures. See id. at 139-40; Shield Club, 647 F.
Supp. at 278-80. The lower court interpreted the decree as requiring that the city
adopt procedures that were "non-discriminatory or demonstrably job related" instead of "non-discriminatory and demonstrably job related." Shield Club, 838 F.2d
at 139 (emphasis in original). The Sixth Circuit stated that the original consent
decree language called for both standards, not either/or. Id. On that basis, the
appellate court held, "the amended consent decree automatically provides that all
relevant data must be supplied by the City." Id. at 139-40. The Sixth Circuit,
nonetheless, stressed that it did "not imply that the drug/urine test was in any way
impermissible not that evidence of drug injestion [sic] was not a valid, job related
ground for testing the qualification of cadets." Id. at 140. It was rather, the court
observed, that in cases such as this, it was advisable to give "broad latitude" to
discovery requests. Id.
499 Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1105. The jockeys also charged that "while jockeys, trainers, officials, and grooms are subject to breathalyzer testing, only jockeys
and officials are so tested." Id.
500 Id.
501 Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143-44.
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eys," he stated, "who are the most visible human participants in
the sport, could affect public confidence in the integrity of that
sport.

' 50 2

Noting that under equal protection principles, the

state could implement a policy in increments, he held that the
government was constitutionally entitled to address "the phase
of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative
03
mind."

5

Judge Bissell, in Poole v. Stephens, also considered and rejected an equal protection challenge. 50 4 The Poole drug testing
program was applicable only to a selected class of corrections
employees: those who came in direct extended contact with inmates.5 °5 As the jockeys in Shoemaker, the Poole plaintiffs claimed
that such underinclusion violated the equal protection clause to
the fourteenth amendment.50 6 Finding a reasonable state objective in limiting testing to those in the most "stressful situations,"
Judge Bissell held that the Commissioner could take a step at a
time or restrict the program to specific classification
indefinitely.50 7
4. Right of Privacy
Plaintiffs in drug testing cases have sometimes claimed a
"right of privacy" both in the act of urination 50 and in the contents of the urine.50 9 Protection of "privacy" is not a novel legal
concept. As a common law substantive interest, it predates the
federal constitution. 1 0 In modern times, the "right of privacy"
has evolved into three different legal concepts: (1) a common
law tort, (2) a statutory right, and (3) a constitutional fundamental right. 5 11 The common law tort provides legal and equitable
relief against invasions of privacy committed by private parties
which affect the solitude, personhood, or reputation of individuals.51 Various state and federal statutory provisions confer a tort
Id. at 1144.
Id. (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110
(1949)).
504 Poole v. Stephens, 688 F. Supp. at 156-57 (D.N.J. 1988).
505 Id. at 159 (exhibit a).
506 Id. at 156.
507 Id. at 157.
508 See infra notes 527-28.
509 See infra notes 520-26, 531-33.
510 See Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Texas State
Employees Union, 708 S.W.2d 498, 506 & n.6 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987) (mandatory polygraph testing).
511 Id. at 505.
512 See generally, 62 AM.JUR. 2d Privacy §§ 1-49 (1972); Zimmerman, Requiem for a
502
503
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right on citizens against certain invasions by the government. 513
These protections are based on clear-cut legal concepts articulated through well developed bodies of law. The constitutional
right of privacy, on the other hand, is a product of Supreme
Court opinions, mostly from cases decided during the past quarter of a century.51 4
This "fundamental right" is not plainly stated in the United
States constitution, but rather it is derived from various other
constitutional guarantees. In Griswold v. Connecticut,5" 5 the Court
held that a constitutional right of privacy may be implied from
the Bill of Rights. The Court cited the first amendment right of
association, the third amendment ban on peacetime forced quartering of soldiers in private homes, the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination, and the ninth
amendment retention of non-enumerated rights to the people.
Such constitutional provisions, the Court found, create "zones of
privacy" which protect the individual citizens against certain unreasonable governmental intrusions.516 Eight years later, the
Court held that the right of privacy was also supported by "the
concept of liberty guaranteed
by the first section of the Four51 7
teenth Amendment.1

Whether this new-found fundamental right of privacy is a
genuine right included within the original intent of the federal
constitution has been the subject of considerable controversy. It
certainly does not protect against all state intrusions into the affairs of individuals.51 8 Nevertheless, the right of privacy has now
become part of the American constitutional law. Academic discussions notwithstanding, later judicial decisions have dealt not
so much with the constitutional validity of the right, but with its
outer limitations. Subsequent to Griswold, the Court suggested
that the right of privacy is limited to government intrusions into
Heavyweight: A Fairwell to Warren and Brandeis'sPrivacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291,
296-97 (1983).
513 See L. TRIBE, supra note 477, at 895; Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to the
FederalLegal Aspects of the Right of Privacy, 43 L.Ed. 2d 871, 896-97 (1976).
514 See 3 G.B. TRUBOW, PRIVACY LAw & PRACTICE
19.01-19.03 (1987).
515 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
516 Id. at 484. Justice Douglas, writing the majority opinion, stated that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance." Id. (citations omitted).
517 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
518 See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 606 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
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non-criminal "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. "519 It may, however, extend to personal information. In
Whalen v. Roe, 52 1 the Supreme Court recognized "the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" to the
state. 52 ' This provision has been used in some cases to challenge

drug testing on the ground that urinalysis may uncover all sorts
of private physical information about the person being tested.522
The danger of privacy invasion is very real, but constitutionally untenable. In Whalen, the court determined that the individual's objection can be overcome if the purpose of the inquiry is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest and if
proper procedures are in place to protect confidentiality.5 23 In
New Jersey, the state Supreme Court has also instituted "a balancing test to resolve conflicts between governmental needs for
information and an individual's right of confidentiality.

'5 24

This

test, however, must be weighted in favor of "the narrowest
means which can be designed to achieve the public purpose. "525
On this basis, barring an actual breach of confidentiality or a
probability of disclosure, it6 is unlikely that a right of privacy viola52
tion could be sustained.

Claims offundamental right of privacy in the act of urination
are rare. 527 Such right has been defined as the "perceived indig519 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
520 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
521 Id. at 599 (footnote omitted). In this case, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a New York state law requiring physicians and pharmacists to report to a
"centralized computer file, the names and addresses of all persons who [had] obtained, pursuant to a doctor's prescription, certain drugs for which there is both a
lawful and an unlawful market." Id. at 591. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Stevens also rejected the contention "that a constitutional privacy right emanates
from the Fourth Amendment" of the. federal constitution. Id. at 604 n.32.
522 See Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1571-72
(C.D. Cal. 1987); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 586 (N.D. Ohio
1987); Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1528 (D. Neb.
1987), aft'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
523 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597-98, 601-02.
524 In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 318, 447 A.2d 1290, 1302 (1982).
525 Id. (quotingwith approval Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 140 N.J. Super. 250, 264, 356
A.2d 35, 43 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd o.b., 75 N.J. 459, 383 A.2d 428 (1978).
526 See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 592 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); see also Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1144; Rushton, 653
F. Supp. at 1528.
527 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 808 F.2d 1057,
1061 (5th Cir.), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 2479 (1987), (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring); Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1528.
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nity of the whole process, a perceived affront to personal identity
by the presence in the same room of another while engaging in a
private function. 5 s 28 Where the courts have recognized an in-

fringement of privacy they have preferred to address it in the
context of fourth amendment search and seizure protections
rather than rely on "penumbral" fundamental rights.529 Other
claims of a fundamental right to choose to use drugs during offduty hours have been summarily dismissed by the courts.530
In the Third Circuit, the only plaintiffs to challenge urinalysis under a right of privacy claim were the jockeys in Shoemaker
and the Poole corrections employees. The jockeys' original complaint alleged a violation both in the Commission's request for
information about prescription and non-prescription drugs prior
to testing, and in the possible breach of confidentiality after testing.
After finding a "substantial governmental interest" in
promoting the "safety and integrity" of the sport, Judge Brotman
held that the requested information was essential to furthering
the state's purposes. Such information, he pointed out, was used
in evaluating "positive" samples to determine whether the positive result may have been prescription drug induced.53 2 Judge
Brotman also found that the Commission's guidelines on chainof-custody and confidentiality were adequate to safeguard the
jockey's privacy interests.533 On appeal, the Third Circuit
echoed the lower court's opinion. Judge Gibbons, however, also
indicated that the right of privacy claim was actually not ripe for
adjudication since as yet there had been no breach of confidentiality.53 4 In Poole, Judge Bissell summarily dismissed the right of
privacy claim by declaring that the argument had already been
53
properly defeated in the Shoemaker opinion.

5

528 National Treasury Employees Union, 808 F.2d at 1061 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring).
529 Id.; Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663
F. Supp. 1560, 1571-72 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F.
Supp. 578, 586 (N.D. Ohio 1987); see Capua, 643 F. Supp. 1514-15. See also supra
notes 251-67 and accompanying text for infringement of expectation of privacy in
the context of fourth amendment analysis.
530 See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley 839 F.2d 575, 591 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); see also Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277
v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1571-72 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
531 Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1105.
532 Id. at 1106.
533 Id. at 1107.
534 Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1144.
535 Poole, 688 F. Supp. at 155 n.5.
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CONCLUSION

In examining the cases, it seems clear that expectation of privacy has been the key to whether or not a person should be required to submit to random testing. Plaintiffs challenging
random or mass testing have prevailed only on search and
seizure claims and only where courts found high privacy expectations in the testing subjects. None of the other constitutional
claims have survived judicial scrutiny. Despite the abundance of
case law across the nation, the decisions still rest on a poorly defined legal basis. Expectation of privacy is a subjective concept
which can be stretched or shrunken to meet a particular judge's
standards. Absent a clear national standard, each circuit, indeed
each district judge, can reinterpret and distinguish precedent almost at will. Such situation has led to some startlingly incongruous results.
It can be argued that there is something amiss with a system
which puts the confidence of the wagering public on the outcome
of a horse race ahead of the confidence of all the citizenry on the
integrity and competence of police officers and firefighters. Furthermore, since many of these constitutional restraints apply only
to the public sector, the result is a double standard which demands squeaky clean factory workers but tolerates possibly impaired law enforcement officers. Under current case law, we may
be protecting the individual rights of people in occupations vital
to the survival of the community at the expense of the community
itself, simply because these individuals happen to be working for
the government. The same police officers who cannot be tested
on a random basis by a municipality, would have to submit or
lose their jobs if they were employed by a private security service.
Yet, under both employers, the officer may be carrying the same
type of gun capable of inflicting the same damage. Moreover, as
a public law enforcement employee, a police officer has considerably more power and discretion than a private security employee.53 6 Such result makes a travesty of constitutional
536 The United States supreme Court has stressed the importance of maintaining
a reliable work force. This concern has been articulated recently by Justice
O'Connor in a case involving the workplace warrantless search of a federal employee's desk:
Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies
inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement
or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many
cases, public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility,
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guarantees. The framers of the Constitution intended to protect
individuals from the actions of the state as a governing entity, not
as an employer.
Although it is generally true that fundamental rights cannot
be waived through consent, expectations of privacy are perforce
based on notice. Any man or woman going into the military
knows-and if not, is soon appraised of the fact-that there is
little or no privacy in the armed forces. None is expected, therefore none can be claimed. However, not all the situations where
random testing would be justified necessarily involve a natural
lesser expectation of privacy. There is a profound logic in excepting from the reasonable suspicion requirement individuals in
critical positions. Where people are appraised well in advance of
the possibility of being subjected to random searches, random
selection should be available. The question then comes down to
which areas of human enterprise are so important to society at
large as to warrant a restricted expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court has found administrative searches of
food facilities, gun manufacturers and liquor retails sufficiently
critical to the well being of society to allow unannounced
searches. It has also indirectly endorsed warrantless searches in
the horse racing industry. In all cases it has been argued that the
deterrent effect is so significant, and the potential damage to society so great, that suspension of some constitutional rights is allowed. Based on this premise, random testing should be
implemented for activities which allow no room for error. Thus,
any occupation that potentially affects life and limb of a human
being should be a natural candidate for random selection. Such a
list would certainly include policemen, fire fighters, airline pilots,
but drivers, train conductors, crane operators, etc. Additionally,
occupations that affect the survival of the nation should also be
included.
The low expectation of privacy standard, of course, could
not always be imposed overnight. The present workforce in
many of these categories can credibly argue that it came into such
jobs with a high expectation of privacy. On the other hand, it has
been suggested that, under the "regulated enterprise" principle,
no government employee would be exempted as the government
and the consequences of their misconduct can be severe.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1502 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
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itself is the ultimate regulated enterprise. 5s Be that as it may,
reasonable suspicion could be the only constitutional standard
for the period of time necessary to put everyone concerned on
notice, or until the present individuals leave their occupations.
All new personnel coming into these positions would do so with
the understanding that their privacy would be curtailed.
Correspondingly, the subject of impairment must be addressed. If a national standard allowing some type of random
testing is established, the litigation will almost surely shift to determine standards of impairment. Because some prerogatives
would be abrogated, a positive/negative standard might no
longer be sufficient. It would then be necessary to establish appropriate benchmarks to determine impairment, while dismissal
or other corrective measures could not be imposed unless there
was clear evidence of impairment on the job. An impairment
standard will probably require re-examination of the constitutional safeguards against blood testing. On the other hand, it
will protect an employee's off-duty behavior. The current basic
measure in drug testing is consumption, much like the basic
criminal offense is possession, not ingestion. However, some
people may be "lawfully" impaired on over-the-counter medication, while others who test positive for controlled substances during long periods of time after consumption, could be totally
competent. There is no question that an impairment standard
would be more fair to the employees targeted for testing.
So far, impairment litigation is still in the future. The subject has only been discussed in a tangential basis by the cases.
The pressing problem at the moment is to find a common expectation of privacy standard. The United States Supreme Court has
agreed to hear at least two cases. 538 Hopefully, the Court will
issue clear guidelines that will end the confusion in federal
courts. It might, however, not be sufficient to settle all disputes.
If the latest trend toward utilizing the broad provisions of state
constitutions continue, a national federal standard allowing random testing may have a limited impact. The ultimate battle for
state employees will probably be fought in state courts which may
537 See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 608 n.30
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("In a sense, government employees aren't intensely regulated;
rather, as workers for the government, they are in essence totally regulated .... ").
538 See, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988) (U.S. Customs' employees); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
2033 (1988) (railroad employees).
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keep state employers to a more restricted standard than the federal courts might be willing to impose.
C. Maria Flynn

